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ABSTRACT 
 
This research focuses on developing methodologies to model the damage and recovery of 
interdependent infrastructure systems under disruptive events for community resilience planning. 
The overall research can be broadly divided into two parts: developing a model to simulate the 
post-disaster performance of interdependent infrastructure systems and developing decision 
frameworks to support pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster recovery planning of the 
interdependent infrastructure systems towards higher resilience.  
The Dynamic Integrated Network (DIN) model is proposed in this study to simulate the 
performance of interdependent infrastructure systems over time following disruptive events. It 
can consider three different levels of interdependent relationships between different 
infrastructure systems: system-to-system level, system-to-facility level and facility-to-facility 
level. The uncertainties in some of the modeling parameters are modeled. The DIN model first 
assesses the inoperability of the network nodes and links over time to simulate the damage and 
recovery of the interdependent infrastructure facilities, and then assesses the recovery and 
resilience of the individual infrastructure systems and the integrated network utilizing some 
network performance metrics. The recovery simulation result from the proposed model is 
compared to two conventional models, one with no interdependency considered, and the other 
one with only system-level interdependencies considered. The comparison results suggest that 
ignoring the interdependencies between facilities in different infrastructure systems would lead to 
poorly informed decision making. The DIN model is validated through simulating the recovery of 
the interdependent power, water and cellular systems of Galveston City, Texas after Hurricane Ike 
(2008).  
Implementing strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation plan to improve the resilience of the 
interdependent infrastructure systems is essential for enhancing the social security and economic 
prosperity of a community. Majority of the existing infrastructure risk mitigation studies or 
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projects focus on a single infrastructure system, which may not be the most efficient and effective 
way to mitigate the loss and enhance the overall community disaster resilience. This research 
proposes a risk-informed decision framework which could support the pre-disaster risk mitigation 
planning of several interdependent infrastructure systems. The characteristics of the 
Interdependent Infrastructure Risk Mitigation (IIRM) decision problem, such as objective, 
decision makers, constraints, etc., are clearly identified. A four-stage decision framework to solve 
the IIRM problem is also presented. The application of the proposed IIRM decision framework is 
illustrated using a case study on pre-disaster risk mitigation planning for the interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems in Jamaica. The outcome of the IIRM problem is useful for the decision 
makers to allocate limited risk mitigation budget or resources to the most critical infrastructure 
facilities in different systems to achieve greater community disaster resilience. 
Optimizing the post-disaster recovery of damaged infrastructure systems is essential to 
alleviate the adverse impacts of natural disasters to communities and enhance their disaster 
resilience. As a result of infrastructure interdependencies, the complete functional restoration of a 
facility in one infrastructure system relies on not only the physical recovery of itself, but also the 
recovery of the facilities in other systems that it depends on. This study introduces the 
Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Planning (IIRP) problem, which aims at optimizing the 
assignment and scheduling of the repair teams for an infrastructure system with considering the 
repair plan of the other infrastructure systems during the post-disaster recovery phase. Key 
characteristics of the IIRP problem are identified and a game theory-based IIRP decision 
framework is presented. Two recovery time-based performance metrics are introduced and 
applied to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the post-disaster recovery plan. The IIRP 
decision framework is illustrated using the interdependent power and water systems of the 
Centerville virtual community subjected to seismic hazard. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
The disaster resilience of communities or infrastructure systems is related to their ability 
to withstand the disruptive events and recover rapidly from the disruptions. Community 
resilience depends on the performance of its built environment, including buildings and 
infrastructure systems, and socioeconomic systems which are essential for the immediate 
response, short-term restoration and long-term recovery of a community following a disaster. 
Improving community resilience requires coordinated efforts of experts from multiple disciplines, 
including environmental science, engineering, sociology, information science, economics, etc. As 
a starting point, the research presented in this dissertation addresses the community resilience 
planning issue by focusing on the disaster risk management of the critical infrastructure systems 
in a community.   
Nowadays, infrastructure systems rarely operate on their own. The normal operation of one 
facility in a system usually depends on the functioning of several other facilities, including those 
in other systems for product input and information sharing. Thus, when an infrastructure system is 
damaged and its service is disrupted, the disruption would soon propagate to other systems that 
depend on this damaged system and result in a widespread disruption of lifeline services. The need 
for considering infrastructure interdependencies in infrastructure disaster risk management for 
community resilience has been highlighted by the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection since 1997 (Foundations, 1997), and has been noted from the 
performance of the infrastructure systems under natural and manmade disasters in recent decades, 
such as 9/11 terrorist attack (2001), Hurricane Katrina (2005), Wenchuan earthquake and 
landslide (2008), Joplin tornado (2011), Superstorm Sandy (2012), Nepal earthquake (2015), 
Bangladesh monsoon flooding (2017), Indonesia earthquake and tsunami (2018) and so on. 
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Although the occurrence of natural or manmade hazards is unavoidable, their impact to 
the community’s socioeconomic well-being could be reduced through implementing actions on 
improving the disaster resilience of its interdependent infrastructure systems. Three significant 
challenges of infrastructure disaster risk management are (1) developing mathematical models to 
better understand and quantify the post-disaster performance of interdependent infrastructure 
systems; (2) developing measurement metrics to provide yardsticks of the infrastructure 
performance; and (3) developing risk-informed decision frameworks to better guide the strategic 
pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster recovery planning works. Good mathematical 
models, measurement metrics and decision frameworks should be the ones that are feasible, 
reasonable and applicable to various interdependent infrastructure systems under multiple 
hazards. Researches in this direction are useful for (1) the infrastructure investors to prioritize 
and better allocate their investment; (2) the infrastructure owners to optimize the infrastructure 
risk mitigation and recovery works; (3) the insurance, reinsurance and other relevant companies 
to better understand and manage the risks facing their businesses; (4) the policy-makers to update 
the codes, standards and regulations to better prepare their community for future disruptive 
events; and will eventually benefit the life quality of every individual person in a community. 
1.2. Objective and Tasks 
This research aims at developing models, metrics and decision frameworks for disaster 
risk management of interdependent infrastructure systems to support community resilience 
planning. The specific research tasks to accomplish the objective include: 
(1) Review the current state of the research in disaster risk management of infrastructure 
systems for community resilience planning to identify progresses, challenges and gaps; 
(2) Identify critical components (e.g.: facilities, lines) of some critical infrastructure 
systems in a community and their interdependencies; 
(3) Develop a mathematical model to simulate the damage and recovery of 
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interdependent infrastructure systems under multi-hazards with considering the uncertainties; 
(4) Introduce measurement metrics to evaluate the infrastructure performance; 
(5) Develop risk-informed decision frameworks to support strategic pre-disaster risk 
mitigation and post-disaster recovery planning for interdependent infrastructure systems. 
1.3. Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation describes the methodologies to complete the above research tasks, 
illustrated with examples or case studies. The remainder of this dissertation consists of five 
chapters, followed by a list of references. Chapter 2 reviews the state-of-art of current research and 
practice on infrastructure disaster risk management for community resilience planning. Chapter 3 
introduces the Dynamic Integrated Network (DIN) model which simulates the damage and 
recovery of interdependent infrastructure systems under multi-hazards with considering the 
uncertainties. The modeling methodology, modeling parameter quantification, model comparison 
and model validation are presented in this chapter. In Chapter 4, a decision problem in the 
pre-disaster risk mitigation phase is defined. The corresponding decision framework and 
supporting measurement metrics used as decision criteria are also introduced. Similarly, in Chapter 
5, the decision problem, decision framework and measurement metrics for the post-disaster 
recovery phase are presented. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the major contributions of this study 
and suggests recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter describes the current state-of-the-art of the studies on disaster risk 
management for community resilience planning with an emphasis on infrastructure systems. 
Recent decades have witnessed a growing body of projects and studies on community disaster 
resilience planning. The efforts can be broadly grouped into five categories: (1) defining the 
concept of community resilience; (2) evaluating the community or infrastructure resilience 
quantitatively using mathematical models or qualitatively using conceptual frameworks; (3) 
modeling the post-disaster damage and recovery of infrastructure systems to support community 
resilience assessment; (4) developing infrastructure performance metrics to measure and evaluate 
the post-disaster performance of infrastructure systems; and (5) developing infrastructure risk 
management decision frameworks to better support the community resilience planning. In the 
following subsections, the community resilience initiatives in recent decades at various scales are 
presented first, followed by a review of the studies on the above five aspects.  
2.1. Community Resilience Initiatives 
Community resilience planning against natural and manmade disasters has gained 
traction around the world in recent decades. A wide variety of initiatives addressing the disaster 
preparedness, risk mitigation, emergency response, recovery and reconstruction of communities 
from disruptive events are taken by entities at different levels, including multinational 
development agencies, non-profit organizations, government agencies, foundations, corporations, 
research institutions, universities, and so on. Table 2-1 summarizes some representative 
community resilience initiatives in recent two decades with an emphasis on the efforts involving 
resilience planning for critical civil infrastructure systems. In reviewing these community 
resilience initiatives, the following aspects are considered: 
(1) Name: the name of the initiative, such as the name of the program or project. 
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(2) Organizer(s): the name of the organizer(s) who proposes and/or leads the initiative, such 
as the name of the multilateral development agency, government agency, foundation, 
research institution, corporation, university research group, etc..  
(3) Goal: the aim of the initiative. 
(4) Scale: the scale of the initiative, such as international, regional, national, local or 
organizational. 
(5) Dimensions: different dimensions of community resilience that the initiative focuses on, 
such as buildings, cyber security, economics, emergency management, environment, 
finance, food and agriculture, governance, healthcare, infrastructure systems (e.g.: electric 
power, water and sanitation, natural gas and oil, transportation, telecommunication), 
logistics and supply chain, maritime security, military, natural resources, sociology, urban 
planning and so on. 
(6) Approaches: the actions taken to reach the goal of the initiative, such as developing 
guideline documents or assessment tools, providing financial and/or technical assistance, 
organizing workshops and/or training programs for education purpose, conducting 
research, participating in the construction projects and so on. 
(7) Reference: the reference of the initiative, such as the program website, link or reference 
of the related reports, documents or technical papers. 
The community resilience initiatives in Table 2-1 are ordered first based on scale (from 
international to organizational) and then chronologically.   
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Table 2-1. Summary of the recent community resilience initiatives with an emphasis on infrastructure resilience initiatives. 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
1 
Building Resilience: 
Integrating Climate 
and Disaster Risk into 
Development 
The World 
Bank Group 
Building climate 
and disaster 
resilience to end 
extreme poverty 
and build shared 
prosperity for 
developing 
countries in the 
world 
International Buildings, 
economics, 
environment, 
finance, food and 
agriculture, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems, urban 
planning 
Develop guideline 
documents, provide 
financial and technical 
assistance to developing 
countries in the world to 
build climate and disaster 
resilience 
World Bank 
(2013) 
2 
Community-Based 
Disaster Risk 
Reduction (CBDRR) 
programmes 
International 
Federation of 
Red Cross and 
Red Crescent 
Societies 
Enabling healthy 
and safe 
communities, 
reduce 
vulnerabilities, 
strengthen 
resilience and 
foster a culture of 
peace around the 
world 
International Economics, 
emergency 
management, 
healthcare, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems, natural 
resources, sociology 
Develop guideline 
documents, provide 
humanitarian assistance 
to improve humanitarian 
standards, work as 
partners in community 
development 
and in response to 
disasters, persuade 
decision-makers to act at 
all times in the interests 
of vulnerable people 
International 
Federation of 
Red Cross and 
Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) 
(2014) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
3 
United Nations 
International 
Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction 
Resilience 
Scorecard 
United Nations Providing a set of 
assessments that will 
allow local 
governments to 
monitor and review 
progress and 
challenges in the 
implementation of 
the Sendai 
Framework for 
Disaster Risk 
Reduction: 
2015-2030, and 
assessing disaster 
resilience at both the 
preliminary level and 
detailed level 
International Buildings, 
economics, 
environment, 
finance, 
governance, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
logistics and 
supply chain, 
natural 
resources, 
sociology, 
urban planning 
Develop resilience 
assessment guideline 
documents and excel 
spreadsheets, educate the 
general public about 
resilient development 
United Nations 
Office for 
Disaster Risk 
Reduction 
(2014) 
4 
The Global 
Resilience Institute 
& Global 
Resilience 
Research Network 
The Northeastern 
University with the 
participation of 20 
universities and 
research institutes 
from 14 countries 
around the world 
Serving as both a 
channel and a 
catalyst for experts 
in industry, 
academia, and 
government to 
collaborate on 
solving the world’s 
most pressing 
resilience challenges 
International Buildings, 
cybersecurity, 
governance, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology 
Conduct multi- and 
interdisciplinary-research, 
develop new experiential 
education programs that 
will help prepare the next 
generation of leaders 
Global 
Resilience 
Institute 
(2016) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
5 
Rockefeller 
Foundation 100 
Resilient Cities 
The Rockefeller 
Foundation 
Helping cities 
around the world 
become more 
resilient to the 
physical, social and 
economic challenges 
that are a growing 
part of the 21st 
century 
International Economics, 
environment, 
governance, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology 
Provide funding, resources 
and technical assistances to 
support the membership 
cities around the world in 
developing and 
implementing resilience 
strategies for city services, 
programs and policies; hold 
workshops to educate the 
public about resilient 
planning and development   
Rockefeller 
(2016) 
6 
Community-Based 
Disaster Risk 
Reduction Study 
Arup Improving the 
understanding of 
community 
resilience and 
influencing the 
building design and 
urban planning 
toward disaster 
resilient cities 
International Buildings, 
infrastructure 
systems, urban 
planning 
Combine desk-based 
research and analysis with 
fieldwork 
Arup (2018) 
7 
Resilience team in 
Stantec 
Stantec Inc. Improving 
community 
resilience across the 
globe 
International Buildings, 
infrastructure 
systems, urban 
planning 
Provide professional 
engineering consulting 
service in disaster response 
and recovery, resilience 
assessment, mitigation, and 
design unites 
improvements 
Stantec (2018) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
8 
Regional Disaster 
Resilience and 
Homeland 
Security Program 
The Center for 
Regional Disaster 
Resilience in The 
Pacific NorthWest 
Economic Region  
Improving the 
Pacific Northwest's 
ability to withstand 
and recover and to 
protect its critical 
infrastructures from 
all-hazards disasters 
Regional 
(northwest 
states of 
Alaska, 
Washington, 
Idaho, 
Montana, 
Oregon and 
Canadian 
provinces and 
territories of 
Alberta, British 
Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, 
Yukon & 
Northwest 
Territories) 
Cybersecurity, 
finance, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
maritime 
security, 
supply chain 
Conduct research, develop 
advanced technologies and 
tools, propose action plans 
Pacific 
Northwest 
Economic 
Region (2011) 
9 
Climate Change at 
the IDB: Building 
Resilience and 
Reducing 
Emissions 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
Integrating climate 
change mitigation 
into development 
work to build 
resilience, reduce 
poverty and 
inequality in Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean countries 
Regional 
(Latin America 
and Caribbean) 
Environment, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Conduct policy and 
strategy studies, provide 
financial and technical 
support to developing 
countries in Latin America 
and Caribbean 
Gonzalez Diez 
et al. (2014) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
10 
Economic 
Resilience 
Initiative 
European Investment 
Bank 
Rapidly mobilizing 
additional financing 
in support of the 
capacity of 
economies in the 
Southern 
Neighborhood and 
Western Balkans 
regions to boost 
economic resilience, 
absorb and respond 
to crises and shocks, 
such as the Syrian 
refugee crisis, while 
maintaining strong 
growth 
Regional 
(Europe) 
Economics, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Invest in vital 
infrastructure, develop the 
private sector and stimulate 
growth and job creation, 
contribute to addressing 
root causes of migration 
European 
Investment 
Bank (2016) 
11 
State and Societal 
Resilience 
European Union Strengthen the 
resilience of states 
and societies, further 
enhancing common 
actions on building 
resilience on the 
ground 
Regional 
(Europe Union 
countries) 
Economics, 
food and 
agriculture, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Provide humanitarian 
intervention, create jobs, 
invest in critical 
infrastructure systems, 
educate the public 
European 
Union (2016) 
12 
Resilience 
Development 
Asian Development 
Bank 
Helping vulnerable 
communities and 
sectors in Asia to 
cope with climate 
variability and 
strengthen their 
resilience to the 
long-term and 
uncertain impacts of 
climate change 
Regional 
(Asia) 
Food and 
agriculture, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Conduct policy and 
strategy studies, provide 
financial and technical 
assistance to developing 
counties in Asia to build 
resilience to current and 
future climate variability 
Asian 
Development 
Bank (2018) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
13 
Sustainable 
solutions for risk 
reduction and risk 
management 
The Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Center 
Building the 
resilience of people 
and institutions to 
disasters and climate 
change impacts in 
Asia and the Pacific 
Regional (Asia 
and the Pacific, 
member 
countries 
include: 
Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, 
China, India, 
Nepal, 
Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and 
Thailand) 
Buildings, 
emergency 
management, 
governance, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology, 
urban planning 
Develop and implement 
cross-sectoral programs 
and projects, conduct 
analysis and research, 
publish guidance 
documents, design and 
deliver training courses, 
workshops and national 
training centers 
Asian Disaster 
Preparedness 
Center (2018) 
14 
Building 
Sustainable Cities 
Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank 
Investing in 
sustainable 
infrastructure and 
other productive 
sectors in Asia to 
improve social and 
economic outcomes 
Regional 
(Asia) 
Infrastructure 
systems 
Conduct policy and 
strategy studies, provide 
financial and technical 
assistance to Asian 
countries to build resilient 
infrastructure systems 
Asian 
Infrastructure 
Investment 
Bank (2018) 
15 
Increase 
Environmental 
Resilience 
The Asia Foundation Improving 
community 
resilience under 
disasters and climate 
change across a 
dynamic and 
developing Asia 
Regional 
(Asia) 
Cybersecurity, 
economics, 
environment, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
natural 
resources, 
sociology, 
urban planning 
Develop guidance 
documents, provide direct 
program support, distribute 
educational materials to 
nurture new talent and 
rising young leaders 
The Asia 
Foundation 
(2018) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
16 
Rebuild, Share, 
Prepare, Advise 
Advocate 
SBP national 
organization 
Becoming a leader in 
disaster resilience 
and recovery, 
shrinking the time 
between disaster and 
recovery 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Rebuild home quickly after 
disasters, share rebuilding 
innovations with other 
rebuilding organizations, 
prepare home and business 
owners prior to and 
following disaster with 
specific steps to mitigate 
risk and improve resilience, 
advise policy makers 
immediately after a disaster 
so they can deploy federal 
dollars sooner, advocate for 
the reform of disaster 
recovery strategies in the 
U.S. to improve the 
predictability and speed of 
recovery, provide free 
resilience training in ten 
communities per year  
SBP (2006) 
17 
Coastal Storms 
Program 
Mississippi-Alabama 
Sea Grant 
Consortium and 
National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
Developing a tool 
which could perform 
self-assessment of 
community 
resilience to coastal 
hazards, identifying 
weaknesses a 
community may 
want to address prior 
to the next hazard 
event and guiding 
community 
discussion 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Economics, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology, 
urban planning 
Developed a 
self-assessment tool 
(guiding document) called 
Coastal Resilience Index  
Sempier et al. 
(2010) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
18 
Community 
Resilience System 
and the Campus 
Resilience 
Enhancement 
System 
The Community and 
Regional Resilience 
Institute 
Helping develop and 
then share critical 
paths that any 
America community 
or region may take to 
strengthen its ability 
to prepare for, 
respond to, and 
rapidly recover from 
significant 
man-made or natural 
disasters with 
minimal downtime 
of basic community, 
government, and 
business services 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Economic, 
emergency 
management, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology  
Combine community 
engagement activities with 
practical research activities, 
develop the web-enabled 
Community Resilience 
System and the Campus 
Resilience Enhancement 
System, conduct monthly 
interactive workshops 
Community 
and Regional 
Resilience 
Institute 
(2013) 
19 
Planning Resilient 
Infrastructure 
American Planning 
Association 
Creating great 
communities for all 
by advancing 
planning through 
leadership in 
education, research, 
advocacy, and 
ethical practice 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Infrastructure 
systems 
Develop guide documents American 
Planning 
Association 
(2014) 
20 
International 
Security Program: 
Disaster 
Preparedness, 
Response, 
Recovery, and 
Resilience 
The Center for 
Strategic and 
International Studies 
Providing strategic 
insights and policy 
solutions to help 
decision-makers 
chart a course toward 
a better world 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Emergency 
management, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Conduct research and 
analysis and develop policy 
initiatives 
Kostro & Riba 
(2014) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
21 
National 
Preparedness Goal 
and National 
Planning 
Framework 
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency  
Building a secure 
and resilient nation 
with the capabilities 
required across the 
whole community to 
prevent, protect 
against, mitigate, 
respond to, and 
recover from the 
threats and hazards 
that pose the greatest 
risks, including 
natural disasters, 
disease pandemics, 
chemical spills and 
other manmade 
hazards, terrorist 
attacks and 
cyber-attacks 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
cybersecurity, 
economics, 
emergency 
management, 
environment, 
governance, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
logistics and 
supply chain, 
sociology 
Define goals and develop 
guidance documents 
Federal 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency (2015 
a, b) 
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Table 2-1 (Cont.) 
No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
22 
Community 
Resilience 
Planning Guide for 
Buildings and 
Infrastructure 
Systems 
National Institute of 
Science and 
Technology 
Providing a 
methodology for 
communities to 
develop long-term 
plans by engaging 
stakeholders, 
establishing 
performance goals 
for 
buildings and 
infrastructure 
systems, and 
developing an 
implementation 
strategy, by 
providing a 
mechanism to 
prioritize and 
determine the 
efficiency of 
resilience actions 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Develop guidance 
documents and collect data 
from communities 
implementing the guidance 
documents to inform future 
versions 
NIST (2015a) 
23 
Community 
Resilience 
Economic 
Decision Guide for 
Buildings and 
Infrastructure 
Systems 
National Institute of 
Science and 
Technology 
Providing a standard 
economic 
methodology for 
evaluating 
investment decisions 
aimed to improve the 
ability of 
communities to 
adapt to, withstand, 
and quickly recover 
from disruptive 
events 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
economics, 
finance, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Develop guidance 
documents and the 
software-based 
EDGe$ (Economic 
Decision Guide Software) 
Tool 
NIST (2015b) 
16 
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No. Name Organizer(s) Goal Scale Dimensions Approaches Reference 
24 
Community 
Resilience Center 
of Excellence 
National Institute of 
Science and 
Technology 
researchers and 
partners from 12 
universities led by 
Colorado State 
University 
Developing 
system-level models 
and associated 
databases to support 
community 
resilience 
decision-making 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
economics, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology 
Develop an open-source 
computational model 
known as IN-CORE and 
associated database 
Ellingwood et 
al. (2016) 
25 
Regional 
Resiliency 
Assessment 
Program 
U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 
Generating greater 
understanding and 
action among public 
and private sector 
partners to improve 
the resilience of a 
region’s critical 
infrastructure 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Infrastructure 
systems 
Conduct targeted studies 
and modeling, collect and 
analyze data on the critical 
infrastructure within the 
designated area, publish 
reports, organize 
workshops 
U.S. 
Department of 
Homeland 
Security 
(2016) 
26 
Building 
mathematical 
foundation for 
resilience in 
systems 
engineering 
The Risk and 
Decision Science 
Team in the US 
Army Crops 
Engineer Research 
and Development 
Center 
Improving 
decision-making and 
stakeholder 
engagement through 
application and 
development of risk 
and decision science 
techniques 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Cybersecurity, 
environment, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
military, 
supply chain 
Conduct research, provide 
risk decision advisory 
services, develop software 
and other tools 
The Risk and 
Decision 
Science Team 
(2018) 
27 
Infrastructure 
Security 
U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 
Working with 
businesses, 
communities, and 
local governments 
across the United 
States to enhance the 
security and 
resilience of the 
nation's critical 
infrastructure and to 
prepare for and 
recover from any 
hazard 
National 
(U.S.A) 
Infrastructure 
systems 
Provide tools, resources, 
training programs and 
strategic guidance to public 
and private partners and 
coordinates the effort to 
promote the security and 
resilience of critical 
infrastructures 
U.S. 
Department of 
Homeland 
Security 
(2018) 
17 
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28 
SPUR’s 
Sustainability and 
Resilience Agenda 
San Francisco 
Planning and Urban 
Research Association 
(a member supported 
nonprofit 
organization) 
Reducing ecological 
footprint and making 
cities resilient 
Local (San 
Francisco Bay 
Area, 
California 
State, U.S.A) 
Food and 
agriculture, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Promote good planning and 
good government in the 
San Francisco Bay Area 
through research, education 
and advocacy 
SPUR-San 
Francisco 
Planning and 
Urban 
Research 
Association 
(2009) 
29 
The Oregon 
Resilience Plan 
Oregon Seismic 
Safety Policy 
Advisory 
Commission 
Positively 
influencing decisions 
and policies 
regarding 
pre-disaster 
mitigation of 
earthquake and 
tsunami hazards, 
increasing public 
understanding of 
earthquake hazard, 
risk, exposure, and 
vulnerability through 
education, and be 
responsive to the 
new studies and/or 
issues raised around 
earthquakes and 
tsunamis 
Local (Oregon 
State, U.S.A) 
Emergency 
management, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Develop guidance 
document, support 
earthquake education, 
research and legislation 
Oregon 
Seismic Safety 
Policy 
Advisory 
Commission 
(2013) 
30 
Disaster recovery 
and community 
resilience work 
The Queensland 
Reconstruction 
Authority 
Making Queensland 
the most disaster 
resilient state in 
Australia 
Local 
(Queensland 
State， 
Australia) 
Emergency 
management, 
governance, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Provide financial and 
technical assistance to 
Queensland government, 
businesses and educate the 
wider community to 
support the policy-making, 
reconstruction, disaster risk 
mitigation works 
Queensland 
Reconstruction 
Authority 
(2018) 
18 
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31 
Community 
Resilience 
Program 
Los Angeles County 
Community Disaster 
Resilience Project 
Translating lessons 
learned by leaders in 
the field 
into a pragmatic 
website useful for 
community-focused 
organizations 
engaged in 
increasing resilience 
in communities 
Local (Los 
Angeles 
County, 
California 
State, U.S.A) 
Buildings, 
environment, 
infrastructure 
systems, 
sociology 
Develop web-based 
community resilience 
planning tools and hold 
programs, workshops and 
community activities to 
advocate for community 
resilience initiatives 
Resilience in 
Communities 
(2018) 
32 
The ECIP 
(Enhanced Critical 
Infrastructure 
Protection) 
Dashboard 
Argonne National 
Laboratory 
Developing 
resilience 
measurement indices 
to facilitate 
infrastructure risk 
management 
decision-making 
Organizational Infrastructure 
systems 
Develop the web-based 
tool called ECIP 
Dashboard to assess 
infrastructure vulnerability, 
risk and resilience and 
support disaster risk 
management related 
decision-making 
Petit et al. 
(2013) 
33 
Communities 
Advancing 
Resilience Toolkit 
University of 
Oklahoma Health 
Sciences Center 
Enhancing 
community 
resilience through 
assessment, 
group processes, 
planning, and action 
Organizational Economics, 
healthcare, 
sociology, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Develop a survey 
instrument, the 
Communities Advancing 
Resilience Toolkit, to 
assess community 
resilience; educate the next 
generation of community 
resilience leaders 
Pfefferbaum et 
al. (2013) 
34 
Community 
Resilience 
Research 
The RAND 
Corporation 
Developing solutions 
to public policy 
challenges to help 
make communities 
throughout the world 
safer and more 
secure, healthier and 
more prosperous 
Organizational Economics, 
emergency 
management, 
healthcare, 
infrastructure 
systems 
Develop guidance 
documents, conduct 
research 
RAND 
Corporation 
(2018) 
19 
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35 
Stanford Urban 
Resilience 
Initiative 
Stanford University Exploring the 
frontier of Resilience 
Science & 
Engineering, an 
emerging field which 
applies engineering 
analyses to broader 
questions of social 
impact and human 
behavior in the 
context of natural 
disasters and 
extreme events 
Organizational Buildings, 
infrastructure 
systems, urban 
planning  
Develop the latest tools and 
technologies to build 
resilient communities, 
educate the next generation 
of leaders working in the 
community resilience field 
Stanford 
Urban 
Resilience 
Initiative 
(2018) 
20 
 
It can be learned from Table 2-1 that community disaster resilience planning has gained 
wide attention at various scales, from international, regional, national, local to organizational 
scales. The wide range of community resilience research and programs are motivated by the 
impacts of catastrophic events in recent decades, such as 9/11 terrorist attack (2001), Hurricane 
Katrina (2005), Wenchuan Earthquake (2008), Joplin Tornado (2011), Great East Japan 
Earthquake (2011), Superstorm Sandy (2012), Bangladesh monsoon flooding (2017), Indonesia 
earthquake and tsunami (2018) and so on. The above community resilience initiatives are led by 
different types of organizations/institutions, which have different decision-makers, source of 
funding and governance structure for implementation. Example types of the organizers include: 
multinational development banks, multilateral development agencies, non-profit organizations, 
government agencies, foundations, research institutions, corporations, university research groups 
and so on. The approaches taken by these organizations to address community resilience issues are 
summarized in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1. The approaches used to address community resilience by various organizations. 
The statistics in Figure 2-1 indicate that most initiatives addressing the community disaster 
resilience planning are still in the research and development stage. Common approaches in this 
stage include: conducting disaster resilience research, developing methodologies and tools to 
assess community resilience, conducting strategy and policy studies to support the community 
resilience planning, and developing resilience assessment and implementation guideline 
21 
 
documents. Only a small portion of the initiatives actually put plans into actions, such as providing 
financial, technical and/or humanitarian (e.g. material and logistic) interventions, implementing 
projects or programs to assist the pre-disaster risk mitigation (e.g. upgrading, retrofitting or 
frequent maintenance of existing buildings and infrastructure facilities) and post-disaster recovery 
(e.g. repairing or reconstructing damaged facilities) works. However, lots of efforts have been 
witnessed on educating the general public about resilient development and nurturing the next 
generation of community resilience leaders through workshops, training programs, advocacies, 
and so on. These educational programs can raise the public awareness of community disaster 
resilience related issues and lead to coordination efforts of people from all walks of life to work on 
disaster risk management and community resilience planning. 
 
Figure 2-2. Different dimensions of community resilience considered by the initiatives. 
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Achieving community disaster resilience requires coordination efforts of experts from 
different fields since community resilience has various dimensions. Figure 2-2 shows the wide 
range of dimensions of community resilience that have been addressed by one or more initiatives 
listed in Table 2-1. Among all the 35 reviewed community resilience initiatives with an emphasis 
on infrastructure disaster resilience, 5 of them only focus on the critical civil infrastructure 
systems, without considering the interactions with any other systems. The rest of the initiatives 
all address community resilience with considering at least one more dimension(s) apart from the 
civil infrastructure systems. Many of the community resilience initiatives with an emphasis on 
infrastructure resilience also aim at improving the resilience of economic, social, healthcare, 
governance systems and the physical building environment to better achieve an overall 
community resilience. Some of the programs or studies also take the urban planning, 
environmental protection and emergency management into consideration. The coordination 
efforts of assessing and improving community resilience at multiple dimensions gradually 
become a trend in the most recent decade.  
In summary, the catastrophic events in recent decades have motivated the community 
disaster resilience related studies and projects worldwide. The community disaster resilience 
planning has gained traction at various scales, from international, national, regional, local to 
organizational levels. Among all the community resilience initiatives with an emphasis on 
improving the resilience of critical civil infrastructure systems, more and more initiatives 
nowadays began to extend the efforts to a wider range of systems, such as social and economic 
systems, in order to better enhance the overall community resilience against natural and/or 
manmade hazards. However, the above review indicates that most of the community resilience 
projects or programs are only at a research and analysis stage. The proposed community disaster 
resilience plans, strategies or guidelines are not always implemented. Thus, it’s recommended 
that various levels of institutions, organizations, government agencies and local communities 
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should further reinforce the corporation so that the proposed resilience plans, strategies and 
programs can be actually put into action.  
2.2. Concept of Resilience  
Clearly defining and understanding the concept of resilience is fundamental and essential 
to determine the direction and emphasis of each community resilience initiative, which is found 
to be common approach of the above-mentioned community resilience initiatives.  
The term resilience is derived from the Latin word resilio, which means “to jump back” 
(Klein et al., 2003). There is an agreement in the literature that the concept of resilience originates 
from the field of ecology in 1970s (Holling, 1973; Klein et al., 2003; Zhou et al., 2010; Koliou et 
al., 2017). Over the years, the concept of resilience has wide application in a host of disciplines, 
ranging from psychology, ecology, education, environmental science, health-related science, 
sociology, economics to engineering and so on (Jeffcott, Ibrahim & Cameron, 2009; Cumming, 
2011; Okvat & Zautra, 2011; Foster, O'brien & Korhonen, 2012; Biggs, Schlüter & Schoon, 2015; 
Sprecher et al., 2015; Mansfield et al., 2016; Gherhes, Vorley & Williams, 2018; Saja et al., 2018). 
Resilience is often viewed as consisting of three dimensions: the ability of an entity to resist or 
withstand the shock, the ability of the entity to recover from the shock, and its ability to adapt to 
future shocks. Here, the word “shock” can refer to any disruptive events, depending on the 
discipline that resilience is applied to. For example, parental mental illness can be the shock to a 
child when studying psychological resilience of the child (Foster, O'brien & Korhonen, 2012), 
while natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes can be viewed as shocks to the 
infrastructure systems in a community when assessing the community infrastructure resilience 
(Ellingwood et al., 2016). Besides, there are disagreements in the literature as to the property of 
resilience, whether resilience is an ability, an outcome or a process. 
A number of the resilience concept and corresponding property, type (application 
discipline) and dimensions, chronologically ordered, are listed in Table 2-2. Since this thesis 
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mainly focuses on the community disaster resilience, or more specifically, the resilience to the 
natural or manmade hazards of the critical civil infrastructure systems in a community, the 
forgoing review of the community or infrastructure resilience concept are presented in 
disproportionate frequency. Definitions describing the resilience in other disciplines, such as 
ecology, psychology, sociology or material science, are representative of others in the literature.
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Table 2-2. Summary of the concept of resilience with an emphasis on community disaster resilience. 
No. Type Definition Properties 
Dimensions 
Reference Resist 
shocks 
Recover 
from 
shocks 
Adapt to 
future 
shocks 
1 Ecological resilience 
The ability of systems to absorb changes of state 
variables, driving variables, and parameters, and still 
persist. 
Ability √   Holling (1973) 
2 Material resilience 
The ability to store strain energy and deflect elastically 
under a load without breaking or being deformed. 
Ability √   Gordon (1978) 
3 Community resilience 
The capacity to absorb and recover from occurrence of 
a hazardous event. 
Ability √ √  
Timmermann 
(1981) 
4 General resilience 
The capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after 
they have become manifest and learn to bounce back to 
normal. 
Ability √ √  
Wildavsky 
(1988) 
5 Psychological resilience 
The process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful 
adaptation despite challenging or threatening 
circumstances. 
Process, 
ability, 
outcome 
√ √ √ 
Masten, Best & 
Garmezy (1990) 
6 
Psychological and 
psychopathological 
resilience 
The capacity for successful adaptation, positive 
functioning or competence, despite high-risk status, 
chronic stress, or following prolonged or severe 
trauma. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Egeland, 
Carlson, & 
Sroufe (1993) 
7 
Psychological and social 
resilience 
The process through which mediating structures (e.g.: 
schools, church groups, family networks, and sporting 
organizations) and activity settings successfully adapt 
to adversity, stressful events, and oppressive systems. 
Process √ √ √ 
Sonn & Fisher 
(1998) 
8 Community resilience 
The ability of a community to withstand an extreme 
natural event without suffering devastating losses, 
damage, diminished productivity, or quality of life, and 
without a large amount of assistance from outside the 
community. 
Ability √   Mileti (1999) 
9 Social resilience 
The ability to withstand stresses and disturbances 
caused by social, political and economic changes. 
Ability √   Adger (2000) 
10 Community resilience 
The capability to bounce back and use physical and 
economic resources effectively to aid recovery 
following exposure to hazard events. 
Ability √ √  Paton (2000) 
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No. Type Definition Properties 
Dimensions 
Reference Resist 
shocks 
Recover 
from 
shocks 
Adapt to 
future 
shocks 
11 
Social and 
ecological 
resilience 
The amount of disturbance a system can absorb and remain 
within a domain of attraction, the capacity for learning and 
adaptation and the degree to which the system is capable of 
self-organizing. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Carpenter et al. 
(2001) 
12 
Community 
resilience 
The ability of social units (e.g. organizations, communities) to 
mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they 
occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimized 
social disruptions and mitigate the effects of future hazards. 
Ability √ √ √ Bruneau et al. (2003) 
13 
Community 
resilience 
The ability of individuals and communities to deal with a state 
of continuous, long term stress, which causes gaps between 
environment stimuli and their functional coping behavior; the 
ability to find unknown inner strengths and resources in order to 
cope effectively; the measure of adaptation and flexibility. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Ganor & Ben-Lavy 
(2003) 
14 
Community 
resilience 
The ability of physical systems and human communities to 
survive and function under extreme stress. 
Ability √   Godschalk (2003) 
15 
Enterprise 
resilience 
The ability and capacity of an enterprise or organization to 
withstand systemic discontinuities and adapt to new risk 
environment by effectively aligns is strategy, operations, 
management systems, governance structure and 
decision-support capabilities to the changing environment.  
Ability √ √ √ 
Starr,  Newfrock & 
Delurey (2003) 
16 
Community 
resilience 
The process of using material, physical, socio-political, 
socio-cultural, and psychological resources in a community to 
promote the safety of its residents, protect residents against 
injury and violence risks, and allow residents to recover after 
exposure to general adversity and injury risks. 
Process √ √  Ahmed et al. (2004) 
17 
Psychological 
resilience 
An individual’s ability to adapt to stress and adversity; a 
process that can be learned by anyone using positive emotions. 
Process, 
ability 
√ √ √ 
Tugade, Fredrickson 
& Feldman Barrett 
(2004) 
18 
Social and 
ecological 
resilience 
The capacity of linked social-ecological systems to absorb 
recurrent disturbances, the capability of self-organization and 
building capacity for learning and adaptation 
Ability √ √ √ Adger et al. (2005) 
19 
General 
resilience 
The capacity of a system to maintain its functions and structure 
in the face of internal and external change and to degrade 
gracefully when it must. 
Ability √   
Allenby & Fink 
(2005) 
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shocks 
20 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The capacity to prevent or protect against significant 
multi-hazard threats and incidents, including terrorist attacks, 
and to recover and reconstitute critical services with minimum 
devastation to public safety and health. 
Ability √ √  
Infrastructure 
Security Partnership 
(2006) 
21 
Community 
resilience 
The capacity or ability of a community to anticipate, prepare 
for, respond to, and recover quickly from impacts of disaster; it 
is not only the measure of how quickly the community can 
recover from the disaster impacts, but also the ability to learn, 
cope with or adapt to hazards. 
Ability √ √ √ Mayunga (2007) 
22 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability of a system to recover from adversity, either back to 
its original state or an adjusted state based on new requirements. 
Ability √ √ √ McCarthy (2007) 
23 
Community 
resilience 
A process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive 
trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance. 
Process √ √ √ Norris et al. (2008) 
24 
Community 
resilience 
The ability of a system to respond and recover from disasters 
and includes those inherent conditions that allow the system to 
absorb impacts and cope with an event, as well as post-event, 
adaptive processes that facilitate the ability of the system to 
re-organize, change, and learn in response to a threat. 
Ability √ √ √ Cutter et al. (2008) 
25 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability of a system to sustain external and internal 
disruptions without discontinuity of performing the system’s 
function or, if the function is disconnected, to fully recover the 
function rapidly.  
Ability √ √  
American Society of 
Mechanical 
Engineers (2009) 
26 
General 
resilience 
The ability of a system to withstand a major disruption within 
acceptable degradation parameters and to recover within 
acceptable time and composite costs and risks 
Ability √ √  Haimes (2009) 
27 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly 
recover from a potentially disruptive event. 
Ability √ √ √ 
National 
Infrastructure 
Advisory Council 
(2009) 
28 
Social and 
ecological 
resilience 
The capacity of a system to cope with shocks and undergo 
change while retaining essentially the same structure and 
function, and the ability to build and increase the capacity for 
learning and adaptation. 
Ability √ √ √ Walker et al. (2009) 
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29 
Infrastructure 
and economic 
resilience 
The system’s ability to reduce efficiently both the magnitude 
and duration of the deviation from targeted system 
performance levels. 
Ability √ √  Vugrin et al. (2010) 
30 
Economic 
resilience 
The process of adapting to the changing competitive, 
technological and market pressures and opportunities that 
confronting local economy. 
Process √ √ √ 
Simmie & Martin 
(2010) 
31 
Logistics and 
supply chain 
resilience 
The ability of a system to return to its original state or to a new 
more desirable one after experiencing a disturbance and 
avoiding occurrence of failure modes. 
Ability √ √ √ Cabral et al. (2011) 
32 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functionality in 
the presence of a disturbance and unpredicted changes. It is the 
sum of the passive survival rate (reliability) and the proactive 
survival rate (restoration) of a system. 
Ability √ √  
Woods,  Leveson & 
Hollnagel (2012) 
33 
Economic 
resilience 
The policy-induced ability of an economy to recover from or 
adjust to the negative impacts of adverse exogenous shocks 
and to benefit from positive shocks. 
Ability √ √  Mancini (2012) 
34 
National and 
community 
resilience 
The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or 
more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events. 
Ability √ √ √ 
National Research 
Council (2012) 
35 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The systems’ ability to resist various possible hazards, absorb 
the initial damage from hazards, and recover to normal 
operation one or multiple times during a time period. 
Ability √ √  
Ouyang & 
Dueñas-Osorio 
(2012) 
36 Social resilience 
The capacities to cope with the disruptions, to adapt to 
changing conditions, and transform to the new stable state. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Keck & Sakdapolrak 
(2013) 
37 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability of systems to prepare for and adapt to changing 
conditions, withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Presidential Policy 
Directive (2013) 
38 
Community 
resilience 
The capacity of a person, household or other aggregate unit to 
avoid poverty in the face of various stressors and in the wake 
of myriad shocks over time. 
Ability √ √  
Barrett & Constas 
(2014) 
39 
Social and 
ecological 
resilience 
The ability of social or ecological system to absorb 
disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways 
of functioning, the capacity of self-organization, and the 
capacity to adapt to stress and change. 
Ability √ √ √ 
International Panel of 
Climate Change 
(2014) 
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40 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability of a system to adapt its behavior to maintain 
continuity of function (or operations) in the presence of 
disruptions. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Alderson, Brown & 
Carlyle (2015) 
41 
Food system 
resilience 
The capacity over time of a food system and its units at 
multiple levels, to provide sufficient, appropriate and 
accessible food to all, in the face of various and even 
unforeseen disturbances. 
Ability √ √  Tendall et al. (2015) 
42 
Power system 
resilience 
The system’s ability to recognize, adapt to, and absorb 
disturbances in a timely manner. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Arghandeh et al. 
(2016) 
43 
Material 
resilience 
The maximum elastic energy absorbed by a material when a 
load is applied. 
Ability √ √  
Dessavre, 
Ramirez-Marquez & 
Barker (2016) 
44 
Power system 
resilience 
The operational resilience refers to the characteristics that 
would secure operational strength for a power system, e.g., the 
ability to ensure the uninterrupted supply to customers or 
generation capacity availability in the face of a disaster. The 
infrastructure resilience refers to the physical strength of a 
power system for mitigating the portion of the system that is 
damaged, collapsed or in general becomes nonfunctional. 
Ability √ √  Panteli et al. (2017) 
45 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, 
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents; the 
ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions. 
Ability √ √ √ Fujita et al. (2018) 
46 
Water system 
resilience 
The ability to mitigate and recover from failure. Ability √ √  
Huizar, Lansey & 
Arnold (2018) 
47 
Infrastructure 
resilience 
The ability of a system to withstand stressors, adapt, and 
rapidly recover from disruptions. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Sharma, Tabandeh & 
Gardoni (2018) 
48 
Power system 
resilience 
The ability to withstand and recover rapidly from deliberate 
attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents, 
adapt to changing conditions. 
Ability √ √ √ 
Shayeghi & Younesi 
(2019) 
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It can be learned from Table 2-2 that multiple definitions of resilience exist within the 
literature, with no broadly accepted single definition. This may be due to the fact that the 
resilience concept is shared by various disciplines, applied to a wide range of objects at different 
scales (e.g.: individual human beings, structural components, infrastructure systems, 
socio-ecological systems, socioeconomic systems, overall communities, etc.), and under different 
types of disruptive events (e.g.: mental disorder, stress, natural hazard, load, pollution, etc.). 
However, even though the definitions of resilience vary from case to case, some of them share 
common properties or dimensions.  
There is a debating view in the literature as to the property of resilience, whether it’s an 
ability, a process or an outcome. It’s easy to be identified from Table 2-2 that the majority of 
researchers view resilience as an inherent ability or capacity of people, systems or communities 
to cope with the disruptions, while only one early literature defines psychological resilience as an 
outcome of successful adaptation of human beings to threatening circumstances (Masten, Best & 
Garmezy, 1990). Additionally, some researchers, especially in the psychology or community 
disaster resilience planning field, tend to view resilience as a process rather than an ability or an 
end. They understand resilience as a whole process of coping with, adapting to or learning from 
the changing conditions (Sonn & Fisher, 1998; Ahmed et al., 2004; Tugade, Fredrickson & 
Feldman Barrett, 2004; Norris et al., 2008; Simmie & Martin, 2010).  
As for the dimensions of resilience, most of the reviewed literatures in Table 2-2 address 
resilience in multiple dimensions, including (1) the ability to absorb or resist external shocks; (2) 
the ability or speed to recover from impacts; and (3) the ability to adapt to future disruptions or 
the changing environment. A few conceptual definitions of resilience in early years only focus 
on the first dimension and view resilience as the ability to withstand the external shocks (Holling, 
1973; Gordon, 1978; Mileti, 1999; Adger, 2000). This is a very narrow understanding of 
resilience, and nowadays, this dimension is usually described using the term vulnerability, 
reliability or robustness (Adger, 2006; Cutter et al., 2008; Reed, Kapur & Christie, 2009; Shirley, 
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Boruff & Cutter, 2012; Sarkar et al., 2018). Apart from these few exceptions, all the other 
definitions of resilience focus on both the resistance to impact when it occurs (dimension (1)) 
and the rapid recovery from the impact over time (dimension (2)). The focus on the first two 
dimensions remains central to nearly all definitions of resilience regardless of the disciplines. 
The tripartite view of resilience (resisting impacts, rapid recovery, and adaptation to future 
disruptions) was first proposed in psychology field to describe psychological resilience (Masten, 
Best & Garmezy, 1990), and gradually became prevalent in the resilience definitions in all 
disciplines over the last decade. From this perspective, resilience is not simply the ability to 
absorb or resist external shocks and rapidly recover from the impacts to reach a pre-existing state, 
but also learn to adapt to future shocks and change to a new state that is more suitable or 
sustainable in the current environment.  
In recent years, a tendency of addressing all three dimensions of resilience has been 
witnessed, especially in defining community or infrastructure disaster resilience. Many 
literatures considered the possibility of the infrastructure systems or communities to recover to a 
new equilibrium state in order to adapt to the post-disaster new normal condition or mitigate the 
future disaster impacts (Bruneau et al., 2003; Presidential Policy Directive, 2013; Fujita et al., 
2018; Sharma, Tabandeh & Gardoni, 2018; Guidotti, Gardoni & Rosenheim, 2019). The 
post-disaster new normal may result from various policy or socioeconomic reasons, such as 
post-disaster demand or capacity change, removing old or building new infrastructure facilities, 
etc. A resilient community of infrastructure system is able to learn from the past disaster 
experience and reach to a better state of functioning. Rather than simply ‘surviving’ the disruptive 
events, a resilient community or infrastructure system may respond in creative ways and transform 
in an adaptive way to external shocks (Maguire & Cartwright, 2008). This transformation view of 
resilience is particularly useful for understanding how a community as a whole can respond 
positively to disruptions. It recognizes the powerful capacity of people from different walks of life 
in the community to learn from their experiences and to consciously incorporate this learning into 
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their interactions with the broader social, economic and physical environment. This view of 
resilience is important since it acknowledges that people themselves can play a central role in 
mitigating the impact of disruptions and are able to shape their community towards a more disaster 
resilient one. Indeed, this broader perspective of resilience concept has inspired and guided 
worldwide efforts to promote community resilience to hazard events, as is shown in the 
community resilience initiatives summarized in section 2.1. 
2.3. Resilience Assessment 
The concept of resilience provides the basis of assessing resilience quantitatively. This 
section mainly focuses on the quantitative resilience assessment methods for civil infrastructure 
systems. Measuring the resilience of infrastructure systems is important to evaluate the 
performance of infrastructure systems under disasters and compare the effectiveness of different 
pre-disaster risk mitigation or post-disaster recovery plans, which can be found in nearly all the 
reviewed community resilience initiatives in section 2.1.  
Lots of studies have attempted to quantify the resilience of civil infrastructure systems 
and many different methodologies have been proposed. Some representative resilience 
assessment methods are shown in Table 2-3. For each method listed in Table 2-3, the name of the 
resilience metric, the mathematical or conceptual definition of the metric, its methodological 
category, advantages, limitations and the reference of some representative works are clearly 
identified. The resilience assessment methods in Table 2-3 are broadly grouped into three 
categories: (1) subjective evaluation-based, (2) probability theory-based and (3) recovery 
curve-based. The subjective evaluation-based resilience assessment methods rely on expert 
judgements and estimations; the probability theory-based methods measure resilience 
probabilistically with considering the uncertainties, while the recovery curve-based methods 
calculate resilience from recovery curves of the infrastructure systems under disruptive events 
using some mathematical equations. A recovery curve of an infrastructure system represents the 
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performance of the system at any time step over a certain duration following the occurrence of 
the disruptive event (Sharma, Tabandeh & Gardoni, 2018). The curve would experience a drop at 
the occurrence of the disruptive event and is typically a non-decreasing function of time 
following the disruptive event. An example recovery curve of an infrastructure system is shown 
in Figure 2-3. It’s noted that the infrastructure system may recover to a post-disaster new normal 
state following the disaster. In the recovery curve shown in Figure 2-3, the horizontal axis shows 
the time, t, following the disruptive event, with 
0t = the time when the disruption occurs; 1t = the 
time when the infrastructure system recovers; 
2t = the end point of the time period in 
consideration when calculating resilience using some methods in Table 2-3. The vertical axis in 
the recovery curve in Figure 2-3 represents the system performance indicator,  Q t , which is a 
metric indicate the state or performance level of the infrastructure system over time. It will be 
discussed in more detail in section 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2-3. An example recovery curve of an infrastructure system following a disruptive event. 
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Table 2-3. Summary of the resilience assessment methods. 
No.1 Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
S-1 
Community 
resilience 
indicators 
29 community resilience indicators in six 
categories: ecological, social, economic, 
institutional, infrastructure and 
community competence are proposed. 
Each indicator is scored between 0 and 
100. The score for each category is 
calculated using an unweighted average 
of each indicator, and the total score is 
calculated by taking the unweighted 
average of all categories.  
• It can measure 
resilience comprehensively 
by considering 
multi-categories. 
• The result is highly dependent 
upon expert estimation or 
self-evaluation, which is very 
subjective. 
• If the number of experts 
providing estimations to the surveys 
is not enough, then the result may not 
be reliable. 
Cutter et al. 
(2008) 
S-2 Resilience 
The resilience is measured by the level of 
vulnerability and capability to recover 
from a disruptive event. A set of 152 
questions divided into 6 sections of 
vulnerability assessment and 15 sections 
of recovery capability assessment are 
proposed. The importance of each factor 
is weighted by policymakers. The 
responses to the questions are combined 
using weighted sum approach to get the 
overall resilience. 
• It can measure 
resilience comprehensively 
by considering 
multi-categories. 
• The result is highly dependent 
upon expert estimation or 
self-evaluation, which is very 
subjective. 
• If the number of experts 
providing estimations to the surveys 
is not enough, then the result may not 
be reliable. 
• The weights provided by the 
policy makers are subjective.  
Pettit (2008) 
 
 
  
                                                 
1 The abbreviation before the number refers to the methodological category of each metric, where “S” stands for subjective evaluation-based, “P” stands for probability 
theory-based, “PS” stands for probability theory-based and subjective evaluation based, “R” stands for recovery curve-based metric. 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
S-3 
Resilience 
index 
The resilience index is calculated as the 
weighted sum of the score of each 
component of resilience. The score is 
determined from expert estimation. The 
infrastructure resilience is composed of 
three levels. The components in the first 
level include: robustness, recovery and 
resourcefulness. Each of these level 1 
categories can be further divided into 
subgroups (level 2), and each level 2 
category can be further divided into level 
3 subgroups. 
• It can measure 
resilience comprehensively 
with using more levels, 
categories and subgroups. 
• The result is highly dependent 
upon expert estimation, which is very 
subjective. 
• If the number of experts 
providing the estimation is small, 
then the result may not be very 
reliable. 
Fisher & Norman 
(2010) 
S-4 
Coastal 
resilience index 
The resilience index of low, medium or 
high is identified for different categories 
of a community (e.g. critical 
infrastructures and facilities, social 
systems, emergency plans, mitigation 
efforts, business plans, etc.) after 
completing a self-assessment evaluation.  
• It can measure 
resilience comprehensively 
by considering 
multi-categories. 
• The result is based on 
self-evaluation, which is very 
subjective and may be over- or 
under-rated. 
• If the number of experts 
providing estimations to the surveys 
is not enough, then the result may not 
be reliable. 
Sempier et al. 
(2010) 
S-5 Resilience 
The resilience is categorized into six 
groups. The score for each indicator is 
collected from a survey and then the data 
are analyzed and combined into a single 
score using principal component analysis. 
• It can measure 
resilience comprehensively 
by considering 
multi-categories. 
• The result is highly dependent 
upon expert estimation, which is very 
subjective. 
• If the number of experts 
providing estimations to the surveys 
is not enough, then the result may not 
be reliable. 
Shirali, 
Mohammadfam 
& Ebrahimipour 
(2013) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
P-1 
Resilience 
between 
1t  and 
2t ,  1 2Re ,t t  
 
 
 
1 2
1 2
1
,
Re ,
FS
F
P t t
t t
P t
   
where  1FP t = the probability of failure 
at 
1t ;  1 2,FSP t t = a two‐state transition 
probability, or the intersection probability 
that a system fails at 
1t , and recovers at 
2t . 
• It’s straightforward to 
understand. 
• Determining the transition 
probability is a challenging task. It 
may require lots of input information. 
• It is associated only with 
recovery actions, while preparedness 
actions (vulnerability) are 
disregarded. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Li & Lence 
(2007) 
PS-1 
Resilience, 
 Pr |A i  
Resilience is quantified as the probability 
of meeting both robustness and rapidity 
standards in event i. 
   0 1Pr | Pr * *A i r r and t t    
Where A = predefined performance 
standards; i = the hazard intensity; 
0r  = 
vulnerability; *r  = robustness standard; 
*t  = rapidity standard. 
• It’s easy to interpret 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It considers the 
uncertainties in 
quantification of resilience. 
• The performance standards are 
determined subjectively. 
Chang & 
Shinozuka 
(2004) 
PS-2 
Resilience 
index, Rix 
  lim
n
s
Rix P R
n
 
   
 
  
where P(R) = number of successful 
response; s = number of success; n = 
number of trails. Here, successful 
response means the recovery time and 
cost are both below the threshold value. 
• It can consider both the 
recovery time and recovery 
cost. 
• It’s easy to interpret. 
• The acceptable recovery time 
and cost are determined subjectively. 
Gay & Sinha 
(2012) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
R-1 
Loss of 
resilience, 
LR  
 
1
0
1
t
L
t
R Q t dt     
• It’s easy to calculate 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It’s generally 
applicable. 
• It cannot distinguish the 
resilience associated with recovery 
curves having different trajectories 
but same area above the curves, such 
as the case in Figure 2-5 and Figure 
2-6. 
• It assumes that the 
infrastructure system would recover 
back to its pre-disaster state, not 
considering post-disaster new 
normal. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Bruneau et al. 
(2003) 
R-2 Resilience, R 
 
1
0
1 0
t
t
Q t dt
R
t t



 
• It’s easy to calculate 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It cannot distinguish the 
resilience associated with recovery 
curves having different combinations 
of recovery times and recovery 
trajectories, such as the case in 
Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Bruneau & 
Reinhorn (2007); 
Cimellaro, 
Reinhorn & 
Bruneau (2010b); 
Ayyub (2014); 
Bonstrom & 
Corotis (2014); 
Shayeghi & 
Younesi (2019) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
R-3 Resilience, R 
 
2
0
2 0
t
t
Q t dt
R
t t



  
• It can distinguish 
the resilience associated 
with recovery curves having 
different recovery times, 
such as the case in Figure 
2-4. 
• It’s easy to calculate 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It cannot distinguish the 
resilience associated with recovery 
curves having different trajectories 
but same area under the curves, such 
as the case in Figure 2-5. 
• It’s needed to agree on a time 
period in consideration (the value of 
2t ) before calculation. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Reed, Kapur & 
Christie (2009); 
Cimellaro, 
Reinhorn & 
Bruneau (2010a); 
Decò, Bocchini 
& Frangopol 
(2013); He & 
Cha (2018b); 
Sun, Bocchini & 
Davison (2018) 
R-4 
Recovery- 
dependent 
resilience, RDR 
   
1 1
0 0
1 0
1
t t
t t
Q t dt RE t dt
RDR
t t
    


 
 
where RE(t) = recovery effort at time t; 
 = weighting factor to assign relative 
importance of systematic impact and total 
recovery effort.  
• It considers the impact 
of resourcefulness during 
the recovery phase to the 
resilience. 
• RE(t) and   are hard to 
quantify. 
• It cannot distinguish the 
resilience associated with recovery 
curves having different combinations 
of recovery times and recovery 
trajectories, and same RE(t) and  . 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Vugrin, Warren 
& Ehlen (2011) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
R-5 
Resilience, 
 ,R X T   
 
*
*
1 2
,
1
T X T
R X T
T
  


 
where  0,1X   = percentage of 
functionality lost after a disruption; 
*0,T T  
 = time required for full 
recovery; *T  = a suitably long time 
interval over which lost functionality is 
determined. 
• It can distinguish the 
resilience associated with 
recovery curves having 
different recovery times, 
such as the case in Figure 
2-4. 
• It’s easy to calculate 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It uses the resilience triangle 
paradigm, which means that this 
method assumes that the disruptive 
event has an instantaneous impact 
and the recovery begin immediately 
and is a linear line. The instant drop 
of functionality, immediate start of 
recovery and linear recovery 
trajectory may not be realistic for 
some systems and events. 
• It cannot distinguish the 
resilience associated with recovery 
curves having different trajectories 
but same area above the curves, such 
as the case in Figure 2-5. 
• It’s needed to agree on a time 
period in consideration (the value of 
*T ) before calculation. 
• It assumes that the system 
would recover back to its pre-disaster 
state.  
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Zobel (2011); 
Adams, Bekkem 
& Toledo-Durán 
(2012); Zobel & 
Khansa (2014); 
Sahebjamnia, 
Torabi & 
Mansouri (2015) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
R-6 
Resilience at 
time t,  R t  
 
 
 d
Recovery t
R t
Loss t
   
It describes the ratio of recovery at time t 
to the loss suffered by the system at some 
previous point in time 
dt . If recovery is 
equal to the loss, then the system is fully 
resilient, and if there is no recovery, then 
no resilience is exhibited. 
• It’s easy to calculate 
and straightforward to 
understand. 
• It is not considered as a 
system’s property but rather as an 
effect of recovery actions, which 
means that if a system does not suffer 
any loss, there is no scope for a 
recovery and thus there is no scope to 
exhibit resilience. 
• It is associated only with 
recovery actions, while preparedness 
actions (vulnerability) are 
disregarded. 
• The parameters need to be 
further defined in order to formulate 
a consistent quantitative approach. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Henry & 
Ramirez- 
Marquez (2012); 
Zhang et al. 
(2018) 
R-7 
Annual 
Resilience, AR 
 
2
2
0
0
( )
t
t
Q t dt
AR E
TP t dt
 
 
 
  


  
where 
2t  = 1 year;  TP t  = target 
performance at time t.  
• It can incorporate 
multiple inter-related 
hazards happened during 
one year, making the 
approach more applicable 
for real-world applications. 
• The target performance 
curve can be a constant line 
or a stochastic process. 
• It needs more input data such as 
the annual occurrence frequency of 
different hazards. 
• It focuses only on the technical 
dimension of resilience and 
introduces the multiple hazards 
effects in a non-correlated manner. 
• Quantifying resilience using a 
single metric may only provide 
partial information about actual 
resilience. 
Ouyang, 
Dueñas-Osorio & 
Min (2012) 
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Table 2-3 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Advantages Limitations Reference 
R-8 
Dynamic 
resilience 
metric, 
i , for 
event i 
0 0
dr
i P
FF
S
F F
    
where pS  = speed of recovery; 0F  = 
pre-disaster performance level; 
dF  = 
performance level immediately following 
the disruption; 
rF  = the performance 
level of the post-disaster new normal.  
• It considers the 
possibility that the system 
may recover to a 
post-disaster new normal. 
• This metric is not constrained 
on [0, 1], thereby making the extreme 
values difficult to comprehend. 
• It assumes that the speed of 
recovery follows exponential growth, 
which may not always be the case. 
Francis & Bekera 
(2014) 
R-9 
(1) Resilience 
disparity, 
 1 2,q q   
(2) Center of 
resilience, Q   
(3) Median of 
resilience, 
,0.5Q   
(4) Mode of 
resilience, 
,maxQ   
(5) Resilience 
quantile, ,Q w   
(6) Resilience 
bandwidth, Q   
(7) Resilience 
skewness, Q   
The mathematical definition of each 
metric can be found in the reference 
paper. The general idea is to view the 
recovery curve as the cumulative 
resilience function, which is similar to the 
cumulative distribution function in 
probability theory, and then use the 
comparable terms in probability theory to 
describe different characteristics of 
resilience. 
• It can systematically 
describe the recovery curve 
and provide a whole picture 
of resilience. 
• It can distinguish any 
recovery curves, including 
the examples shown in 
Figure 2-4, Figure 2-5 and 
Figure 2-6. 
• The calculation of these 
resilience metrics is a little bit 
complicated. 
Sharma, 
Tabandeh & 
Gardoni (2018) 
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Figure 2-4. Two example recovery curves having the same normalized area under the curve, normalized by recovery 
time. 
 
Figure 2-5. Two example recovery curves having the same area under the curve. 
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Figure 2-6. Two example recovery curves having the same area above the curve. 
The forgoing review shows that several quantitative resilience assessment approaches 
exist, which can measure resilience either deterministically or probabilistically. The subjective 
evaluation-based methods usually start with assessing different characteristics (e.g. robustness, 
rapidity, redundancy) or different aspects of resilience (e.g. infrastructure resilience, social 
resilience, economic resilience) based on expert estimation or self-evaluation. The score for each 
category or indicator of resilience are then aggregated in some way (e.g. weighted or unweighted 
sum) to produce an index of resilience. The primary advantage of this type of approach is that the 
resilience can be assessed comprehensively by including more characteristics or aspects of 
resilience. However, the major limitation of this type of approach is that the assessment result is 
very subjective. Different experts may have very different perspectives about the infrastructure 
system’s performance, or other indicators of community resilience. The result is especially 
unreliable if only few experts’ opinions are collected.  
The distinguishing feature of the probability theory-based approach is its 
acknowledgement of uncertainty in quantification of resilience. However, it can be noticed from 
Table 2-3 that most probability theory-based methods are used together with the subjective 
evaluation-based methods. This is due to the fact that most probability theory-based methods 
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require the identification of some acceptable performance standards, such as the maximum 
acceptable loss or maximum acceptable recovery time, etc. These threshold values are usually 
determined based on expert judgements, which makes the quality of the evaluation results highly 
dependent upon the subjective expert judgements of the threshold values.  
Among the three types of resilience assessment approaches, the recovery curve-based 
approach is least dependent upon subjective estimations and has the widest application. A 
recovery curve of infrastructure systems under a disruptive event provides a whole picture of the 
infrastructure performance under disasters to quantify resilience, since it could reflect the 
systems’ vulnerability when disaster happens, the recovery time to the pre-disaster state or a 
post-disaster new normal state, and the performance of the infrastructure systems at each time 
step between the hazard occurrence and the fully recovery times. Although every single recovery 
curve-based resilience assessment method shown in Table 2-3 has its own pros and cons, this 
type of approach in general has been most widely accepted to measure resilience of infrastructure 
systems, either individually or as an integrated network. Implementing different pre-disaster risk 
mitigation or post-disaster recovery plans would change the trajectory of the recovery curve and 
the recovery curve-based resilience metric, thus making this type of approach suitable to 
compare different risk mitigation strategies or optimize different recovery plans. Since this 
research also uses the recovery curve-based resilience assessment method to develop framework 
to guide community infrastructure resilience planning, the following section would present a 
review of the state-of-research on infrastructure recovery modeling for resilience assessment. 
2.4. Infrastructure Recovery Modeling for Resilience Assessment 
Developing models to simulate the post-disaster damage and recovery of the 
infrastructure systems to better support disaster risk management decision making has become an 
important research topic of the community resilience initiatives reviewed in section 2.1. This 
section provides an overview of the existing infrastructure recovery models developed in recent 
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decades, as are summarized in Table 2-4. For each methodology reviewed in Table 2-4, the 
methodological type, model highlights, its application, the resolution of the infrastructure 
interdependency considered in the model, and the reference of some representative works are 
clearly identified. The resolution of the modeled infrastructure interdependency is divided into 
four categories: (1) not considered: the model does not consider any interdependencies between 
different infrastructure systems or it’s only suitable for modeling the recovery of one 
infrastructure system; (2) system-to-system level: only the interdependencies between one 
infrastructure system (as a whole) and another infrastructure system (as a whole) are considered; 
(3) system-to-facility level: the interdependencies between one infrastructure system (as a whole) 
and a facility from another infrastructure system are considered; (4) facility-to-facility level: the 
interdependencies between two infrastructure facilities between different infrastructure systems 
are considered. It is noted that no attempt is made to score or rank different methodologies. Rather, 
this review is intended to identify modeling strategies, features, and gaps in a manner that will 
support future research efforts. The reviewed methodologies in Table 2-4 are first grouped by 
methodological type, and then listed chronologically. 
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Table 2-4．Summary of the infrastructure recovery models for resilience assessment. 
No.2 Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling3 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
A-1 
The Sandia National Laboratory developed five 
versions of the agent-based models (Aspen, 
Aspen-EE, CommAspen, NABLE, 
cyber-Attack-Consequence Assessment Process) 
to simulate and analyze the performance of 
interdependent systems, where different systems 
are viewed as agents who follow simple rules of 
behavior to react to the changing environment.  
Interdependent 
transportation, 
telecommunications, 
electric power, banking 
and finance, water, 
agriculture, emergency 
services, fossil fuels, and 
government systems 
 √   
Basu, Pryor & Quint 
(1998); Barton et al. 
(2000); Barton et al. 
(2004); Brown, Beyeler 
& Barton (2004); 
Schoenwald, Barton, & 
Ehlen (2004); Ehlen & 
Scholand (2005); Eidson 
& Ehlen (2005); Phillips, 
Kelic & Warren (2008) 
A-2 
The Argonne National Laboratory developed three 
versions of agent-based simulation models 
(SMART II, SMART II++ and FAST) for utility 
companies to better plan and operate the system 
performance. The models use integrated set of 
agents and interconnections representing the 
infrastructure facilities and the connections 
between them. 
Interdependent electric 
power and natural gas 
systems 
 √   North (2000, 2001a & b) 
 
 
  
                                                 
2 The abbreviation before the number refers to the methodological type, where “A” refers to agent-based approach, “SD” refers to system dynamics-based 
approach; “IO” refers to input-output based method; “CGE” refers to computable general equilibrium-based method; “NT” refers to network topology-based 
method; “NF” refers to network flow-based method. 
3 “N/A” refers to no interdependency is considered; “S-to-S” refers to system-to-system level interdependency is considered; “S-to-F” refers to system-to-facility 
level interdependency is considered; “F-to-F” refers to facility-to-facility level interdependency is considered. 
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Table 2-4 (Cont.) 
No. Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
A-3 
The agent-based modeling technology is used to 
simulate the behavior of web system to the 
changing environment. The key characteristic of 
an agent is that it exists as an individual entity 
with location, capabilities, and memory. From the 
interaction among these agents “emerge” 
behaviors that are not predictable by the 
knowledge of a single agent. 
Web system √    Cardellini et al. (2006) 
A-4 
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
developed the agent-based CIMS model to analyze 
the cascading failure associated with civil 
infrastructure interdependencies. It uses an 
agent-based approach to model infrastructure 
elements, the relations between elements, and 
individual component behavior.  
Interdependent electric 
power grid and key 
assets, including schools, 
government facilities, 
hospitals, and water 
pumping stations 
   √ 
Dudenhoeffer, Permann 
& Boring (2006); 
Dudenhoeffer, Permann 
& Manic (2006); 
Dudenhoeffer et al. 
(2007) 
A-5 
A model is developed based on the socially 
rational multi-agent systems. The equilibrium of a 
fictitious play is considered to analyze the impacts 
of various levels of information available to the 
interconnected system operators on the outcomes 
of the decision-making process under physical or 
cyber-attack. 
Power system √    
Bompard, Napoli & Xue 
(2009) 
A-6 
A framework is developed to model individual 
behavioral adaptation in the event of a no-notice 
crisis and its emergent effect on multiple 
infrastructures. The modeling environment 
provides policy makers and analysts a way to 
compare various response strategies and what if 
scenarios. 
Interdependent social, 
transportation and 
cellular systems 
 √   Barrett et al. (2010) 
A-7 
An agent-based model is proposed which can 
integrate an environmental vulnerability indicator 
to better guide the decision-making process of the 
associated stakeholders. Such approach will aid 
urban planners to redevelop societies into a more 
resilient status. 
Waste water treatment 
system 
√    Eid & El-adaway (2016) 
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Table 2-4 (Cont.) 
No. Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
SD-1 
The Los Alamos, Sandia, and Argonne National 
Laboratories developed the CIPDISS which is 
intended for analysis of high-level behavior of 
metropolitan or regional infrastructure, taking into 
account the way disruptions in one sector may 
propagate to other infrastructure systems. 
Modeling is performed using a system dynamics 
methodology where an infrastructure system is 
broken down into simple items and processes 
(feedback loops, stocks, and flows), which interact 
to produce complex behaviors. 
Interdependent 
transportation, health 
care, power, 
telecommunication and 
emergency service 
systems 
 √   
Croope, S., & McNeil 
(2011); Steinberg, 
Santella, & Zoli (2011) 
SD-2 
EVA-INFRA-SD is developed with an objective 
of measuring system performance over time 
following a disaster scenario. It can identify the 
effects of the failure of one infrastructure 
component as they propagate through different 
systems. 
Interdependent power, 
water and transportation 
systems 
  √ √ 
Tonmoy & El-Zein 
(2013) 
IO-1 
The Dynamic Inoperability Input-output Model 
(DIIM) is proposed to analyze how the system of 
interdependent sectors can be adversely affected as 
a result of initial perturbations to other sectors 
through willful attacks or natural disasters. The 
strength of interdependencies between different 
industry sectors is measured by the national and 
regional commodity-transaction data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Regional Input–Output Multiplier System (RIMS 
II). 
Nearly 500 sectors of the 
U.S. economy 
 √   
Haimes (2002); Crowther 
et al. (2004); Jiang & 
Haimes (2004); Haimes 
et al. (2005 a,b); Lian & 
Haimes (2006); Santos 
(2006); Crowther,  
Haimes & Taub (2007); 
Haimes (2008); Barker & 
Haimes (2009 a,b) Reed, 
Kapur & Christie (2009); 
Cagno et al. (2011); 
Zhang, Kong & 
Simonovic (2018a) 
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Table 2-4 (Cont.) 
No. Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
CGE-1 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE)-based 
approach is used to model the behavioral response 
of critical infrastructure systems to input shortages 
and changing market conditions. The proposed 
methodology advances the CGE analysis of major 
supply disruptions of critical inputs in four 
aspects. 
Water distribution or 
power system 
√    
Rose & Liao (2005); 
Rose, Oladosu & Liao 
(2005) 
CGE-2 
The CGE-based multilayer infrastructure network 
(MIN) model is proposed which uses a 
market-based mechanism to address the disparate 
system characteristics. The MIN(S)CGE 
framework provides an elegant modeling platform 
to analyze multiple infrastructure systems and 
formulate their interdependencies. 
Interdependent 
transportation and 
telecommunication 
systems; interdependent 
power and energy (e.g. 
fossil energy products 
such as oil, natural gas, 
and coal) systems 
 √   
Peeta & Zhang (2009); 
Zhang & Peeta (2011 a, 
b) 
NT-1 
A model is proposed for the dynamic spreading of 
failures in networked systems. The model 
combines network nodes as active, bistable 
elements and delayed interactions along directed 
links. By means of simulations, the 
time-dependent spreading and cascade failures in 
different network topologies are explored. The 
model can be used to improve disaster 
preparedness and anticipative disaster response 
management. 
A hypothetical network    √ 
Buzna, Peters & Helbing 
(2006) 
NT-2 
Several metrics are proposed to measure the 
network topology change following a disruption. 
The physical interdependency strength between 
two infrastructure facilities is quantified by the 
probability of failure of one facility given the 
failure of another facility. 
Interdependent power 
and water systems 
   √ 
Dueña-Osorio, Craig & 
Goodno (2007) 
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Table 2-4 (Cont.) 
No. Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
NT-3 
A framework is developed to understand the 
robustness of interacting networks subject to 
cascading failure due to random removal of nodes. 
The result shows that a broader degree distribution 
increases the vulnerability of interdependent 
networks to random failure, which is opposite to 
how a single network behaves. Thus it highlights 
the need to consider interdependencies in 
designing robust networks. 
Two hypothetical 
interdependent systems 
   √ Buldyrev et al. (2010) 
NT-4 
A framework for interdependent infrastructure 
systems vulnerability analysis is proposed which 
could be used to optimize interface network 
topology design to minimize cascading failure. 
Both long-term and focused vulnerability analyses 
are executed. 
Interdependent power 
and water systems 
   √ 
Wang, Hong & Chen 
(2012) 
NT-5 
A five-phase probabilistic methodology is 
proposed which provides the ability to statistically 
characterize and model restoration for a given 
topology at a detailed enough level to be able to 
model dependency and potential interdependencies 
using mechanistic approaches. 
Electric power system √    
Unnikrishnan & van de 
Lindt (2016) 
NF-1 
The interdependent layer network (ILN) model is 
proposed to model the performance of 
infrastructure systems with considering five types 
of dependencies. The model can be used to 
optimize service restoration by solving a set of 
linear programming mathematical equations. 
Interdependent power 
and telecommunication 
systems 
   √ 
Wallace et al. (2001); 
Lee II, Mitchell  & 
Wallace (2007) 
NF-2 
A six-step probabilistic approach is proposed to 
model infrastructure system resilience that 
considers its dependency on other systems and 
incorporates both physical damage and network 
functionality to estimate system recovery as a 
function of time. 
One-way dependency of 
water system on power 
system 
   √ Guidotti et al. (2016) 
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Table 2-4 (Cont.) 
No. Model highlights Application 
Resolution of interdependency modeling 
Reference 
N/A S-to-S S-to-F F-to-F 
NF-3 
A mathematical framework is developed to 
simulate the time variant performance of the 
electric power infrastructure system. The 
framework is capable of representing regional 
infrastructure by explicitly modeling their various 
capacities, demands, and corresponding supply 
measures. 
Electric power system √    
Sharma & Gardoni 
(2018) 
NF-4 
A probabilistic network flow-based methodology 
is proposed to predict the reduction or loss of 
functionality of the infrastructure in terms of their 
ability to provide essential goods or services to 
satisfy the post-disaster demand. 
Interdependent social 
system (human response 
such as evacuation or 
relocation) and water 
system 
  √  
Guidotti, Gardoni & 
Rosenheim (2019) 
 
52 
 
The foregoing review shows that there exist several studies on the methodologies to 
model and simulate the performance of infrastructure systems under disruptive events to date. 
These existing methodologies can be classified into five broad types: agent-based approach, 
system dynamics-based approach, input-output-based approach, computable general 
equilibrium-based approach, network topology-based approach and network flow-based 
approach. The agent-based approach views civil infrastructure systems and the decision makers as 
autonomous agents which could interact with each other and its environment following a set of 
rules (Ouyang, 2014). An agent is a computational entity that receives information and acts on its 
environment in an autonomous way. Through the use of simulation techniques such as 
evolutionary learning techniques, linear and nonlinear programming, numerical simulation or 
Monte Carlo simulation, the interactive behavior of these agents can be examined as they make 
real-life decisions in an environment where agents communicate with each other and adapt their 
behaviors to changing conditions, all the while learning from their past experience (Pederson et al., 
2006). The system dynamics-based approach models the interdependent complex adaptive 
systems using three core components: stocks (the accumulation of resources in a system), flows 
(the rates of change that alter those resources) and feedback loops (the information that determines 
the values of the flows) and analyzes their behavior over time based on nonlinear theory and 
feedback controls (Stapelberg, 2008; Hasan & Foliente, 2015). The input-output-based approach 
extends the principles of Leontief’s Input-output (I-O) model in economics and makes it 
applicable to simulate the recovery of interdependent infrastructure systems following a 
disruptive event (Leontief & Leontief, 1986; Haimes et al., 2005 a, b). The computable general 
equilibrium-based approach can be viewed as an extension of the I-O model since it inherits the 
main features of the I-O models such as the consideration of interdependencies among economic 
sectors but overcomes some of its limitations including the linear assumption, lack of consumers’ 
and producers’ behavior responses to market and price constraints and so on (Rose, 2004; Rose & 
Liao, 2005). As is indicated by the name, the network topology-based approach models the civil 
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infrastructure systems based on their topologies. The states of the nodes and links in the network 
can be either normal or damaged. The nodes can fail directly due to their vulnerability during 
hazards, or indirectly due to the disconnections from their dependent supply nodes (Patterson & 
Apostolakis, 2007; Adachi & Ellingwood, 2008). Some topology-based or functionality-based 
metrics can be used to measure the overall performance of the infrastructure network, which will 
be further discussed in section 2.5. Building upon the topology of the network, the network 
flow-based model takes into account the products, information or services delivered by the civil 
infrastructure system as network flows. Each node in the network can be either a supply, demand 
or transshipment node, while each link has a limited capacity with the commodities flow on the 
links. 
The infrastructure interdependencies can be modeled at different resolutions. Some of the 
reviewed methodologies in Table 2-4 are developed for a specific infrastructure system, or focus 
on individual systems, which make them hard to be generalized into modeling the damage and 
recovery of other infrastructure systems, or the integrated interdependent infrastructure network. 
For those methodologies that can incorporate interdependencies between different infrastructure 
systems, many of them consider only the system-to-system level interdependencies, especially 
for the agent-based, system dynamics-based or input-output-based models. One of the 
advantages of incorporating the system-to-system level interdependency in modeling the 
post-disaster recovery and resilience of the infrastructure network is that it’s simple and easy to 
be modeled. Besides, the data needed to assess the system-to-system level interdependencies, 
such as the performance data of various infrastructure systems under historical disasters, is 
relatively easier to be obtained. The disadvantage of only considering the system-to-system level 
interdependencies is that it simplifies the recovery process of the infrastructure system by 
ignoring the different damage levels and recovery times of the facilities within each system after 
a disaster. The modeling result may not be very helpful in guiding the strategic risk mitigation 
planning of a community in terms of identifying the most critical facilities in a system which 
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needed to be repaired or upgraded in order to achieve higher resiliency. To overcome the 
limitation of only considering the system-to-system level interdependencies among different 
infrastructure systems and get a more refined modeling result, the facility-to-facility level 
interdependency/dependency are considered in some recovery models, especially in those 
network topology or network flow-based models. The refined modeling result could be more 
useful for supporting decisions for disaster risk management. However, not all systems can be 
modeled, or need to be modeled at the facility level given the nature and complexity of the 
system, and different modeling resolutions are needed for individual systems. In these situations, 
the system-to-facility level interdependencies/dependencies come into play. Based on the nature 
of system, some systems could be modeled using a network, while others, such as the social 
system, the manufacturing system and so on, could not. For those systems that could be 
represented by a network, different types of network topology exist. A system can be modeled as 
a network consisting of only isolated nodes (e.g. trees, lighthouses), or only links (e.g. roads, 
natural gas pipelines), or a more common network with nodes connected by the links (e.g. power 
system, water system). Considering the interaction of the systems with different natures when 
assessing the community resilience can help to understand the community resilience in a more 
comprehensive way. Besides, if a large number of systems needed to be considered when 
assessing the community resilience, modeling every system in the facility level may not be 
feasible due to long computation time. In this case, modeling some relatively unimportant 
(independent) systems at system level while modeling the most important (dependent) systems at 
facility level could lead to shorter computation time while still achieving the satisfied level of 
detail and accuracy of the modeling result. The summary in Table 2-4 reveals that only few 
methodologies are capable to consider system-to-facility level interdependencies. It would be 
more flexible and applicable if a recovery model could incorporate three different levels of the 
infrastructure interdependency, which is the direction of the proposed research. 
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2.5. Post-disaster Infrastructure Performance Metrics 
As is indicated in the previous sections, the infrastructure recovery curve depicts the 
performance of the infrastructure system(s) over time following a disruptive event. Various 
post-disaster infrastructure performance metrics have been developed in recent decades through 
different community resilience initiatives or other related research efforts, which can be broadly 
grouped into three types based on the applicable phase. The first type focuses on assessing the 
hazard-resistant performance of infrastructure system at the time of hazard occurrence. Example 
metrics of this type include: reliability, probability of failure, vulnerability, robustness, flexibility, 
survivability and so on (Nicholson, 2003; Grubesic & Murray, 2006; Sun, Turnquist & Nozick, 
2006; Abdel-Rahim et al., 2007; Murray, Matisziw & Grubesic, 2007; Berle, Asbjørnslett & Rice, 
2011; Chen & Kasikitwiwat, 2011; Luping & Dalin, 2012; Snelder, van Zuylen & Immers, 2012; 
Chen, Kasikitwiwat & Yang, 2013; Faturechi & Miller-Hooks, 2014). The second type measures 
the performance of the infrastructure system at any point in time after a disruptive event and 
examples of metrics of this type includes connectivity, efficiency, accessibility, relative order of 
the largest cluster, flow capacity, travel time/distance, water pressure, etc. (Günneç & Salman, 
2011; Guidotti et al., 2016; Zhang, Wang & Nicholson, 2017; He & Cha, 2018a). The third type 
of the metrics measure the performance of the infrastructure system over the entire recovery 
curve and can be used to evaluate the efficiency or effectiveness of the infrastructure recovery. 
Some of the metrics in this type, such as recovery time or rapidity, are often used to measure the 
efficiency of the recovery process (or how fast the recovery is), while other metrics of this type, 
such as skewness, are oftentimes used to quantify the effectiveness of the recovery (where the 
shape of the recovery trajectory is taken into consideration) (Bruneau et al., 2003; Reed, Kapur & 
Christie, 2009; Sharma, Tabandeh & Gardoni, 2018). A list of post-disaster infrastructure 
performance metrics, including the definitions, applicable system(s), applicable phase and the 
reference of some representative works, is shown in Table 2-5 alphabetically. 
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Table 2-5. Summary of the post-disaster infrastructure performance metrics. 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
1 Accessibility 
j
i i i
i i j i ij
P
A w a w
t
        
where A = accessibility of a road network; 
ia = the 
accessibility of a road intersection point i; 
iw = 
weight attached to the accessibility of road 
intersection point i; jP = population attached to 
point j; ijt = travel time between point i and j;  = a 
calibration parameter related to traffic count. 
Transportation 
system 
 √  
Chang & 
Nojima (2001); 
Antunes, Seco 
& Pinto (2003); 
Taylor (2012); 
Moya-Gómez 
(2018) 
2 
Average path 
length 
 
1
1
ij
i j
l d
N N 


   
where l = average path length of a graph; ijd = the 
distance between node i and j; N = the total number 
of nodes in a graph. The average path length is a 
measure of how the network is scattered.  
All  √  
Holmgren 
(2006); Costa et 
al. (2007) 
3 
Average 
vertex degree 
1
1 N
i
i
k k
N 
    
where k = average vertex degree; ik = vertex 
degree of node i; N = the total number of nodes in a 
graph. The vertex degree of a node is the number of 
edges connecting to the node.  
All  √  
Holmgren 
(2006); Costa et 
al. (2007) 
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Table 2-5 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
4 
Characteristic 
path length 
 
1
1
1
2
ij
i j
L d
n n 


   
where L = characteristic path length of the network; 
n = the number of nodes in the network; 
ijd = the 
shortest path length between nodes i and j. 
All  √  
Dueñas-Osorio 
et al. (2007) 
5 
Clustering 
coefficient 
 
 
1
1
1
2
i
i
i i
E
C
n
d d


 
   
where C =clustering coefficient;  iE  = the 
number of edges in the neighborhood of node i; 
id = 
vertex degree of node i. 
 
All  √  
Holmgren 
(2006); Costa et 
al. (2007); 
Dueñas-Osorio 
et al. (2007) 
6 
Connectivity 
loss / 
Connectivity 
1
i
g
L
g i
N
C
N
    
where 
LC = connectivity loss; gN = total number of 
source nodes (e.g. power generators from the power 
system); i
gN = the number of source nodes that are 
connected to node i. The averaging is done over 
every node i. 
All  √  
Albert, Albert & 
Nakarado 
(2004); Clark & 
Watling (2005); 
Guikema & 
Gardoni (2009); 
Peeta et al. 
(2010);  
Bocchini & 
Frangopol 
(2011); Kurtz, 
Song & Gardoni 
(2015); He & 
Cha (2018a & 
b, 2019a) 
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Table 2-5 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
7 Efficiency  
 
1 1
1 i j ij
E
N N d


  
where E = average path length of a graph; ijd = the 
distance between node i and j; N = the total number 
of nodes in a graph. 
All  √  
Costa et al. 
(2007); 
Dueña-Osorio, 
Craig & 
Goodno (2007); 
Nagurney & 
Qiang (2007); 
He & Cha 
(2018a & b, 
2019a) 
8 Flow capacity 
Depends on system, could be traffic for road 
network, power flow for power system, water flow 
for water system, etc. 
All  √  
Lee et al. 
(2011); Guidotti 
et al. (2016) 
9 
Percentage of 
demand meet 
The percentage of customers with infrastructure 
service. 
All  √  
Kameda (2000); 
Guidotti et al. 
(2016); He & 
Cha (2019c) 
10 Power The power flow in MW. Power system  √  
Fang et al. 
(2018) 
11 
Probability of 
failure 
The probability of damage or loss of function. All √   
Reed, Kapur & 
Christie (2009); 
Luna, 
Balakrishnan & 
Dagli (2011) 
12 Rapidity The rate of recovery. All   √ 
Bruneau et al. 
(2003); Reed, 
Kapur & 
Christie (2009) 
13 
Recovery 
time 
The time from infrastructure damage to full 
recovery. 
All   √ 
Bruneau et al. 
(2003); Reed, 
Kapur & 
Christie (2009) 
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Table 2-5 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
14 
Redundancy 
ratio 
 
 
 2
2
;
1 1
,
1v j V v j v
R I v j
n S    
 


    
where R = redundancy ratio; n = the number of nodes 
in the network;  2 v = the neighbors of the 
neighbors of node v;  ,I v j = the number of 
node-independent paths from v to j. 
All  √  
Dueñas-Osorio 
et al. (2007) 
15 
Relative 
order of the 
largest cluster 
The number of nodes in the largest cluster (of 
connected nodes) divided by the total number of 
nodes in the network. 
All  √  
Holmgren 
(2006) 
16 Reliability 
The ability of the system to maintain normal 
operation before or under disruptions. 
All √   
Hosseini, 
Barker & 
Ramirez- 
Marquez 
(2016); 
Soltani-Sobh et 
al. (2016); 
Panteli et al. 
(2017) 
17 Robustness 
The ability to withstand the hazard when it occurs. 
Can be calculated as the complement of 
vulnerability. 
All √   
Bruneau et al. 
(2003); Reed, 
Kapur & 
Christie (2009) 
18 Skewness 
   
 
1
0
1
0
0
t
t
t
t
R t t t dt
s
R t dt
 



  
where s = the skewness of the recovery trajectory; 0t  
and 1t  = the end points of the time period in 
consideration;  R t  = the recovery trajectory. 
All   √ 
Zhang, Wang & 
Nicholson 
(2017); Sharma, 
Tabandeh & 
Gardoni (2018) 
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Table 2-5 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
19 Survivability 
(S,E,D,V,T,P)Survivability f   
where S is the set of acceptable service 
specifications, E describes the ways in which the 
system can degrade based on external challenges, D 
are the practical values of E, V is the relative 
ordering of service values S D, T S S D is the 
set of valid transitions between service states S given 
a challenge D, and P are the service probabilities that 
some s  S must meet dependability requirements. 
Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its 
mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of 
threats such as attacks or large-scale natural 
disasters. 
All √   
Heegaard & 
Trivedi (2009); 
Sterbenz et al. 
(2010) 
20 
Travel 
time/distance 
The driving or walking time/distance between two 
points in the road network, or the average of all 
driving or walking time/distance between any pair of 
points in the road network. 
Transportation 
system 
 √  
Asakura & 
Kashiwadani 
(1995); Chen, 
Kasikitwiwat & 
Yang (2007); 
Zhang & Wang 
(2017) 
21 Vulnerability 
0
0
P P
V
P

   
where V = vulnerability; P = post-disaster 
performance; 0P = pre-disaster performance. It’s 
defined as the drop in performance after the disaster. 
All √   
Costa et al. 
(2007); Reed, 
Kapur & 
Christie (2009); 
MacKenzie & 
Barker (2012) 
22 
Water 
pressure / 
water quality 
The pressure of the water flow in the network. 
Percentage of local demand nodes without issuance 
of a boil water notice (an indicator of water quality) 
Water system  √  
Guidotti et al. 
(2016) 
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Table 2-5 (Cont.) 
No. Metric Definition Applicable system 
Applicable phase 
Reference 
Only at 
hazard 
occurrence 
Every time 
step during 
recovery phase 
Overall 
recovery 
phase 
23 
Weighted 
independent 
path 
1
1 1
1 1
1
n n
ij
i j
IPW K
n n

 


    
where IPW = the average number of the independent 
pathways in a road network; n = the number of nodes 
in the network; ijK = the number of independent 
pathways between node i and j. This metric could be 
weighted by reliability of each road, the emergency 
facilities or traffic.   
Transportation 
system 
 √  
Zhang et al. 
(2017, 2018) 
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The review in Table 2-5 shows that numerous post-disaster performance metrics for 
infrastructure systems were proposed in recent years. Although every metric has its own merits, 
most of the existing performance metrics for the infrastructure systems has one or several of the 
following limitations. The first type of the post-disaster infrastructure performance metrics, such 
as reliability, vulnerability and robustness, are suitable to measure the performance of 
infrastructure system only at the time of hazard occurrence and fail to take the whole recovery 
phase into consideration. This type of metric is of limited use when quantifying the performance 
of the infrastructure systems over time following a disruptive event. The second type of the 
metrics, such as connectivity, efficiency and accessibility, are used to measure the performance 
of the infrastructure system at one point in time during the recovery phase. Although they are 
suitable for measuring the change of infrastructure performance over time, they cannot reflect the 
overall performance of the infrastructure systems during the entire recovery phase. Thus, they 
are of limited use when trying to compare different recovery curves under different network 
topologies or recovery strategies. The third type of the metrics, such as skewness and recovery 
time, can measure the overall performance of the entire interdependent infrastructure network 
over the whole post-disaster recovery phase; however, they may also have some limitations 
under some circumstances. Besides, most of the metrics emphasize on measuring the 
functionality of infrastructure systems and fail to take the service disruptions to the end-users 
into consideration. In summary, it’s recommended to use several different metrics to measure the 
infrastructure performance from different perspectives and provide a more complete picture of 
the infrastructure performance under disasters to better guide the pre-disaster risk mitigation and 
post-disaster recovery planning. 
2.6. Infrastructure Risk Management Decision-making for Community Resilience Planning 
The previous sections present a number of existing studies on defining and quantifying 
infrastructure recovery or resilience. However, their usefulness is limited unless they can guide 
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the planning for community resilience. As is highlighted before, resilience can be generally 
understood as the ability or the process of an entity to withstand a disruption, to recover from it 
rapidly either to the pre-disaster state or to a post-disaster new normal. All these components of 
resilience are the result of strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation planning and post-disaster 
resource allocation and recovery optimization efforts. The pre-disaster and post-disaster are two 
distinct phases of community resilience planning since they have different objectives, constraints, 
decision makers and so on. The existing literatures on infrastructure disaster risk management 
decision-making for community resilience planning are summarized in Table 2-6. For each 
reviewed work, its applicable phase and infrastructure system(s), whether the interdependency 
between different infrastructure systems is considered, the brief summary of the general 
approaches used and some references are clearly identified. The literatures in Table 2-6 are first 
categorized based on the applicable phase, then ordered chronologically.
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Table 2-6. Summary of the infrastructure disaster risk management decision framework for community resilience planning. 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
1 Pre-disaster Gas and power systems Yes 
A mathematical model and solution procedure are 
proposed to optimize investments in interconnected 
infrastructures to achieve improvements in "time to 
recover" subject to a budget constraint. 
Nozick et al. (2004); 
Xu et al. (2007) 
2 Pre-disaster 
A general infrastructure 
network 
N/A 
An evolutionary algorithm is proposed to optimize the 
topology of large-scale infrastructure network for higher 
resilience against cascading failures. 
Ash & Newth (2007) 
3 Pre-disaster Bridge network No 
A numerical model is proposed to find the optimal bridge 
retrofit program that aims to maximize the postdisaster 
network evacuation capacity. 
Chang et al. (2012) 
4 Pre-disaster 
Any infrastructure system 
that has a network topology 
No 
A mixed integer non-linear program is proposed to 
quantify the operational resilience of a critical 
infrastructure system. The proposed program aims to find 
out the best defense strategy in case of attacks. 
Alderson, Brown & 
Carlyle (2014) 
5 Pre-disaster 
Transportation system 
(railroad network) 
No 
A mathematical optimization model and iterative heuristic 
algorithm solution approach are proposed to identify 
critical railroad infrastructure components to maximize rail 
network resilience. 
Khaled et al. (2015) 
6 Pre-disaster 
Transportation system 
(bridge network) 
No 
A decision model is proposed to assist bridge authorities in 
determining a preferred maintenance prioritization 
schedule for a degraded bridge network in a community 
that optimizes the performance of transportation systems 
within budgetary constraints at a regional scale. The 
problem is solved using network analysis methods, 
structural reliability principles and meta-heuristic 
optimization algorithms. 
Zhang & Wang (2017) 
7 Pre-disaster Power and gas systems Yes 
A game-theoretic attacker-defender and 
defender-attacker-defender modeling techniques are 
applied to assessing the resilience of interdependent 
critical infrastructure systems under worst-case disruptions 
and advising policymakers on making pre-disruption 
decisions for improving the resilience of interdependent 
infrastructures. 
Fang & Zio (2019) 
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Table 2-6 (Cont.) 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
8 Post-disaster Telecommunication system No 
A multi-objective optimization approach for network 
restoration during disaster recovery is proposed. The 
proposed model permits tradeoffs between two objectives, 
minimization of system cost and maximization of system 
flow, to be evaluated. 
Matisziw, Murray & 
Grubesic (2010) 
9 Post-disaster 
Transportation system (road 
network) 
No 
An innovative framework that integrates two newly 
developed models for resource utilization and 
multi-objective optimization are proposed to optimize the 
recovery efforts. The developed models provide new and 
unique capabilities, including (1) allocating limited 
reconstruction resources to competing recovery projects, 
(2) estimating the reconstruction duration and cost 
associated with implementing specific recovery plans, and 
(3) generating optimal trade-offs between minimizing the 
reconstruction duration and cost. 
Orabi et al. (2010) 
10 Post-disaster 
Transportation system (road 
network); can be applied to 
several interdependent 
infrastructure systems 
Yes 
A rule-based decision framework is proposed to provide 
strategies to maximize resilience. A multi-objective 
optimization algorithm is used to improve the performance 
of interdependent networks of multiple systems. 
Reed, Zabinsky & 
Boyle (2011) 
11 Post-disaster 
Transportation system (road 
network) 
No 
A two-stage stochastic model is proposed which could 
optimize the post-disaster recovery scheduling of the 
transportation systems to maximize its resilience. 
Chen & Miller-Hooks 
(2012); Miller-Hooks, 
Zhang & Faturechi 
(2012) 
12 Post-disaster 
Transportation system 
(airport pavement network) 
No 
A mathematical model is proposed to address the problem 
of assessing and maximizing the resilience of an airport's 
runway and taxiway network under multiple potential 
damage-meteorological scenarios. The problem is 
formulated as a stochastic integer program that seeks an 
optimal allocation of limited resources to response 
capabilities and preparedness actions. 
Faturechi,  Levenberg 
& Miller-Hooks (2014) 
13 Post-disaster 
Transportation system 
(public metro system) 
No 
A two-stage stochastic programming model is developed 
to optimize the resilience of a metropolitan public 
transportation network. The model could generate 
alternative paths under disruptive conditions. 
Jin et al. (2014) 
14 Post-disaster 
Transportation system (road 
network) 
No 
A multi-objective optimization model is proposed to 
optimize road recovery sequences and modes. 
Vugrin, Turnquist & 
Brown (2014) 
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Table 2-6 (Cont.) 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
15 Post-disaster Power and water systems Yes 
Two component importance measures based on an 
interdependent networks resilience optimization model are 
proposed to prioritize the restoration process of the 
disrupted components in each infrastructure network such 
that the resilience of the interdependent infrastructure 
networks is maximized 
Almoghathawi, Barker 
& Ramirez-Marquez 
(2017) 
16 Post-disaster Power system No 
An optimization model for the post-disaster restoration 
planning of infrastructure systems, taking into account the 
possibility of combining the construction of new 
components and the repair of failed ones, is proposed. The 
problem is formulated as mixed-integer binary linear 
program, and an efficient Benders decomposition 
algorithm is devised to cope with the computational 
complexity of its solution. 
Fang & Sansavini 
(2017) 
17 Post-disaster 
Power, water and gas 
systems 
Yes 
A reduced-order representation, dubbed a recovery 
operator, of a high-fidelity time-dependent recovery model 
of interdependent infrastructure systems is proposed. The 
proposed compact representation provides simple yet 
powerful information regarding systemic recovery 
dynamics and enables generating fast suboptimal recovery 
policies in time-critical applications. 
González et al. (2017) 
18 Post-disaster Gas pipeline system No 
A multi-objective optimization model is proposed which 
aims at minimizing both the loss from disruption and 
recovery time. The trade-off between generation, 
transmission, recovery costs and lost demand is analyzed. 
The model provides insights for improving the resilience 
of gas pipelines after disruption; and serves as a tool for 
analyzing strategic recovery and potential cascading 
failure effects in gas network. 
He & Nwafor (2017) 
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Table 2-6 (Cont.) 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
19 Post-disaster Power and water system Yes 
A best-case decentralized model is proposed to allow 
controllers to develop a full recovery plan to minimize 
recovery cost. Accounting for network controllers' urgency 
in repairing their system, an ad hoc sequential 
game-theoretic-based model is proposed where 
interdependent infrastructure network recovery is 
represented as a discrete time non-cooperative game 
between network controllers that is guaranteed to converge 
to equilibrium. The computation time is reduced by 
finding a solution by applying a best-response heuristic 
Smith et al. (2017) 
20 Post-disaster 
Transportation system 
(road-bridge network) 
No 
A resilience-based framework is proposed which could 
optimize the scheduling of the post-disaster recovery 
actions of the road-bridge transportation network. The 
framework is illustrated by using genetic algorithm to 
solve the post-disaster restoration schedule optimization 
problem for a hypothetical bridge network subjected to 
scenario seismic event. 
Zhang, Wang & 
Nicholson (2017) 
21 Post-disaster Power system No 
A sequential discrete optimization approach is proposed, 
as a decision-making framework at the community level 
for recovery management. The proposed mathematical 
approach leverages approximate dynamic programming 
along with heuristics for the determination of recovery 
actions given limited resources. 
Nozhati et al. (2018a) 
22 Post-disaster Power and water systems Yes 
A Markov decision process-based optimization approach 
is proposed which incorporates different sources of 
uncertainties to compute the restoration policies. The 
computation of optimal scheduling schemes using this 
method employs the rollout algorithm, which provides an 
effective computational tool for optimization problems 
dealing with real-world large-scale interdependent 
infrastructure systems. 
Nozhati et al. (2018b) 
23 Post-disaster 
Power and 
telecommunication systems 
Yes 
A minimum cost flow assignment optimization problem is 
proposed to minimize the cost and maximize the total 
amount of load served during the recovery intervention 
with considering the interdependency between power and 
its monitor systems. 
Tootaghaj et al. (2018) 
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Table 2-6 (Cont.) 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
24 Post-disaster Power and water systems Yes 
An optimization model for determining an optimal joint 
restoration strategy at infrastructure component level by 
minimizing the economic loss from the infrastructure 
failures is proposed. 
Zhang, Kong & 
Simonovic (2018b) 
25 Post-disaster 
Power, water, transportation, 
food, fuel, healthcare and 
education systems 
Yes 
A holistic mathematical model is proposed to evaluate the 
vulnerability of an urban infrastructure system against the 
threats of cascading failures. 
Lu et al. (2018) 
26 Post-disaster Power and water systems Yes 
A resilience-driven multi-objective restoration model is 
developed using mixed-integer programming that aims to 
maximize the resilience of the system of interdependent 
infrastructure networks while minimizing the total cost 
associated with the restoration process. The restoration 
model considers the availability of limited time and 
resources and provides a prioritized list of components, 
nodes or links, to be restored along with assigning and 
scheduling them to the available work crews. 
Almoghathawi, Barker 
& Albert (2019) 
27 
Pre-disaster 
& 
post-disaster 
Transportation system No 
A systematic approach is proposed for risk modeling and 
disaster management of transportation systems in the 
context of earthquake engineering. 
Chang (2010); Chang, 
Elnashai & Spencer, 
(2012) 
28 
Pre-disaster 
& 
post-disaster 
Water system No 
Two stochastic resilience-based component importance 
measures are developed to highlight the critical waterway 
links that contribute to waterway network resilience. An 
optimization approach is proposed determines the order in 
which disrupted links should be recovered for improved 
resilience. 
Baroud, Barker & 
Ramirez-Marquez 
(2014) 
29 
Pre-disaster 
& 
post-disaster 
Power system No 
A tri-level decision-making model supporting critical 
infrastructure resilience optimization against intentional 
attacks is proposed. A novel decomposition algorithm is 
introduced to exactly identify the best pre-event defense 
strategy (protecting vulnerable components and building 
new lines), the worst-case attack scenario, and the optimal 
post-event repair sequence of damaged components. 
Ouyang & Fang (2017) 
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Table 2-6 (Cont.) 
No. 
Applicable 
phase 
Applicable system(s) 
Interdependency 
considered? 
Approaches Reference 
30 
Pre-disaster 
& 
post-disaster 
Transportation system (road 
network) 
No 
A three-stage decision framework is proposed to support 
resilience planning for roadway networks regarding 
pre-disaster mitigation (Stage I), post-disaster emergency 
response (Stage II) and long-term recovery (Stage III). A 
stage-wise decision process is then formulated as a 
stochastic multi-objective optimization problem, which 
includes a project ranking mechanism to identify 
pre-disaster network retrofit projects in Stage I, a 
prioritization approach for temporary repairs to facilitate 
immediate post-disaster emergency responses in Stage II, 
and a methodology for scheduling network-wide repairs 
during the long-term recovery of the roadway system in 
Stage III. 
Zhang et al. (2017, 
2018) 
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The review in Table 2-6 shows that recent decade has witnessed a growing body of 
studies on infrastructure disaster risk management decision-making, but the following gaps are 
identified for future work.  
(1) The majority of the literatures reviewed focus on optimizing the post-disaster 
recovery scheduling given limited available resources, while only few researches aim at 
optimizing the pre-disaster risk mitigation prioritization or investment. Improving the 
pre-disaster risk mitigation and preparedness and enhancing the post-disaster emergency 
response and long-term recovery are equally important in improving the community resilience, 
thus more studies are needed to improve the pre-disaster risk mitigation and preparedness;  
(2) Most of the reviewed decision-making models or frameworks tend to focus on a 
single type of the infrastructure system, especially the transportation or power system, while 
ignoring the interdependencies between different infrastructure systems. However, improving the 
performance of one single infrastructure system under disasters may not be the most efficient and 
effective way to reduce the loss and enhance the overall community resilience. In a modern 
society, the infrastructure systems are usually interdependent upon each other. The proper 
operation of a facility in one infrastructure system not only depends on the operation of facilities 
in the same system, but also relies on the functioning of facilities in several other infrastructure 
systems for product input and information sharing. The service interruptions of the facilities in 
one infrastructure system could set off a cascading failure across the facilities in the 
interconnected systems after the disaster, which could pose both direct and indirect 
socioeconomic impacts. Furthermore, during the post-disaster recovery phase, the complete 
recovery of a facility in one infrastructure system depends not only on the physical restoration of 
itself, but also on the recovery of the facilities in other infrastructure systems that it depends on. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the interdependencies with other infrastructure systems 
when planning the pre-disaster risk mitigation or post-disaster recovery of any infrastructure 
system in order to achieve higher community resilience;  
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(3) To the author’s knowledge, the majority of the studies available in the literature are 
still at the research and development stage. It’s needed to develop user-friendly decision-making 
tools to better guide the decision-makers to prioritize pre-disaster risk mitigation and optimize 
post-disaster recovery planning actions;  
(4) Most of the reviewed literatures do not consider the uncertainties when quantifying 
the recovery and resilience of the infrastructure systems, which are not suitable to support the 
risk-informed decision-making; and  
(5) The existing decision models or frameworks have relatively weak integration of 
physical infrastructure systems with social and economic systems. The interactions between the 
physical, social and economic aspects should be further characterized and quantified to advance 
models and frameworks for more comprehensive community resilience planning. 
2.7. Closure 
This chapter provides a review of the current state-of-the-research on disaster risk 
management for community resilience planning with an emphasis on infrastructure systems. 
Some representative community resilience initiatives worldwide have been reviewed first. Then, 
the five most common directions of these community resilience research efforts have been 
reviewed, including: (1) defining the concept of resilience; (2) assessing resilience quantitatively; 
(3) modeling infrastructure recovery for resilience assessment; (4) measuring infrastructure 
performance under disruptive events, and (5) planning for infrastructure disaster risk 
management towards community resilience. This review has identified some of the research 
issues associated with each of the above five aspects. For example, despite a tendency of 
understanding the concept of resilience as the ability to withstand the shock, to recover from the 
shock rapidly and to adapt to post-shock new normal state, there are still lots of debates on how 
to best quantify resilience with incorporating the above three aspects. Besides, there exist many 
studies on post-disaster infrastructure performance modeling, but the interdependencies between 
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facilities in different infrastructure systems has not been well incorporated yet in modeling the 
damage and recovery of the infrastructure systems. Thirdly, numerous metrics exist on measuring 
the infrastructure recovery performance, but most metrics have some limitations when applied to 
measure the performance of interdependent infrastructure systems under disasters. Last but not 
the least, in spite of extensive methodologies that have been developed to simulate the 
performance of interdependent infrastructure systems under different types of hazards, few 
studies have been done to extend the model in guiding the strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation 
and post-disaster recovery planning decision making for interdependent infrastructure systems.  
This research addresses some of the above-mentioned research issues. First of all, the 
Dynamic Integrated Network (DIN) model is proposed which can simulate the damage and 
recovery of the infrastructure systems with considering different levels of interdependencies (e.g.: 
system-to-system, system-to-facility and facility-to-facility levels). Secondly, several 
infrastructure performance metrics (e.g.: the total service restoration time (TSRT), the skewness 
of the service restoration trajectory (SSRT), the total-facility-recovery-waiting-time (TFRWT) 
and the total-service-restoration-waiting-time (TSRWT)) are introduced to facilitate evaluating 
the efficiency and effectiveness of different pre-disaster risk mitigation or post-disaster recovery 
plans. Thirdly, two decision problems and the corresponding decision frameworks, applicable to 
either the pre-disaster or post-disaster phase, are proposed in this research to better guide the 
community resilience planning decision-making.  
  
73 
 
CHAPTER 3 INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY 
MODELING USING DYNAMIC INTEGRATED NETWORK MODEL 
As shown in the literature review in the previous chapter, although there exist extensive 
studies on developing methodologies to model the post-disaster performance of infrastructure 
systems under disruptive events, the interdependencies among facilities in different infrastructure 
systems have not been very well incorporated into the damage and recovery modeling. In this 
research, the interdependency between two components is defined as the bidirectional 
relationship between two components through which the state of each component influences or is 
correlated to the state of the other. However, if the state of one component, Ni, influences or is 
correlated to the state of the other component, Nj, but not the other way around, then it’s said that 
Nj is dependent upon Ni. The component can either be an infrastructure system, or an 
infrastructure facility in this study. Based on this classification of the network components, the 
interdependency/dependency relationship between two network components can be categorized 
into three levels: system-to-system, system-to-facility and facility-to-facility.  
This chapter introduces the Dynamic Integrated Network (DIN) model, which can 
simulate the damage and recovery of the infrastructure systems after disruptive events with 
considering different levels of the interdependency/dependency relationships to better support 
community resilience planning decision-making. The methodologies of modeling the initial 
damage and recovery of the infrastructure facilities, systems and the integrated network with 
considering the uncertainties are introduced first. Then, the importance of considering the 
infrastructure interdependencies at a higher resolution is discussed by comparing the recovery 
modeling result from the DIN model with those from two other conventional models. Finally, the 
DIN model is validated to show that the proposed DIN model can produce comparable recovery 
estimations with physical reality. 
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3.1. Model Development 
3.1.1. Overview of the Dynamic Integrated Network Model 
The DIN model simulates the damage and recovery of the interdependent infrastructure 
systems after disruptive events to guide strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster 
recovery planning. The DIN model can be applied to simulate the performance of any 
infrastructure systems under any hazard or multi-hazards. There are four features of the DIN 
model, which can be summarized as dynamic, probabilistic, integrated and interdependent.  
Firstly, the DIN model is dynamic since it can simulate the damage and recovery of the 
infrastructure facilities, systems and the integrated network over time following a disruptive 
event. Secondly, it is probabilistic since the uncertainties in the modeling variables can be 
considered probabilistically. Thirdly, the DIN model is integrated since it models the recovery of 
the critical facilities in different infrastructure systems and the end-users in a unified network, 
where the network nodes represent critical facilities and the network links represent the 
dependency relationships among them, as is illustrated in Figure 3-1. Fourthly, the DIN model 
can consider physical (e.g. product/material/service input and output), cyber (e.g. information 
sharing) and geospatial (e.g. co-location) interdependencies (Rinaldi, Peerenboom & Kelly, 
2001), both at the system-to-facility level and the facility-to-facility level, which is of higher 
resolution compared with existing recovery models. 
 
Figure 3-1. The integrated infrastructure network. 
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3.1.2. Interdependent Infrastructure Network 
In the DIN model, different infrastructure systems are modeled as an integrated network 
where different infrastructure facilities are represented by different nodes. The nodes are 
connected by links through which products, information or services (PISs) flow. With using such a 
network model, the physical and cyber dependencies between individual facilities within and 
across different infrastructure systems can be explicitly considered, which is essential to 
investigate the failure and recovery of the individual facilities and systems. In the event of damage 
of a facility, the production of the damaged facility would decrease and hence affect the 
functionality of the facilities that rely on the damaged facility for any PIS. In this way, the damage 
of one facility would soon propagate to its neighbors and eventually affect the functionality of the 
whole network. Thus, the facility-to-facility level physical and cyber dependency relationships 
can be identified by considering the functionality failure modes of the facilities under disruptive 
events (e.g. cyber dependencies specifically refer to the dependency relationship between one 
facility with a telecommunication system facility).  
To illustrate the methodology of identifying network nodes (critical facilities) and links 
(facility-to-facility level dependencies) based on failure modes of the infrastructure facilities under 
historical hazards, the interdependent electric power, water supply and cellular systems are used. 
The power, water and cellular systems are three of the most critical infrastructure systems in a 
community, since they are essential for the social security, public health and welfare, and the 
normal operation and/or recovery of most other infrastructure systems. The critical infrastructure 
facilities and their failure modes under past natural or manmade hazards of the interdependent 
power, water and cellular systems are summarized in Table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1. The critical facilities and failure modes of power, water and cellular systems. 
System Critical facilities Failure modes Example configuration References 
Electric 
power  
• Power plants 
• Substations 
• Transmissio
n towers 
• Distribution 
poles 
• Physical 
damage of critical 
facilities 
• Failure of 
transmission and 
distribution lines 
• Failure of 
supporting 
infrastructure 
systems such as 
water system (for 
cooling) and 
SCADA system 
(for monitoring 
and control) 
 
Davidson et al. 
(2003); 
O’rourke, 
Lembo & 
Nozick (2003); 
Liu et al. 
(2005); Brown 
(2008); Drabble 
(2011); Drabble 
(2012); Allan 
(2013); Short 
(2014); 
Unnikrishnan & 
van de Lindt 
(2016) 
Water 
supply  
• Raw water 
collection 
points 
• Pumping 
stations 
• Treatment 
plants 
• Storage 
tanks 
• Physical 
damage of critical 
facilities 
• Broken water 
pipelines 
• Failure of 
supporting 
infrastructure 
systems such as 
the power system 
and SCADA 
system 
 
Germanopoulos 
(1985); 
Mendenhall 
(1988); Drabble 
(2011); Grigg 
(2012) 
Cellular  
• Central 
offices 
• Switching 
offices 
• Cell sites 
• Physical 
damage of critical 
facilities 
• Failure of 
supporting 
infrastructure 
systems such as 
power and/or 
water system(s) 
 
Davidson et al. 
(2003); Banipal 
(2006); Comfort 
& Haase (2006); 
Poole (2006); 
Kwasinski 
(2011); Radio 
Regulations 
(2012) 
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The critical facilities and their failure modes summarized in Table 3-1 can be further used 
to identify the facility-to-facility level physical and cyber dependency relationships within and 
between the power, water and cellular systems, as is presented in Figure 3-2. This dependency 
relationship graph provides the basis for constructing the study regions used for illustrating the 
proposed DIN model in the following sections. 
 
Figure 3-2. The facility-level dependencies within and across electric power, potable water and cellular systems. 
 
The geospatial dependency relationship refers to the co-location of two facilities such that 
the damage of one facility would lead to the functional failure of another facility (Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom & Kelly, 2001). The information of co-location serves as additional input 
information used to determine the initial damage and the recovery of the corresponding network 
nodes and links. In other words, the initial damage of a node/link would be affected by the failure 
of its co-located nodes/links, and it may fully recover only after all of its co-located nodes/links 
recover. For example, if link i and link j are known to be in superposition, and link i is physically 
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damaged under the disaster which can only be repaired till the Ti
th day after the disaster. Then, 
link j will also be viewed as damaged due to the geospatial dependency relationship and can only 
recover after max{Ti, Tj} days, where Tj is the time for link j to be physically recovered. 
Although modeling the infrastructure dependency relationships at the facility-to-facility 
level can produce more refined modeling results compared to if only the system-to-system level 
interdependencies are considered, not all infrastructure systems can be, or need to be modeled at 
the facility level given the nature and complexity of the system, and different modeling 
resolutions are needed for individual systems. Thus, the system-to-facility level 
dependency/interdependency is introduced. The system-to-facility level dependency/ 
interdependency describes the relationship between a system and a facility in another system. 
Considering the system-to-facility level dependency/interdependency in modeling the 
post-disaster performance of interdependent civil infrastructure network can be especially useful 
in some situations, including: (1) when assessing the community resilience requires the modeling 
of several systems with different natures, and (2) when different systems are needed to be 
modeled at different resolutions to save the computation time. Based on the nature of system, 
some systems can be modeled as a network, while others, such as the social system or financial 
system, cannot. For those systems that can be represented by a network, different types of 
network topology exist. A system can be modeled as a network consisting of only isolated nodes 
(e.g. trees, lighthouses), or only links (e.g. roads, natural gas pipelines), or a more common 
network with nodes connected by the links (e.g. power system, water system). Considering the 
interaction of the systems with different natures when assessing the community resilience can 
help to understand the community resilience in a more comprehensive way. Besides, if a large 
number of systems needed to be considered when assessing the community resilience, modeling 
every system in the facility level may not be feasible due to long computation time. In this case, 
modeling some relatively unimportant systems at system level while modeling the most 
important systems at facility level can lead to shorter computation time while still achieving the 
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satisfied level of detail and accuracy of the modeling result. In the proposed DIN model, the 
systems that do not have a network topology, or cannot be modeled using a common network 
with nodes connected by links are not explicitly modeled in the integrated network. Their effects 
to the damage and recovery of the other infrastructure systems are implicitly considered through 
some of the modeling parameters, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.1.3. Modeling the Damage and Recovery of Network Nodes 
The inoperability of a network node is defined as the inability of the corresponding facility 
to perform its intended functions. It reflects the degradation of a facility’s capacity to deliver its 
intended PIS due to perturbations. It can be mathematically defined as the percentage of the node’s 
output reduced from its ideal output triggered from disruptive events and/or demand change. 
Assessing the inoperability of the network nodes can help us quantify the initial impact of a 
disruptive event and the propagation and dissipation of that adverse impact on dependent 
infrastructure facilities. In this section, the methodology of assessing the inoperability of nodes 
over time is introduced first. Then, the determination of four important variables in the model, 
namely the dependency matrix, the recovery coefficient matrix, the recovery coefficient ratio 
matrix and the updated inoperability vector, is explained. It’s noted that the operability of a node 
can be viewed as the complement of the inoperability of the node. 
Currently, the proposed DIN model only considers the initial disruption in the operation of 
nodes resulting from the physical damage of corresponding facilities due to a catastrophic event. 
Thus, the initial inoperability of each node can be determined from the physical damage level. For 
simplicity, the initial inoperability is assumed to be proportional to the physical damage level 
determined from fragility curves. Damage of a facility occurs as a random event. The uncertainty 
in the initial damage of node can be captured by the fragility curves that describe the conditional 
probabilities of a facility to experience different damage states given an intensity of hazard. 
Many fragility curves for different types of buildings or infrastructure facilities are available in 
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the existing literature which can be used to measure the initial inoperability of a facility. For 
example, a set of exceedance probability curves for five damage states (very minor, minor, 
moderate, severe and destruction damage) are available for different types of civil infrastructure 
facilities under different types of hazards (Hazus, 1999; HAZUS-MH, 2003; Scawthorn et al., 
2006a, b; Vickery et al., 2006a, b; MRI, 2011). Using the set, cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of damage states can be obtained for each given hazard intensity (e.g. hurricane wind 
speed, earthquake peak ground acceleration, flooding water depth). These CDFs are used to 
simulate the damage state of each node given a hazard scenario, which is used to estimate the 
inoperability. For simplicity, the initial inoperability of a node is assumed to be proportional to 
its damage level. The definition of damage states from ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 
1985) can be used to assign a damage level to the damage states. The range of the damage level 
corresponding to very minor, minor, moderate, severe and destruction damage states are assumed 
to be 0 ~ 1%, 1 ~ 10%, 10 ~ 60%, 60 ~ 100% and 100%, respectively, in the following case 
studies in this research. The linear interpolation can be used to simulate a damage level between 
the boundaries. The method of obtaining the CDF of the damage level is illustrated in Figure 3-3.  
 
Figure 3-3. Cumulative distribution function of the damage level obtained from the curves of damage state exceedance 
probability. 
In reality, several hazards often occur at the same time, such as hurricane and flooding, 
earthquake and tsunami, earthquake and landslide, etc. In such multi-hazard scenario, the initial 
inoperability of the nodes would be calculated separately under each hazard using the 
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corresponding hazard intensities and fragility curves. Then, the overall initial inoperability of a 
node would be the maximum inoperability calculated from all types of the hazards. 
The propagation of the inoperability of each node over time is modeled by considering the 
inoperability of the nodes that depend on this node, as well as the recovery rate of this node under 
the specific hazard. The DIN model builds upon the general framework of the Dynamic 
Inoperability Input-output Model (DIIM) to simulate the dynamic inoperability of each node. The 
DIIM was initially proposed by Haimes et al. (2005 a,b) to model how inoperability of an industry 
sector propagates and dissipates over time following a disruptive event. However, details of the 
DIIM framework cannot be used for simulating the functioning of the individual facilities of civil 
infrastructure systems because the DIIM is based on economic data and measures the performance 
of industries using monetary terms. The inoperability of each node at each given time in the 
proposed DIN model is calculated using Eq. (3-1): 
                        ( )= ( +1) ( )= ( ) ( )
Tq t q t q t r B A q t q t                           (3-1) 
where
 
( )q t = the inoperability vector at time t ; ( )q t = the time derivative of ( )q t at time t ;
 
B  
= the diagonal recovery coefficient matrix; r = the diagonal recovery coefficient ratio matrix; A
= the dependency matrix. The methodologies to determine these variables are explained in the 
following sub-sections. 
3.1.3.1. Dependency Matrix 
The dependency relationships between the facilities are modeled using the dependency 
matrix in Eq. (3-1). In the DIN model, each element of the dependency matrix, ijA , measures the 
importance of node i to the successful operation of node j among all the suppliers of node j during 
the post-disaster recovery phase. This dependency matrix differs from the interdependency matrix 
in the DIIM in the two aspects. First of all, the DIIM only considers the system-level 
interdependencies while the dependency matrix in this DIN model incorporates the facility-level 
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dependencies within and across the systems. Secondly, the interdependency matrix in the DIIM 
uses monetary terms to determine the level of dependency between two industries. However, those 
monetary data in facility-level are not available nor represent the dependency between 
infrastructure facilities properly. In the DIN, the importance level of one facility in the successful 
operation of another facility among all its suppliers during the recovery phase is used to quantify 
the dependency between two facilities. Building upon the original DIIM, the dependency matrix, 
A , in this study is defined as the product of output matrix, O , and the input matrix, I . Each 
element, ikO , in the output matrix represents the importance of the i
th node in producing the kth PIS. 
Since each PIS is defined for each link and thus has only one supplier node, the importance value 
of the ith node in producing that PIS is either 0 or 1. The value is 1 if the ith node is its supplier, 
which means that if the ith node is damaged, the production of the kth PIS would be reduced by 
100%. Thus, the entries in the output matrix, O , can only be 0 or 1. Each element, kjI , in the 
input matrix in the proposed DIN model is defined as the relative importance of the kth PIS in the 
successful operation of the jth node among all the PISs that the jth node would need during the 
recovery phase. In this research, it is assumed that all the PISs received by the jth node have equal 
importance to the recovery of jth node, since without either of them, jth node cannot recover 
properly. By taking the product of the output matrix and input matrix, each entry, 
ijA , in the 
dependency matrix reflects the importance of the ith node in the successful operation of the jth node 
during the recovery phase and is calculated by Eq. (3-2). 
 ij ik kj
k
A O I                                           (3-2) 
3.1.3.2. Recovery Coefficient Matrix 
In the DIN model, the recovery of the individual facilities is modeled by using the recovery 
coefficient matrix, B . It represents the recovery rate of civil infrastructure facilities given 
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sufficient resources and repair crews during the recovery phase. There are multiple ways to 
compute the recovery rates for different types of the infrastructure facilities. It can be determined 
through expert estimation, or using simple linear regression analysis based on empirical data, as is 
described in MacKenzie & Barker (2012), or by using some other methodologies. If the simple 
linear regression analysis approach is used, the relationship for the linear regression analysis 
obtained from Eq. (3-1) can be solved for the inoperability of a single node i as: 
                                 
(1 )
( ) (0) e ii ii ii
r B A t
i iq t q
                                 (3-3) 
The recovery coefficient ratio for a node i, 
iir , is 1 in this analysis given the sufficient 
resources and repair crews assumption in the definition of 
iiB . Also, since in the DIN model, a 
node cannot produce a PIS which is directly consumed by itself (there are no link whose head and 
tail nodes are the same), the importance of a node i to the successful operation of itself, 
iiA  would 
always be 0. Thus, if the initial inoperability,  0iq , and the recovery time, iT , to a desired 
inoperability level,  i iq T , from a disruptive event are known for a node i, rearranging and taking 
the natural log of both sides of Eq. (3-3) yields the Eq. (3-4), which can be used for the simple 
linear regression analysis to predict the values of 
iiB . 
                             ln 0 lni i i ii iq q T B T                                  (3-4) 
In this research, the mean, standard deviation and confidence interval of the recovery 
coefficients for critical facilities in electric power, water supply and cellular systems are computed 
from the regression analysis based on Eq. (3-4) for the use of the case studies in the following 
chapters. The data samples for the regression analysis are obtained from HAZUS®-MH2.2 (MRI, 
2011) analysis and ATC-13 report (Applied Technology Council, 1985). For the data collection, 
the initial inoperability, (0)iq , of different types of critical civil infrastructure facilities in power, 
84 
 
water and cellular systems under seventy-three historical hurricanes from 1990 to 2008 were 
determined based on the HAZUS®-MH2.2 analysis result. The recovery times, 
iT , for those types 
of facilities given different damage levels were determined based on the data provided in ATC-13 
(Applied Technology Council, 1985). The ATC-13 contains the expert estimation of the recovery 
times for different types of facilities in power, water and cellular systems under different damage 
levels in earthquake hazards. It is assumed that the recovery times corresponding to different 
damage levels under the hurricane hazard is the same as those under earthquake hazard, just as the 
assumption made in HAZUS®-MH2.2 hurricane loss assessment model (MRI, 2011). Utilizing the 
data of the initial inoperability and recovery times identified as aforementioned, the regression 
analysis for all types of critical facilities in power, water and cellular systems were performed. The 
results are summarized in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2. The recovery coefficients for different types of facilities obtained from simple linear regression analysis.  
Facility type 
Power 
plants 
Power 
transmission 
towers 
Power 
substations 
Water 
pumping 
stations 
Water 
treatment 
plants 
Water 
storage 
tanks 
Cellular 
switching 
offices 
Cell 
sites 
Mean 
recovery 
coefficient 
0.0032 0.0323 0.0087 0.0095 0.0057 0.0126 0.0056 0.0198 
Standard 
deviation of 
the recovery 
coefficient 
0.0004 0.0043 0.0012 0.0014 0.0007 0.0016 0.0007 0.0027 
99.999% 
confidence 
interval 
0.0011 0.0113 0.0029 0.0028 0.0020 0.0046 0.0021 0.0065 
0.0052 0.0534 0.0144 0.0162 0.0094 0.0206 0.0090 0.0331 
2R of the 
regression 
analysis 
0.4296 0.4479 0.4197 0.3918 0.4324 0.4415 0.4543 0.4149 
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 It’s noted that the 99.999% confidence intervals are listed in Table 3-2 to show the 
variation in the estimation while covering more empirical data since the R2 values are not high, and 
to guarantee that the lower bounds of the recovery coefficients are all above zero. 
 
3.1.3.3. Recovery Coefficient Ratio Matrix 
In reality, a damaged infrastructure facility may not always get sufficient repair resources 
or repair crews during the recovery phase. One reason is because the repair resources and/or 
repair crews may not reach the damaged facility site on time due to the damage or block of the 
road and bridge system (Chang, 2010; Chang, Elnashai & Spencer, 2012; Chang et al., 2012). 
The dependency of the facilities in the other infrastructure systems on the road and bridge system 
can be implicitly considered through the recovery coefficients, 
iiB . If roads and/or bridges are 
damaged or blocked after the disaster, the recovery of the critical facilities in other systems 
would be slowed down. In the DIN model, a ratio,  ir t , would be multiplied to the recovery 
coefficient, 
iiB , at each time step to reflect the impact of the damaged road and bridge system on 
facility i in the network. 
Different methodologies can be used to estimate the recovery coefficient ratio. The 
following methodology is used to compute the recovery coefficient ratios for the damaged 
infrastructure facilities due to the damage of the road and bridge network in this research. If the 
repair crews and resources are assumed to come from any road segment end-points within x km 
of node i, and they drive following the shortest path, the recovery coefficient ratio for node i at 
time t, ( )ir t , can be calculated using Eq. (3-5) or Eq. (3-6): 
 1
1
( )
i
ji
on
i
ji ji
l
r t
n l t
                                (3-5) 
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r t
n T t
                               (3-6) 
where 
in = the number of road segment end-points within x km of node i; ji
ol = the shortest path 
length from road point j to node i in an undamaged road and bridge network;  jil t = the shortest 
path length from road point j to node i in a post-disaster road and bridge network at time t ; 
ji
oT
= the traveling time from road point j to node i in an undamaged road and bridge network; 
 jiT t = the traveling time from road point j to node i in a post-disaster road and bridge network 
at time t . The value of the recovery coefficient ratio is inversely proportional to the traveling 
distance or time increase due to the damage or block of the road and bridge network. 
3.1.3.4. Updated Inoperability Vector 
The inoperability, ( )iq t , of a node i may need to be updated after calculated from Eq.             
(3-1) due to the post-disaster demand change or delayed disruption of the operability of 
corresponding facility i. 
3.1.3.4.1. Post-disaster Demand Change 
According to the definition, the inoperability of a facility refers to the inability of the 
facility to perform its intended functions to satisfy its demand. Thus, the post-disaster demand 
change would also affect the inoperability of a facility. Taking the transportation system for 
example, the changes of people’s travel behavior after disruptive events will affect the travel 
demand on the roads (Chen & Eguchi, 2003; Chang, 2010; Chang, Elnashai & Spencer, 2012; 
Chang et al., 2012; Nakanishi, Black & Matsuo, 2014; Kontou, Murray-Tuite & Wernstedt, 2017). 
Besides, severe disasters often cause lots of temporary and permanent social disruptions to the 
community, including large loss of life or property, major population loss, out-migration and even 
societal collapse. All of these will affect the demand of the civil infrastructure facilities after the 
disaster. Taking hurricane Katrina for example, the population of New Orleans in Louisiana 
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became only 37% of its pre-disaster population four month after the hurricane in 2005 (Kates et al., 
2006; Sastry, 2009; Groen & Polivka, 2010). The population of New Orleans was estimated to 
have reached about half of its previous size by mid-2006 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006; Sastry, 2009). 
Even three years after the hurricane, the population of New Orleans was still only about 70% of its 
pre-disaster population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007; Sastry, 2009). The declined population in New 
Orleans suggested that many lives were lost after the hurricane and many people who were forced 
to evacuate decided not to return (Sastry, 2009). This huge decline in the population after hurricane 
Katrina would have led to the decrease in the demand of power, water and/or other services in New 
Orleans.  
A mathematical definition of the inoperability of a civil infrastructure facility i at time t, 
 iq t , without considering the demand change can be written in the form of Eq. (3-7): 
 
   
 
0
, 0
0
i i
i
i
x x t
q t t
x

                            (3-7) 
where  0ix = production of facility i under normal circumstances before the disaster; and  ix t
= reduced level of production caused by a disruption at time t  ( t  > 0). If the demand of the civil 
infrastructure facility is decreased after a disaster, it means that the facility needs to produce a 
lower amount of PIS under this post-disaster new normal. Let’s suppose that the post disaster 
demand (the new normal) of facility i is  * 0ix . Then, the inoperability of facility i at the initial 
step should be updated to Eq. (3-8): 
 
     
 
 
 
 
*
*
* *
0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0
i i i i
i i
i i
x x q x
q q
x x
                        (3-8) 
where  0iq = the inoperability of facility i based on its pre-disaster demand when the disaster 
happens; and  * 0iq = the updated inoperability of facility i based on its targeted post-disaster 
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demand when the disaster happens. The updated inoperability  * 0iq  is adjusted to 0 if 
     *0 1 0 0i i ix q x     . This is to avoid the updated inoperability to be calculated negative. 
This case occurs when the decrease in the demand exceeds the decrease in the output of the 
facility. In other words, although the output of the facility decreased a little bit due to the hazard, 
the remaining output is still enough to satisfy the new demand after the disaster. 
3.1.3.4.2. Delayed Disruption of Nodal Operability 
The above discussion about the damage and recovery of network nodes is based on the 
assumption that all the damaged facilities would become inoperable immediately after the 
disaster strikes. However, this assumption may not be true under some special conditions. For 
example, some facilities, such as water pumping stations, telecommunication facilities or 
hospitals, usually have backup power system to guarantee that the facility can still remain 
functioning for a certain time after the disruptive event happens (Gruzs & Hall, 2000; Bruneau et 
al., 2003; Adachi & Ellingwood, 2008). In this case, the initial inoperability and the inoperability 
of the facility within the time that the backup power can hold should be changed to 0. More 
generally, the inoperability,  iq t , of a node i at time t would be updated to 0 after calculated 
from Eq. (3-1) within a certain time period if the disruption of the nodal operability would not 
happen until after this time period. It is noted here that the recovery status of the damaged 
facility is determined by the inoperability, of a node i at time t calculated using the originally 
(before updated) initial inoperability. 
3.1.4. Modeling the Damage and Recovery of Network Links 
Links in the civil infrastructure network provide passages to send PIS from one node to 
another. The damage of links in each system can affect the operation of that system and also other 
systems because of the interdependencies across the systems. It has been known that the damage of 
links can be extensive due to the distributed nature of the civil infrastructure system (U.S. 
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Congress, 1990; Dueñas-Osorio & Vemuru, 2009). Unlike the nodes, links have length and a link 
can experience multiple physical damages along its length. The number of damages along a link is 
usually modeled as a Poisson process (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2008; Guidotti et al., 2016). In the 
DIN model, a link is considered as damaged if failure occurs at any location of the link along its 
length. For example, the power distribution line shown in Figure 3-4 is modeled using a series 
system of sub-links segmented by the utility poles. The link would be considered as damaged if the 
failure of any utility pole along the length of the link occurs. Currently, the DIN model does not 
consider the secondary-effect of the damage of power distribution lines, which means that the 
over-loading of a power distribution line due to the re-routing of the power load from the already 
damaged power lines has not been incorporated yet in the model.  
A link would not be physically recovered until all causes of failures are resolved and the 
PIS can flow on this link as is in the normal state. In the above power distribution line example, a 
damaged power distribution line would not be recovered until all utility poles along its length are 
recovered. There are several different methods to estimate the recovery time of a damaged link. 
For example, the ATC-13 has the maximum, minimum, mean and standard deviation of the 
recovery time of links corresponding to different damage levels in different critical infrastructure 
systems (e.g. power distribution lines, power transmission lines, water pipelines, 
telecommunication landlines) based on expert estimation (Applied Technology Council, 1985). 
The advantage of this methodology is that it’s very straightforward to understand and easy to be 
used since no other additional input information is needed as long as the number of damages per 
unit length of a link is known. However, one limitation of this method is that the recovery time 
estimation is based on the damage level per unit length of a link. The recovery time of two links 
with the same damage level per unit length but having different lengths may vary a lot, 
especially when only limited number of repair crews is available. Another way to estimate the 
recovery time of a link is to view it as a function of the total number of damages along the link 
and the number of repair crews available (ALA, 2001; FEMA, 2003; Shi & O’Rourke, 2008; 
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Guidotti et al., 2016). This method does not have the limitation of the previously mentioned 
methodology, but it’s difficult to be used since it requires a lot of additional input information, 
such as the number of the repair crews available, the repair rate for each repair crew, the repair 
sequence of the repair crews (e.g: whether different repair crews can work in parallel or in series, 
the time when the repair for each damaged link can begin, etc.), and so on. In order to focus 
more on the general framework of the DIN model, and due to the data availability issue, all the 
case studies in this research estimate the link recovery time following the first approach (the 
ATC-13 approach) for simplicity, except for the post-disaster recovery planning case study in 
section 5.3 that considers the effect of the number of repair crews available to the recovery time 
and schedule of the damaged network nodes and links. 
 
 
Figure 3-4. An example power distribution line modeled using a series system of sub-links. 
3.1.5. Modeling the Damage and Recovery of the Integrated Network 
The network topology will change over time due to the damage and recovery of network 
nodes and links, which can be used to measure the operability of each infrastructure system and 
the integrated network. The assumptions and methodologies for modeling the operability of each 
infrastructure system and the integrated network are introduced in this section. 
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3.1.5.1. Assumptions for Network Operability Modeling   
The critical civil infrastructure network contains nodes of individual facilities and 
directional links representing the PIS flowing between the nodes. After a disruptive event, some 
nodes may be damaged, and the output of that nodes may decrease, which leads to a decrease of the 
input into the nodes relying on the service of the damaged nodes. Assume that each node has a 
threshold inoperability and each link has a threshold damage level below which the node or link is 
viewed as functioning to an accepted level. If the inoperability of a node or link is higher than this 
threshold, it implies that this facility or line must be shut down for repair. The threshold 
inoperability and threshold damage level for the nodes and links in each system may vary by 
facility and system and should be determined by the experts working in the relevant field through 
reviewing various failure scenarios for an accurate result. One example source of expert 
estimates for the threshold value is the ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 1985). In ATC-13, 
the heavy damage state with the inoperability 0.3 ~ 0.6 is regarded as extensive damage requiring 
major repairs. Based on this description, the threshold inoperability value can be assumed to be 
0.3, which is the value used in the following case studies. 
In the DIN model, the threshold values are used to identify the nonfunctioning nodes and 
links. The damaged links or the links going out of the nonfunctioning nodes from the network are 
removed while the other links and all the nodes would still be kept in the network. A link would be 
added back at the time when both the tail node and the link itself are recovered. A node would be 
recovered when its inoperability first becomes lower than the threshold inoperability. A physically 
damaged link would be recovered after its all failure mechanisms are resolved. A complete 
recovery of a network is defined as the state that the network becomes exactly the same as the 
pre-disturbance state. Figure 3-5 shows snapshots of a network, where damaged nodes are 
illustrated with no output links in initial damage state (Figure 3-5 (b)) and recovery phase (Figure 
3-5 (c)). A complete recovery (Figure 3-5 (d)) is defined as the state that the network becomes 
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exactly the same as the initial state (Figure 3-5 (a)), or when the network reaches its post-disaster 
new normal. 
 
Figure 3-5. Recovery phases of an example network. 
3.1.5.2. Assessing the operability of the integrated network  
To measure the operability of the integrated network and thus to assess its resilience, some 
generic characteristic parameters of network can be used. Using a parameter, the operability of 
individual systems at each time t after a disruptive event is calculated first. Then, the values of the 
parameter can be normalized by dividing their values at each time by the values before a disruptive 
event. This non-dimensional metric is used to describe the operability,  iQ t , of the i
th 
infrastructure system at time t. Then, the operability of the whole network,  Q t , can be 
calculated as a weighted sum of the operability values of all systems using Eq. (3-9).   
                 
1
n
i i
i
Q t w Q t

                                       (3-9) 
where n  is the number of infrastructure systems in the integrated network; 
iw  is the 
weight for the ith system and the sum of 
iw  over all the systems is 1. The weight for each system 
can be determined based on the relative importance of each system to the whole network and the 
community. 
3.1.5.3. Example Metrics of Network Operability 
Major function of critical civil infrastructures is to provide PISs to end-users thus the 
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connectivity between the nodes can be a good metric to evaluate the operability of the network. 
How efficiently the PISs flows across the whole network may also be a key measure of the network 
operability. Thus, one parameter measuring network connectivity (connectivity) and another 
parameter measuring the efficiency of the connection (efficiency) were selected for this study from 
literature reviews.  
In the unperturbed state, an end-user can receive PISs from all the source nodes in 
infrastructure systems connected to it through other facilities. After a disruption, some facilities in 
between lose their functions and the number of sources nodes connected to a certain end-user 
decreases. A network parameter called connectivity loss, 
LC , can be used to measure the severity 
of such losses (Guo, Lawson & Planting, 2002). To measure the operability of a network, the 
connectivity of a network, CL, determined as the complement of connectivity loss, can be used. 
How efficiently the PIS flow across the whole network may also be a key measure of the 
network functionality. A network parameter, efficiency, E, is defined as the average of the 
reciprocals of the shortest path lengths between every two vertices in a graph (Dueñas-Osorio et al., 
2007). The mathematical definitions of the parameters are summarized in Table 3-3. 
 
Table 3-3. Definitions of the characteristic parameters measuring system operability. 
 iQ t  Definition 
Connectivity   
Npi(t) = the number of paths from all source nodes to a 
certain end-user i at time t. 
n= the total number of end-users. 
Efficiency    
N = the number of nodes in a graph;  
dij(t) = the shortest path length between node i and node j 
at time t. 
 
   
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3.1.6. Closure 
This section introduced the DIN model which can simulate the damage and recovery of the 
infrastructure facilities, systems and the integrated network with considering the facility-to-facility 
level and system-to-facility level dependencies. The framework of the proposed DIN model is 
illustrated in Figure 3-6. In this model, the initial inoperability of each node is first determined 
from the physical damage level of the node that is calculated from probability of damage state 
curves. Similarly, the damage level of each link is calculated by considering the failure modes and 
the relevant probabilities. The inoperability of each node over time is then simulated using a 
mathematical equation modified from the DIIM which incorporates the dependency relationships 
between the facilities, different recovery rates for different types of the facilities, the recovery 
rate reductions due to the system-to-facility level dependencies and the post-disaster demand 
change of the facilities. At each step, a link would be removed from the network if the tail node of 
the link is damaged or the link itself is damaged. The damaged link is assumed to recover after the 
recovery time corresponding to the damage level of the link. The link would be added back to the 
network when its tail node is recovered and the link itself is recovered. By considering the varying 
network configuration of each system, the operability of each infrastructure system at each time 
step can be measured by some characteristic parameters from graph theory. The recovery of the 
integrated network over time is assessed by combining the operability of each infrastructure 
system using weighting scheme.  
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Figure 3-6. The framework of the DIN model. 
 
The input information needed to run the DIN model includes: (1) the geospatial locations 
of the critical infrastructure facilities and their dependency relationships; (2) the 
hazard/multi-hazard intensities for each infrastructure facility; (3) the probability of damage state 
curves for each infrastructure facilities, including the implicitly modeled facilities; (4) the 
recovery rates for different types of infrastructure facilities and the recovery times for different 
types of infrastructure lines correspond to different damage levels; (5) the threshold operability 
levels to evaluate whether the infrastructure facilities or lines are functioning at a satisfied level, 
and (6) the post-disaster demand change of the facilities, if any. The output of the DIN model 
includes: (1) the operability of each infrastructure facility at both the temporal and spatial scales; 
(2) the recovery curves of each infrastructure facility, system and the integrated network with 
variations that capture the uncertainties; (3) the service restoration curves for the end-users, and (4) 
the recovery schedule of all damaged network nodes and links. Example plots for each type of the 
DIN model outputs are shown in Figure 3-7 ~ Figure 3-10. 
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Figure 3-7. Example output of the DIN model (1): the operability of individual infrastructure facilities at both the 
temporal and spatial scales. 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Example output of the DIN model (2): the recovery curves of individual infrastructure facilities, systems 
and the integrated network with variations. 
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Figure 3-9. Example output of the DIN model (3): the service restoration curves for the end-users. 
 
 
Figure 3-10. Example output of the DIN model (4): the recovery schedule of all damaged network nodes and links. 
3.2. Model Comparison 
To highlight the importance of considering interdependencies among infrastructure 
facilities in different systems, the DIN model is compared with two conventional recovery models, 
one without considering any inter-system interdependencies and the other one with considering 
only the system-to-system level interdependencies. For the comparison, a hypothetical study 
region consisting of interdependent power, water and cellular systems and a scenario hurricane 
hazard are developed, which are introduced first in the following sub-sections. Then, the DIN 
modeling result and its comparison with the results from two conventional recovery models are 
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presented and discussed. 
3.2.1. Hypothetical Study Region 
A hypothetical study region located in the coastal area of Texas State, USA was built to 
illustrate the proposed DIN model. The area of the region is approximately 1,500 km2, which is 
about the size of a big city such as Houston, TX. Electric power, water supply, and cellular systems 
are considered as the critical civil infrastructure systems in the region. The critical nodes and the 
dependency relationships between and within the three systems identified in Figure 3-2 are used to 
build the three infrastructure systems in this hypothetical region. The hypothetical study region is 
populated with six end-user groups, two power plants, two raw water collection points, two 
cellular central offices and several critical facilities between these generators of each system and 
the end-users. It includes total of 67 nodes and 174 links. The integrated network of the systems is 
shown in Figure 3-11. The numbers of each type of facilities are summarized in Table 3-4. The 
infrastructure systems are modeled in facility resolution and the end-users are modeled by group, 
which means that several residential, industrial or commercial buildings receiving the PISs from 
same suppliers are combined together and modeled as one end-user group node in the network. 
In the region, facilities of the same type are located as far away as possible. The length of a link is 
assumed to be proportional to the straight-line distance between the two end nodes of the link on 
Figure 3-11. Other systems not considered in this study are assumed to be 100% functional 
throughout the recovery.  
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Figure 3-11. Critical nodes and links in the power, water and cellular systems of the hypothetical study region. 
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Table 3-4. The number of each type of the critical facilities in the hypothetical study region. 
System Facility type Acronym Number 
Electric Power 
Power plant PP 2 
Substation PS 6 
Transmission tower PTT 15 
Power SCADA control center PSCC 2 
Power SCADA field site PSFS 3 
Potable Water  
Raw water collection point WCP 2 
Pumping station WPS 2 
Treatment station WTS 2 
Storage tank WST 8 
Water SCADA control center WSCC 1 
Water SCADA field site WSFS 3 
Cellular  
Cellular central office CCO 2 
Cellular switching office CSO 4 
Cell tower CT 9 
End-user  End-user group EG 6 
Total Number of Nodes 67 
Total Number of Links 174 
 
For the structural fragility curves and recovery times of the network links, estimates 
obtained from existing literatures are used (López et al., 2009; Ahmed, Arthur & Edwards, 2010; 
MRI, 2011; Shafieezadeh et al., 2014; Aslam, 2016). The structural type of each node is assumed 
to be one of industrial buildings, residential buildings, metal buildings, towers or substations and 
the corresponding fragility curves are obtained from the literatures (López et al., 2009; Ahmed, 
Arthur & Edwards, 2010; MRI, 2011; Shafieezadeh et al., 2014; Aslam, 2016). The recovery 
times of power transmission and distribution lines and water pipelines corresponding to different 
damage levels are found in ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 1985), which are listed in 
Table 3-5. The recovery times corresponding to other damage levels are calculated using 
interpolation. The central damage factor for power and SCADA lines are assumed to refer to the 
percentage of the line damaged by trees and/or structurally damaged utility poles. The recovery 
times for telephone trunks are used for SCADA landlines in this study, since the telephone line is 
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a typical medium for SCADA system transmission (Daneels & Salter, 1999). Note that the 
recovery times found in ATC-13 were originally developed for earthquake hazard, which may 
not be same for hurricane hazard. These values are used in this study since no other study on 
recovery times for hurricane hazard has been found to date. 
 
Table 3-5. The recovery times corresponding to different damage levels for power, water and SCADA system lines. 
Power transmission lines Power distribution lines SCADA landlines Water pipelines 
Central 
damage 
factor 
Recovery 
time (days) 
Central 
damage 
factor 
Recovery 
time (days) 
Central 
damage 
factor 
Recovery 
time (days) 
Breaks/km 
Recovery 
time (days) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.005 1 0.005 0.5 0.005 0.6 0.25 1.6 
0.05 2.3 0.05 2.3 0.05 2 0.75 3.4 
0.2 16.9 0.2 12.5 0.2 10.9 5.5 9.5 
0.45 48.9 0.45 31.9 0.45 35.4 15 24.6 
0.8 81.9 0.8 71 0.8 67.1 30 73.6 
1 126.7 1 103.1 1 106.8 40 156.4 
 
3.2.2. Scenario Hurricane Hazard  
In this study, the study region in Figure 3-11 is considered to be hit by a Category 2 
hurricane making landfall at (29.333 N, 95.000 W), which is at the bottom center of the region. 
The approach angle (the angle in degrees between the North direction and the hurricane track, 
taken clockwise positive from North (Georgiou, Davenport & Vickery, 1984)) is -44.64, which 
is the mean approach angle for Texas landfall hurricanes calculated based on the historical 
hurricane track data from NOAA (US Department of Commerce, 2018). The wind field of the 
scenario hurricane is developed using the modified Georgiou’s model which determines gradient 
wind speed at a location as a function of various parameters including central pressure difference, 
radius of maximum wind speed, landfall translation speed, angle from hurricane heading 
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direction, distance from hurricane eye, and air density (Georgiou, Davenport & Vickery, 1984; 
Rosowsky, Sparks & Huang, 1999; Huang, Rosowsky & Sparks, 2001; Lee II, Mitchell & Wallace, 
2007). The whole time history of the wind field is determined by utilizing a Markov chain and an 
exponential decay model for central pressure difference (Huang, Rosowsky & Sparks, 2001).  
For the development of the scenario hurricane, the statistics of key parameters were 
obtained for the hurricanes that had made landfall on Texas coastal line based on the data 
collected from NOAA (US Department of Commerce, 2018), which are listed in Table 3-6. The 
scenario hurricane is developed by using the regional mean values of the radius of maximum 
wind speed, landfall translation speed, and decay rate. For the central pressure difference, the 
mean plus five times of standard deviation is used in order to simulate a Category 2 hurricane at 
landfall. The transition matrix in the Markov Chain used to simulate the decay of translation 
speed was also calculated based on the storm track data of the hurricanes landfalling at Texas 
from NOAA and is listed in Table 3-7 (US Department of Commerce, 2018). From the gradient 
wind speed generated by the Georgiou’s model, the surface wind speed of hurricane is calculated 
using a conversion factor. The factor of 0.65 suggested by Lee and Rosowsky (2007) was used 
for this study. Considering the whole time history, the maximum surface wind speed was 
determined for the locations of all nodes, which was used to determine the initial damage level of 
the nodes. The maximum surface wind speed for each link was assumed to be the same for its 
tail node. The maximum wind speed experienced by each node or link ranges from 40.48 m/s to 
45.30 m/s. 
 
Table 3-6. The statistics of the key hurricane parameters for Texas landfalling hurricanes. 
Parameter Sample size Mean Standard deviation 
Central pressure difference (mb) 52 47.37 18.69 
Radius of maximum wind speed (km) 5 23.00 7.35 
Landfall translation speed (m/s) 55 4.33 1.71 
Decay rate 22 0.04 0.10 
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Table 3-7. Transition matrix for translation speed of Texas landfalling hurricanes. 
  1TV t  /  0TV  
 TV t /  0TV * 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 
0.8 0.75 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 
1.0 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 
1.2 0.06 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1.4 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.17 0.13 0.04 
1.6 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.11 0.22 0.22 
1.8 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.40 
2.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.80 
 
3.2.3. Recovery Modeling Using Dynamic Integrated Network Model 
Using the DIN, the initial damage and the recovery are determined for the integrated 
network of the power, water and cellular systems of the hypothetical study region subjected to the 
scenario hurricane hazard. The initial inoperability of a node is first determined by the expected 
physical damage level calculated from the corresponding fragility curves and is updated using Eq. 
(3-1) in each time step to simulate the whole recovery process. The time step used in this 
simulation is a day. The operability of the whole network is calculated with the weight of 1/3 for 
each system since the community would not function well without either one of them.  
From the simulation, the initial inoperability of the nodes ranges between 0.0095 and 
0.7050 which varies by the type and location of the node. It is observed that 16 out of 67 nodes 
and 67 out of 174 links in the study region are initially damaged by the scenario hurricane and 
the time for full recovery is 67 days. Furthermore, the times for the individual infrastructure 
systems and the integrated network to reach 30%, 60% and 90% operability levels are identified 
from the recovery curves shown in Figure 3-12. The 30%, 60%, 90% operability levels are the 
three milestones identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology for community 
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resilience planning (NIST, 2015). The times to reach the three milestones and full recovery for 
the individual systems and the integrated network are summarized in Table 3-8.   
   
                        (a)                                            (b)  
Figure 3-12. The recovery of the civil infrastructure systems of the hypothetical study region measured by (a) 
connectivity and (b) efficiency. 
 
Table 3-8. The time for each individual system and the integrated network to reach 30%, 60%, 90%, and 100% functionality levels 
using DIN model considering interdependency. 
  Recovery time (days) 
Functionality level 
Connectivity Efficiency 
Power Water Cellular All Power Water Cellular All 
30% 19 43 0 27 0 3 0 0 
60% 56 45 27 43 0 39 0 7 
90% 67 57 39 57 56 45 27 45 
100% 67 57 39 67 67 67 39 67 
 
The resilience of each infrastructure system and the integrated network can be calculated 
from the recovery curves in Figure 3-12. Resilience is a metric that measures the ability of a 
system to withstand an unusual perturbation and recover efficiently from the damage induced by 
such perturbation. For infrastructure systems, resilience is usually associated with the ability to 
deliver a certain service level even after the occurrence of an extreme event and recover to the 
desired level of operability as fast as possible. The time average of the area under the recovery 
curve is oftentimes used as a measure of resilience (Albert, R., Albert, I. & Nakarado, 2004; Reed, 
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Kapur & Christie, 2009), as shown in Eq. (3-10). The range of this value is between 0 and 1 with 
the higher value suggesting the higher resilience. 
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t t
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                                 (3-10) 
where R  = the resilience of the network;  Q t = the operability of the network at time t ; 1t
and 2t = the endpoint of the time interval under consideration (Bruneau et al., 2003; Reed, Kapur 
& Christie, 2009). Note that 1t and 2t may not be the starting and ending time of a recovery 
phase. For instance, if we are comparing the resilience of several infrastructure systems, with 
several recovery curves having different recovery times, the endpoint of the time inverval, 2t , 
would better to be a fixed value, e.g. the time when all the systems recover, for the comparison. 
From Figure 3-12 and Table 3-8, it is found that the extent of damage, the recovery time, 
and the resilience vary by system. The cellular system has the highest resiliency among all the 
three systems since only 4 out of 15 cellular system nodes are damaged and they can fully 
recover after 39 days (resilience is 0.7610 and 0.9079 measured by CL and E, respectively, when 
80 days of reference period used. The reference period is same for all the following). The water 
system experiences the most severe damage with the damages of 10 out of 18 water system 
nodes and 51 out of 59 water system links. The full recovery time for the water system is 57 days 
(resilience is 0.4337 and 0.6931 measured by CL and E, respectively). For the power system, 
only 2 nodes are damaged, but the recovery time is relatively long because 16 power system 
links are down (resilience is 0.5312 and 0.8243 measured by CL and E, respectively). The 
operability of the integrated network is found to depend more on the recovery state of the highly 
damaged system as recovery progresses. In other words, the recovery process is dragged by the 
least resilient system especially close at the last stage. Thus, more repair crews and resources 
should be allocated for the recovery of the water and power systems during the post-disaster 
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recovery phase and/or more resources should be allocated to improve the robustness of the water 
and power systems for pre-disaster risk management. 
3.2.4. Comparison with a Model without Considering Inter-System Interdependency 
In many existing studies, the performance or recovery of infrastructure systems has been 
investigated for individual systems (Hwang, Lin & Shinozuka, 1998; Albert, R., Albert, I. & 
Nakarado, 2004; Booker et al., 2010; Portante et al., 2011). Thus, the recovery estimation from 
the proposed DIN model which considers the interdependencies between different infrastructure 
systems is first compared with the estimation from a network model without a consideration of the 
inter-system interdependencies. For the comparison, a counterpart dependency model is built by 
eliminating the inter-system links from the model in Figure 3-2, which is shown in Figure 3-13. 
The corresponding hypothetical study region is developed by modifying the region in Figure 3-11 
based on this counterpart dependency model, as is shown in Figure 3-14. The recovery curves with 
and without the consideration of the interdependencies between systems are shown in Figure 3-15 
for each of the electric power, water supply and cellular systems, and their integrated network.  
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Figure 3-13. The facility-level dependencies within electric power, potable water and cellular systems. 
 
 
Figure 3-14. The hypothetical study region consisting of power, water and cellular systems without any 
interdependencies across systems. 
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                        (a)                                            (b)  
   
                        (c)                                            (d)  
Figure 3-15. Comparison of the recovery curves of (a) electric power system, (b) water supply system, (c) cellular 
system and (d) the integrated network with and without considering interdependencies between systems. 
 
From Figure 3-16, it is found that the recovery time for a given level of operability is 
estimated to be faster if inter-system interdependency is not considered. The recovery time 
estimated 7 days shorter (32 compared to 39 days) for cellular system. The recovery time for 
power and water system remains unchanged since the recovery times of the two systems are 
governed by the damage of the links, a power distribution line and a water pipeline. The recovery 
time for individual nodes also differs a lot between the two cases. The recovery times for the 
damaged nodes whose recovery time varies between the two cases are summarized in Table 3-9. 
It is found that considering the interdependency between the systems is especially important 
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when assessing the water system recovery and resilience. This is due to water system depends the 
most on the other systems. 
Table 3-9. The difference in node recovery times with and without considering inter-system interdependencies. 
  Node recovery time (days) 
Node 
33 
-PSFS 
34 - 
PSFS 
35 - 
WCP 
36 - 
WCP 
49 - 
WSFS 
50 - 
WSFS 
51 - 
WSFS 
52 - 
WSCC 
54 - 
CCO 
55 - 
CSO 
57 - 
CSO 
58 - 
CSO 
With 
interdependency 
16 40 31 18 45 43 33 31 6 22 39 27 
Without 
interdependency 
15 34 29 16 41 40 30 26 4 19 32 22 
Percentage 
difference 
-6.3% -15.0% -6.5% -11.1% -9.8% -7.5% -9.1% -16.1% -33.3% -13.6% -17.9% -18.5% 
 
The underestimation of the recovery time is also observed in the estimation of the times 
to reach the three recovery milestones if inter-system interdependencies are ignored. The time for 
individual infrastructure systems and the integrated network to reach the 30%, 60%, 90%, and 
100% operability levels are listed in Table 3-10, which are comparable to the values in Table 3-8.  
 
Table 3-10. The time for individual systems and the integrated network to reach 30%, 60%, 90%, and 100% functionality levels 
using conventional model without considering interdependency*. 
  Recovery time (days) 
Functionality 
level 
Connectivity Efficiency 
Power Water Cellular All Power Water Cellular All 
30% 
19 
(0%) 
40 
(-6.98%) 
0 
(0%) 
22 
(-18.52%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
60% 
56 
(0%) 
41 
(-8.89%) 
22 
(-18.52%) 
40 
(-6.98%) 
0 
(0%) 
30 
(-23.08%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(-57.14%) 
90% 
67 
(0%) 
57 
(0%) 
32 
(-17.95%) 
57 
(0%) 
34 
(-39.29%) 
41 
(-8.89%) 
22 
(-18.52%) 
34 
(-24.44%) 
100%  
67 
(0%) 
57 
(0%) 
32 
(-17.95%) 
67 
(0%) 
34 
(-49.25%) 
67 
(0%) 
32 
(-17.95%) 
67 
(0%) 
* Note: The percentage difference values in the parentheses in this table are in comparison to the values in Table 3-8. 
110 
 
The underestimation of the recovery time would result in an overestimation of the 
resilience. The resilience for each of the system and the integrated network measured by CL and 
E with and without considering the interdependency between systems are listed in Table 3-11. 
The water system has the largest difference between the resilience values from the two cases. 
 
Table 3-11. Resilience for individual systems and the integrated network with and without considering interdependency. 
  
Resilience 
Measured by CL Measured by E 
Power  Water Cellular  All Power  Water Cellular  All 
With 
interdependency 
0.5312 0.4337 0.7610 0.5753 0.8243 0.6931 0.9079 0.8084 
Without 
interdependency 
0.5432 0.4598 0.8030 0.6020 0.9184 0.7286 0.9239 0.8570 
Percentage 
difference 
2.25% 6.01% 5.51% 4.64% 11.41% 5.12% 1.76% 6.01% 
 
The observed trend seems to be reasonable since without considering the inter-system 
interdependencies, a damaged node is assumed to be able to get everything it needs from other 
systems for its operation during the recovery process. If the interdependency between the 
systems is taken into account, however, insufficient supply of necessary PISs from other systems 
can slow down the recovery process of a damaged node. Thus, the recovery time for the whole 
network as well as the damaged nodes would be underestimated if the interdependency between 
systems is not properly considered. This underestimation on the recovery time and 
overestimation of the resilience may lead to an underestimation of potential losses and risks, 
which will lead to poorly-informed decisions for the recovery planning and risk mitigation. 
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3.2.5. Comparison with a Model with Considering System-to-System Level 
Interdependencies 
To highlight the importance of modeling the infrastructure interdependencies at a higher 
resolution, the recovery estimation from the proposed DIN model which considers the 
dependencies at the facility-to-facility level is compared with the estimation from the conventional 
methodology that considers only the system-to-system level interdependencies (Jiang & Haimes, 
2004; Haimes et al., 2005 a,b; Lian & Haimes, 2006; Crowther, Haimes & Taub, 2007; Barker & 
Haimes, 2009a,b; Reed, Kapur & Christie, 2009). The recovery curves for considering the 
system-to-system level interdependencies and for considering the facility-to-facility level 
dependencies were generated for the comparison. 
Figure 3-16 shows the network of the hypothetical study region modified from Figure 3-11 
by combining all the facilities in one system to be represented by one node. It was assumed that the 
distance from one system node to an end-user group in this modified network equals to the longest 
distance among all the distances from all source nodes in the system to the end-user group in the 
original network. The initial inoperability of a system node in Figure 3-16 was assumed to be the 
maximum initial inoperability of all the nodes in the original network. The recovery coefficient of 
this node was then used as the recovery coefficient of the corresponding system node in the 
modified network. The expected damage level and the recovery time for each link in the modified 
network were assumed to be the maximum expected damage level among all the links going from 
one system to another in the original network and the recovery time of the corresponding link.  
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Figure 3-16. The hypothetical study region represented by a system-to-system level interdependency model. 
The operability of the whole network measured by connectivity and efficiency of the model 
when only the system-to-system level interdependencies are considered is shown in Figure 3-17 
together with the results from the DIN model. It is noted that the recovery time of the network is 38 
days (56.72%) longer if system-to-system level interdependencies are considered rather than the 
facility-to-facility level dependencies. Besides, the operability of the network by considering the 
facility-to-facility level dependencies is always higher than by considering the system-to-system 
level interdependencies. The recovery of the network is described in a more refined way when the 
facility-to-facility level dependencies are considered. This is because by considering the 
dependencies at the facility level, each system can be partially damaged, the nodes in each system 
can recover at different times. However, if each system is viewed as one node, each system at a 
given time can only have the states of damaged or not damaged, which simplifies the modeling of 
the whole recovery process and overestimates the overall damage severity of each system. In 
conclusion, this comparative analysis suggests that the recovery times would be overestimated a 
lot if only system-to-system level interdependencies are considered. This overestimation may 
cause the waste of resources due to the over-preparation of the recovery tools and materials, 
unnecessary social disruptions due to the long-estimated recovery time and poorly-informed 
decision making for pre- and post-disaster risk management. 
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                     (a)                                              (b)  
Figure 3-17. The network operability measured by considering the system-to-system level interdependencies and 
facility-to-facility level dependencies: (a) measured by CL, (b) measured by E. 
3.2.6. Closure 
The DIN model was compared with two conventional recovery models, one without 
considering any dependencies between the facilities in different infrastructure systems, the other 
one with considering only the system-to-system level interdependencies. The first comparison 
shows that if the inter-system interdependencies are ignored, the recovery time of the damaged 
nodes and the infrastructure systems would be underestimated, and the resilience would be 
overestimated, which would lead to an underestimation of the potential damages and losses. The 
second comparison indicates that if the system-to-system interdependencies are considered, 
instead of the facility-to-facility level dependencies, the recovery time of the damaged 
infrastructure systems would be overestimated, and the resilience be underestimated. Besides, the 
overall recovery trajectory would be modeled in a simplified way and overestimates the damage 
severity of each system, which would lead to waste of resources and unnecessary social 
disruptions. Both of these model comparisons show that if the facility-to-facility level 
dependencies within and across different infrastructure systems are not properly incorporated into 
the recovery modeling, the resulted damage severity, recovery time and resilience information 
114 
 
would be misleading, which will in turn result in poorly informed decisions for pre-disaster risk 
mitigation and post-disaster recovery planning. 
3.3. Model Validation 
To validate the model with physical reality, the DIN model was applied to simulate the 
recovery of interdependent power, water and cellular systems in Galveston City, TX after 
Hurricane Ike, 2008. 
3.3.1. Galveston Testbed   
Galveston City a coastal island of Texas State with an area of 542 km2. The critical 
facilities in electric power, water supply and cellular systems were identified using Google Earth. 
The GIS data of the road and bridge network in Galveston City was downloaded from US 
Census website (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Thirty-nine end-user groups were created based on 
Galveston city zoning division (City of Galveston, 2018), including 4 industrial areas, 16 
residential areas and 19 commercial areas. The dependency relationships among electric power, 
potable water and end-user groups were determined based on the nearest facility assumption. All 
the end-user groups were assumed to receive the service from all the cellular towers since 
Galveston City is 46.67 km long and 7.40 km wide, which is within the coverage area of a typical 
cellular tower, 35.40 ~ 72.42 km (Bert Markgraf, 2018). The number of nodes in each type of the 
facilities in power, water, cellular systems is listed in Table 3-12. The dependency relationship 
between the nodes is shown in Figure 3-18. In total, there are 353 nodes and 578 links in the 
network. 
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Figure 3-18. Critical facilities in power, water and cellular systems and the road network in Galveston City, TX. 
 
Table 3-12. The number of each type of critical facilities modeled in the Galveston City infrastructure network. 
System Facility type Number 
Electric Power 
Substation (PS) 7 
Transmission tower (PT) 268 
Potable Water  
Pumping station (WPS) 19 
Treatment station (WTS) 3 
Storage tank (WST) 13 
Cellular  Cell tower (CT) 4 
End-user Group 
Industrial 4 
Residential 16 
Commercial 19 
Total Number of Nodes 353 
Total Number of Links 578 
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3.3.2. Hurricane Ike Hazard Information 
The Hurricane Ike made landfall near Galveston City, TX as a Category 2 Hurricane in 
2008. The maximum wind speeds and the maximum flood depth of Hurricane Ike at different 
infrastructure facility locations in Galveston were found in literature (Masoomi et al., 2011). The 
range of the hurricane wind speed in different locations of Galveston was between 120.84 m/s 
and 174.60 m/s. The range of the flood depth caused by storm surge and heavy rainfall was 
between 0.14 m to 4.71 m. 
3.3.3. Recovery Modeling Using Dynamic Integrated Network Model 
The post-disaster restoration of the interdependent power, water and cellular systems in 
Galveston City, TX after Hurricane Ike, 2008 was assessed by considering the uncertainties in the 
following variables: (1) the initial damage level of the network nodes, utility poles, and roads and 
bridges; (2) the restoration coefficients for network nodes; and (3) the restoration time of the 
network links, utility poles and the roads and bridges. The uncertainties considered in this study 
and their probability distribution parameters are summarized in Table 3-13. Here “restoration” 
refers to the short-term recovery, which refers to the process to restore all the services of the 
infrastructure systems to the end-users to satisfy the demand, even though some long-term 
recovery goals such as the network optimization, facility upgrade, and structural reconstruction 
have not been reached yet. For example, after 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the functional restoration 
time (the time used to restore all the service) was 7 days for electric power supply, 82 days for 
water supply and 85 days for natural gas supply. However, the seismic design code development 
for the lifeline systems, and the upgrade and reconstruction of some life system facilities continued 
over years following the earthquake (Kameda, 2000). 
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Table 3-13. The probabilistic models of the random variables in this analysis. 
No. Random variable Probabilistic model 
1 
Initial damage level of damaged network nodes and 
implicitly modeled utility poles 
Distribution determined from fragility curves  
2 Initial damage level of damaged roads and bridges Standard uniform distribution 
3 Recovery coefficients of damaged network nodes 
Normal distribution with mean and standard 
deviation (S.D.) listed in Table 3-2 
4 
Recovery times of damaged network links and 
implicitly modeled roads and bridges 
Normal distribution with mean and S.D. listed in 
ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 1985) 
 
The following assumptions were made for this analysis. First of all, it was reported that 
the State Highway 87, the Harborside Drive and the FM 3005 road were flooded and the Tiki Dr. 
Bridge is lightly damaged (The State of Texas, 2008; City of Galveston, 2009). Thus, the 
damage level of these damaged roads and bridges were assumed to follow standard uniform 
distribution since no data is available to determine the actual damage levels. The Pelican Island 
Bridge was reported to be destroyed (Stearns & Padgett, 2011) and thus was modeled with an 
initial damage level of 1. Although there may exist some other roads that are also damaged 
and/or blocked, this study didn’t consider all these scenarios since no data about the location of 
these damaged roads are available. Secondly, the short-term restoration time for the damaged 
roads and bridges and network links were assumed to be one fourth of the long-term recovery 
time (Applied Technology Council, 1985), many existing literature suggest the period from the 
disaster impact to month 3 as short-term recovery, or rehabilitation, and month 3 on ward 
(usually around 12 months) often refers to long term recovery, or reconstruction (UNDRO, 1984; 
Schwab et al., 1998; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Thirdly, in order to simulate 
the short-term restoration, the mean recovery coefficients in this analysis were increased to be four 
times of the long-term recovery coefficients, just as the short-term restoration coefficients used 
in (He & Cha, 2018a). The mean and standard deviation of the restoration coefficients for each 
facility type used in this analysis are shown in Table 3-14.  
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Table 3-14. The mean and standard deviation of the restoration coefficients for all critical facility types in Galveston City 
infrastructure network. 
Facility type PS PT WPS WTS WST CT End-user 
Mean 0.0576 0.2136 0.0648 0.0376 0.0824 0.1324 0.1004 
Standard 
deviation 
0.0012 0.0043 0.0014 0.0007 0.0016 0.0027 0.0025 
 
Apart from physical damage of the infrastructure systems, the Galveston City also 
experienced severe population drop after Hurricane Ike. The population was estimated to be 
15,000 people below its pre-storm population of 58,000 (Colley & DeBlasio Sr, 2008). It is 
assumed in this analysis that the demand change for all critical civil infrastructure facilities in 
Galveston City is proportional to the population change, which means that the facilities only 
need to be restored to satisfy a post-disaster demand which is equal to 74.14% of their 
pre-disaster demand. 
3.3.4. Model Validation Result 
For validation purpose, the simulated power system restoration time was compared with 
the actual power system restoration time of Galveston City after Hurricane Ike, 2008. The Latin 
Hypercube simulation was run for 1,000 times until the mean ( ) and standard deviation ( ) of 
the power system restoration time converge. After running 1000 times, we have over 99% 
confidence that the true mean power system restoration time is within 1 day of the simulated 
mean power system restoration time. The variations of the restoration curves for the electric 
power system measured by connectivity and efficiency are shown in Figure 3-19. The 
uncertainties in the modeling parameters are found to result in significant variations in the 
estimated restoration times, which highlight the importance of considering the uncertainties in 
the restoration and recovery estimations. The information on the variations in the restoration time 
provides a whole picture of the risk, which can help the decision makers better make 
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risk-informed decisions. The actual power system restoration time for Galveston City after 
Hurricane Ike was 23.17 days (Department of Energy, 2008), which is within the mean (29.94 
days) minus/plus one standard deviation (7.76 days) of the simulated power system restoration 
time. It shows that the proposed DIN model can produce comparable result with the physical 
reality in general. The simulated mean power system restoration time is 29.94 days, which is 
longer than the actual power system restoration time. This overestimation could be a result from 
the non-accurate fragility curves used in this model. Besides, the restoration coefficients of the 
power system facilities may be larger than the values used in this study. The modeling results 
would be more accurate if more data about the fragility curves and the restoration coefficients 
become available in the future. 
 
    
             (a)                                              (b) 
Figure 3-19. The variations of the power system restoration curves measured by (a) connectivity and (b) efficiency. 
 
3.3.5. Closure 
To validate the model with physical reality, the DIN model was applied to simulate the 
recovery of interdependent power, water and cellular systems in Galveston City, TX after 
Hurricane Ike (2008). In addition to facility-to-facility level dependencies in the power, water, 
and cellular systems, two types of system-to-facility level dependencies were incorporated in this 
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analysis. First, the recovery rates of the damaged facilities in power, water and cellular systems 
were reduced because of the transportation system damage. Second, the post-disaster demand of 
the facilities was reduced in accordance with the post-Ike population drop of Galveston City. The 
uncertainties in some of the modeling variables were considered, such as the initial damage level 
and recovery coefficients of network nodes, the recovery time of the damaged network links and 
so on. The Monte Carlo Simulation with Latin Hypercube sampling was run for 1,000 times until 
the mean and standard deviation of the network recovery time converges. The actual power 
system recovery time for Galveston City after Hurricane Ike was 23.17 days, which is within the 
mean (29.94 days) minus/plus one standard deviation (7.76 days) of the simulated time. It shows 
that the proposed DIN model can produce comparable result with the physical reality. 
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CHAPTER 4 INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE PRE-DISASTER 
RISK MITIGATION PLANNING 
The literature review in section 2.6 indicates that: (1) although there exists extensive 
studies on developing models to simulate the performance of infrastructure systems under 
disruptive events, only limited studies are available on developing decision frameworks to 
support the pre-disaster infrastructure risk mitigation planning; and (2) the few existing studies 
or projects on risk mitigation planning for infrastructure systems tend to focus on a single 
infrastructure system, without considering any interdependencies between the systems, which 
may not be the most efficient and effective way to reduce the loss and enhance the overall 
community resilience. To fill the gaps of extending infrastructure recovery models to support risk 
mitigation planning decision-making and considering infrastructure interdependencies in the 
decision-making process, this chapter introduces the Interdependent Infrastructure Risk 
Mitigation (IIRM) problem, which aims at developing optimal pre-disaster risk mitigation plans 
for the interdependent infrastructure systems under certain constraints. A four-stage decision 
framework to solve the IIRM problem is proposed. One innovation of this decision framework is 
that it includes the pre-decision processing stage, in which the facilities that deserve priority 
consideration for risk mitigation investment and intervention in the interdependent infrastructure 
systems are identified. This step is essential for making the infrastructure risk mitigation planning 
better targeted.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: section 4.1 defines the IIRM 
problem and the four-stage decision framework. Section 4.2 illustrates the proposed IIRM 
decision framework using a case study on pre-disaster risk mitigation planning of the 
interdependent critical infrastructure systems in Jamaica. Finally, the contributions and 
significance of the IIRM decision framework are highlighted and summarized in section 4.3. 
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4.1. Interdependent Infrastructure Risk Mitigation Decision Problem 
The IIRM decision problem is defined as the problem of developing an optimal 
pre-disaster risk mitigation plan for the interdependent infrastructure systems in a community to 
achieve greater community resilience under financial budget/fund and resources constrains. The 
main characteristics of the IIRM problem, including decision objective, applicable phase, decision 
makers and decision constraints are summarized in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1. Main characteristics of the IIRM decision problem. 
Decision objective 
Mitigation of the damage, social disruptions and economic losses when future hazard occurs 
through improving the resilience of interdependent civil infrastructure systems 
Applicable phase Pre-disaster risk mitigation phase 
Decision makers 
• Multi-national development banks (e.g. Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, European Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 
World Bank, etc.) 
• Emergency management departments or agencies (e.g. Department of Homeland 
Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Ministry of the Emergency 
Management of the People’s Republic of China, etc.) 
• Disaster risk management related organizations (e.g. United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), etc.) 
• Utility companies (e.g. Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division, CenterPoint Energy, 
etc.) and other multi-infrastructure system owners 
Decision constraints Financial budget/fund, available resources, time 
 
In the pre-disaster phase, the main objective of the infrastructure risk mitigation work is 
to make the existing infrastructure network more robust and/or redundant in order to reduce its 
vulnerability and minimize the service disruptions to the community when future hazard occurs. 
Some common practices during this phase include: (1) frequent maintenance of the existing 
facilities; (2) upgrading or retrofitting the existing facilities and (3) building new facilities. 
However, due to limited available budget/fund, resources and time, not all the facilities in the 
infrastructure network could be maintained, upgraded or rebuilt. Thus, identifying some critical 
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facilities in all considered infrastructure systems that have the priority need for risk mitigation 
investment and intervention is especially important. The following subsections present a 
four-stage decision framework to solve the IIRM problem with considering the facility 
prioritization in the pre-decision processing step. This framework can be applied to any 
interdependent infrastructure systems under any type of hazard/multi-hazards. The flowchart of 
the IIRM decision framework is shown in Figure 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-1. The flowchart of the IIRM decision framework. 
 
4.1.1. Decision Problem 
The first step of solving the IIRM problem is to define the objective and scope of the 
specific decision problem. Clearly identifying the decision objective, decision makers, constraints, 
study region and hazard types are important to facilitate the data collection and information 
gathering work. Any assumptions and other relevant information needed to define the specific 
IIRM decision problem (e.g. the current status of the infrastructure facilities, time since last 
maintenance, restrictions of new construction, etc.) should also be clarified in this step. 
4.1.2. Pre-decision Processing: Priority Identification 
Due to various constraints, the pre-disaster risk mitigation cannot be performed on all 
facilities in the infrastructure network. The more critical facilities in the network deserve priority 
consideration for the risk mitigation investment and interventions when only limited budget or 
optimal risk 
mitigation plan 
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resources are available. The task of the pre-decision processing stage is to prioritize the facilities in 
different interdependent infrastructure systems based on certain decision criteria. There are three 
steps to assess the priority of individual infrastructure facilities, which is shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2. Priority assessment framework for infrastructure facilities in the pre-decision processing stage. 
 
The decision criterion used to identify the criticality of the infrastructure facilities needs to 
be determined first. Some example decision criteria include: high vulnerability (low robustness), 
high risk, low redundancy, long recovery time, large number of customer served, etc. Next, the 
damage and recovery of the interdependent infrastructure systems subjected to disaster events are 
simulated with considering the dependency relationships among infrastructure facilities. Some 
existing methodologies to simulate the post-disaster performance of interdependent infrastructure 
systems can be used (Ouyang, 2014; He & Cha, 2019a). In the final step, the facilities that 
deserve priority consideration for risk mitigation investment and intervention are identified to 
assist developing alternative risk mitigation plans in the next stage.   
4.1.3. Decision Alternatives 
In this stage, several alternative risk mitigation plans are proposed. Although any facility 
could be included in the risk mitigation plan, priority is given to the critical facilities identified in 
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the previous stage if only limited budget or resources are available. The plans can be formed by 
first listing all possible risk mitigation strategies for different types of infrastructure facilities and 
then allocating budget and resources to the suitable strategies for different critical facilities 
identified in the previous stage. 
4.1.4. Decision Analysis 
In the decision analysis stage, all the alternative risk mitigation plans proposed in the 
previous step are analyzed using decision analysis techniques. Some of the most widely used 
decision analysis tools and techniques include: cost-benefit analysis, decision matrix, Pareto 
analysis, PEST analysis, SWOT analysis, T-chart analysis, trade-off analysis and so on (Hall, 
Ashford & Söderbaum, 2008; Caramela, 2017). Post-disaster performance of the infrastructure 
systems is analyzed for all the alternative risk mitigation plans as part of the decision analysis. 
The decision analysis results are used to compare different risk mitigation plans in order to reach 
the final decision conclusion. 
4.1.5. Decision 
In this final stage, the optimal infrastructure risk mitigation plan(s) would be selected 
based on the decision analysis results. The optimal plan would be implemented on the 
infrastructure network and its effectiveness is recommended to be evaluated throughout the 
entire project period and updated if needed.  
 
4.2. Case Study: Risk Mitigation Planning for Critical Infrastructure Systems in Jamaica 
The proposed four-stage IIRM decision framework is illustrated using a case study on risk 
mitigation planning of the interdependent power, water and transportation systems in Jamaica 
subjected to hurricane hazards.  
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4.2.1. Decision Problem 
In this case study, the IIRM problem aims at developing a strategic plan for critical 
infrastructure systems in Jamaica in order to reduce the service disruptions under future 
hurricane hazard. The key components of the problem are summarized in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2. The IIRM decision problem for Jamaica case study. 
Decision objective 
Reduction of service disruptions to critical end-user facilities by future hurricane hazard 
occurs 
Constraints Financial budget, resources and time 
Study region Jamaica 
Infrastructure systems Electric power, water supply and transportation (road) systems 
Critical end-user facilities Airports, hospitals and schools 
Hazard type Hurricane wind and rainfall-induced flooding hazards 
   
Jamaica is chosen as the study region for the case study. Jamaica is the fourth-largest and 
fourth-most populous island country in the Caribbean Sea with an area of 10,990 km2 and a 
population of 2.9 million (Niehoff, 2017; Potter, 2017; Wikipedia, 2018). The geographic location 
and unique topography make Jamaica one of the most exposed countries to natural hazards in the 
world, especially to hurricane hazards. The severity of the damage and loss of Jamaica caused by a 
hazard is also quite high due to its isolated location and socioeconomic structure. Past catastrophe 
events such as the 2007 Hurricane Dean witnessed huge civil infrastructure network damages 
which led to severe socioeconomic impact to Jamaica (Planning Institute of Jamaica, 2007). Some 
of the infrastructure facilities in Jamaica are located in high risk areas, not built to high standards, 
and poorly maintained, which exacerbate their vulnerability to natural disasters (Fay et al., 2017). 
Thus, strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation plans aiming at tackling these issues are needed to 
improve the resilience of the infrastructure systems and the overall socioeconomic well-being of 
Jamaica. 
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This study focuses on three of the most critical civil infrastructure systems in Jamaica: the 
electric power, water supply and transportation (road) systems. The hospitals, schools and airports 
in Jamaica are chosen to be the critical end-users of the infrastructure systems because of their 
functions for the medical care, sheltering and evacuation/rescue of people after a disaster, 
respectively. The dependency relationships among power, water and end-user facilities were 
determined based on the nearest facility assumption. Also, the post-disaster recovery of all the 
damaged power, water and end-user facilities are assumed to depend on the functionality of the 
road network. The number of each type of nodes (e.g. power plant, water pumping station, etc.) 
and links (e.g. power transmission line, road, etc.) modeled in the integrated network are listed in 
Table 4-3. The location of the network nodes and the road network are shown in Figure 4-3. In 
total, there are 1255 nodes and 2319 links modeled in the network for this case study. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. The locations of the critical facilities and the road network in Jamaica. 
 
Table 4-3. The number of each type of nodes and links modeled in the integrated network. 
System Facility type Number 
Power Power plant 10 
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Power substation 25 
Power transmission line 26 
Power distribution line 1079 
Power transmission tower (implicitly modeled) Every 320 m along transmission lines 
Power distribution poles (implicitly modeled) Every 40 m along distribution lines 
Water 
Water pumping station 11 
Water treatment station 43 
Water storage tank 140 
Water pipeline 1214 
Transportation Road 836 
End-user 
Hospital 50 
Airport 5 
School 971 
Total nodes 1255 
Total links 2319 
 
Eighteen scenario hurricanes affecting Jamaica with different landfall locations, heading 
directions and intensities were simulated using the modified Georgiou’s model with modeling 
parameters determined from the historical hurricane track data from NOAA (Georgiou, Davenport 
& Vickery, 1984; Rosowsky, Sparks & Huang, 1999; Huang, Rosowsky & Sparks, 2001; Lee II, 
Mitchell & Wallace, 2007; US Department of Commerce, NOAA, 2018). The simulated 
hurricanes are shown in Figure 4-4. The wind field of the scenario hurricane is developed using the 
modified Georgiou’s model which determines the gradient wind speed at each location as a 
function of various parameters including central pressure difference, radius of maximum wind 
speed, landfall translation speed, angle from hurricane heading direction, distance from hurricane 
eye, and air density (Georgiou, Davenport & Vickery, 1984; Rosowsky, Sparks & Huang, 1999; 
Huang, Rosowsky & Sparks, 2001; Lee II, Mitchell & Wallace, 2007). The statistics of the 
hurricane wind speed in Jamaica with three different mean recurrence interval (MRI) – 25, 50, and 
100-yr MRI - were calculated from the probabilistic hurricane map of Jamaica, as are summarized 
in Table 4-4. These statistics were used to group the simulated 18 scenario hurricanes into the three 
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intensity levels, with 6 hurricanes correspond to 25-yr MRI intensity, 6 hurricanes correspond to 
50-yr MRI intensity and 6 hurricanes correspond to 100-yr MRI intensity. 
 
Figure 4-4. The landfall location, heading direction and intensity of 18 simulated scenario hurricanes. 
 
Table 4-4. The statistics of the hurricane wind speed with 25, 50 or 100 year MRI in Jamaica (unit: mph). 
MRI Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation Mode 
25 years 74.96301 126.0761 88.80642 11.8013 97 
50 years 87.2297 147.3558 103.585 13.56736 114 
100 years 97.59073 166.6462 116.7062 15.31542 125 
 
After the wind speed for the location of each of nodes and links was determined for each 
scenario hurricane, the wind speed was then used to determine the rainfall rate and flooding water 
depth for the location, as is illustrated in Figure 4-5 (Tuleya, DeMaria & Kuligowski, 2007). The 
rainfall was assumed to continue from the time when the hurricane first hit the Jamaica Island to 
the time when the hurricane completely left Jamaica in this study. 
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Figure 4-5. The methodology to simulate a rainfall-induced flooding hazard for scenario hurricane. 
 
4.2.2. Pre-decision Processing: Priority Identification 
The critical facilities in each of the power, water and transportation systems in Jamaica 
that have priority need for risk mitigation investment and interventions under hurricane hazards 
are identified using the framework presented in Figure 4-2, which is shown in the following 
sub-sections. 
4.2.2.1. Decision Criterion 
The decision criterion used for assessing the priority of the infrastructure facilities in this 
case study is risk, which means that the facilities with higher risk deserve priority consideration for 
risk mitigation investment or interventions. In this study, the term risk of an infrastructure facility 
is understood as the vulnerability of a facility (proportional to the probability of damage of a 
facility) and the consequence if this facility is damaged. If a facility is very likely to be damaged 
under a hazard but its damage would not cause severe socioeconomic consequences, then the 
facility is only viewed as vulnerable, but not risky under the hazard. However, if a facility is very 
likely to be damaged under a disaster and its damage would cause severe socioeconomic 
consequences, then the facility is said to be of high risk.  
4.2.2.2. Recovery Modeling  
The recovery modeling step is to simulate the post-disaster performance of the 
interdependent infrastructure systems. An ideal model to fulfill the purpose of this step is one 
that could (1) simulate the performance of several infrastructure systems over time under 
disruptive events as a whole; (2) consider the facility-to-facility level dependencies within and 
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across different infrastructure systems; and (3) be able to account for the uncertainties in the 
simulation. The DIN model proposed in this research has the above-mentioned capabilities and is 
used for recovery modeling for this case study.  
The modeling parameters in the DIN model such as the dependency matrix, recovery 
coefficients and threshold inoperability/damage level in Chapter 3 are adopted for the recovery 
modeling in this case study. The uncertainties in the variables considered in this case study and 
their probabilistic distributions are summarized in Table 4-5. The Monte Carlo simulation with 
Latin Hypercube sampling was used with 100 iterations for each of the 18 scenario hurricane 
hazards. The 100-iteration time is chosen since the mean and standard deviation of the network 
recovery time is found to converge within 100 iterations. 
 
Table 4-5. The probabilistic models of the random variables in this analysis. 
No. Random variable Probabilistic model 
1 
Initial damage level of the explicitly modeled 
network nodes except transmission towers and 
distribution poles 
Distribution determined from fragility curves (López 
et al., 2009; MRI, 2011) 
2 
Initial damage level of the implicitly modeled 
power transmission towers and distribution poles 
Distribution determined from fragility curves 
(Ahmed, Arthur & Edwards, 2010; Shafieezadeh et 
al., 2014; Aslam, 2016) 
4 Recovery coefficients 
Normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
listed in Table 3-14 
5 Explicitly modeled network link recovery times 
Normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
listed in ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 
1985) 
6 Implicitly modeled road recovery times 
Normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
listed in ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 
1985) 
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4.2.2.3. Priority Identification 
The infrastructure facilities in power, water and transportation systems are prioritized 
based on the decision criterion and the DIN modeling results. The road segments, and power and 
water facilities with different priority levels are identified in the following subsections.  
4.2.2.3.1. Power and Water Systems 
The facilities in the power and water systems that are both vulnerable and serve a large 
number of end-users are considered to be of high risk, thus deserve the priority consideration for 
risk mitigation investment and interventions. The vulnerability of the power and water facilities in 
the study was measured by the mean initial inoperability under all scenario hurricane hazards. The 
changes of the mean inoperability of the power or water system facilities over time under all 
simulated scenario hurricanes are shown in Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7, respectively. The locations 
of the vulnerable power and water system facilities, including the ones that have long recovery 
times, are shown in Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9, respectively.  
 
Figure 4-6. Mean inoperability change of the power system facilities in Jamaica under scenario hurricane hazards. 
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Figure 4-7. Mean inoperability change of the water system facilities in Jamaica under scenario hurricane hazards. 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Vulnerable power system facilities in Jamaica under hurricane hazards. 
 
134 
 
 
Figure 4-9. Vulnerable water system facilities in Jamaica under hurricane hazards. 
 
Taking water pumping station 46 in Figure 4-9 for example, it has the highest priority 
among all water system facilities since it is both highly likely to be damaged under the disaster 
and its damage would affect the normal operation of the largest number of end-users. 
Furthermore, the water pumping station provides service to two hydropower plants. Thus, if it is 
damaged, the power service to lots of end-users would also be affected. Therefore, this water 
pumping station have the highest priority need for risk mitigation investment and interventions 
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among all water system facilities. Similar conclusion also applies to power plant 7 and power 
substation 25 and 26 in Figure 4-8. 
4.2.2.3.2. Transportation System 
The road segments which are both vulnerable and causing severe socioeconomic 
consequences when damaged or blocked have high risk, thus deserve priority consideration for 
risk mitigation investment and interventions. The vulnerability of the roads in Jamaica was 
measured by the percentage of the vehicle speed decrease on the roads due to the hurricane 
rainfall-induced flooding. The speed of a vehicle traveled on a road with certain water inundation 
depth was calculated using the model proposed by Pregnolato et al. (2017). The mean percentage 
of vehicle speed decrease on the roads in Jamaica under all 18 simulated scenario hurricane 
hazards is shown in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11.  
The socioeconomic consequence of the damaged road segments was measured by the 
decrease of the accessibility to some critical facilities. Accessibility to a critical facility at time t is 
inversely related to the average travel time increase from any road intersection points within a 
certain distance of the facility to that facility. Thus, the accessibility is determined using Eq.                           
(4-1).   
 
 
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ji ji
t
accessibility t
n t t
                             (4-1)                                                  
where in   the number of road intersection points within a certain distance of node i;  jit t   the 
time to travel from road intersection point j to node i at time t; 0
ji
t   the time to travel from road 
intersection point j to node i in an undamaged road network. In this study, the travel time from any 
road intersection points within 10 km of a facility to that facility is considered. The geographic 
locations of the infrastructure and end-user facilities whose accessibility would be most severely 
affected (top 30%) due to the road network damage under the hurricane rainfall-induced flooding 
hazard are shown in Figure 4-10. Similarly, the geographic locations of the vulnerable power and 
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water facilities whose accessibility would be most severely affected (top 30%) due to the damaged 
or blocked road network under hurricane rainfall-induced flooding are shown in Figure 4-11. The 
regions in Jamaica which have both high vulnerable road segments and large number of critical 
facilities whose accessibility would be most severely affected due to the damage of the roads are 
identified in rectangular boxes in Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11. The road segments in these regions 
have high risk, thus require priority need for risk mitigation intervention. 
 
 
Figure 4-10. High risk road segments with socioeconomic consequence measured by the number of critical 
infrastructure and end-users facilities been affected. 
 
137 
 
 
Figure 4-11. High risk road segments with socioeconomic consequence measured by the number of vulnerable 
power and water system facilities been affected. 
 
Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11 measure the socioeconomic consequence differently. Figure 
4-10 focuses on the road segments whose damage would affect the accessibility to the critical 
facilities in other infrastructure systems and the end-users, while Figure 4-11 focuses on the road 
segments whose damage would affect the accessibility to the most vulnerable power and water 
system facilities. Roads in region III in Figure 4-10 have the highest priority need for risk 
mitigation interventions since these roads are very likely to be damaged under the disaster and 
their damage would affect the accessibility to the largest number of critical infrastructure and 
end-user facilities. The service restoration work of large number of potentially damaged critical 
water and power system facilities, the transmission of injured people to nearby hospitals and the 
evacuation/rescue of people to schools or airports would be affected if roads in this region are 
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damaged or blocked. Roads in region A in Figure 4-11 require high priority consideration for risk 
mitigation investment and interventions since they have the highest vulnerability level and are 
connected to large number of vulnerable power and water system facilities whose failure would in 
turn disturb the service to the largest number of end-users. Even though the vulnerability of the 
roads in region D in Figure 4-11 are not as high as that for region B and C, these roads lead to 
several vulnerable power and water system facilities whose damage would disrupt the service to 
much more end-users compared to the roads in region B and C. Therefore, the roads in region D 
also have a high priority for investment and interventions. 
4.2.3. Decision Alternatives 
4.2.3.1. Risk Mitigation Strategies for Power, Water and Transportation Systems 
Some suggested risk mitigation strategies for the power, water, transportation systems 
and critical end-user facilities are listed in Table 4-6. Although these strategies can be applied to 
any facilities in the corresponding system, the high-risk facilities identified in section 4.2.2.3 
deserve priority consideration under limited budget or resources constraints. Besides, the budget 
is better to be distributed among facilities in different infrastructure systems if possible, rather 
than investing in one single infrastructure system. This is because the normal operation of a 
facility usually depends on the functioning of the facilities from other infrastructure systems. It’s 
only when all the infrastructure systems serving the facility function properly after the disaster 
that the facility can regain its socioeconomic value. 
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Table 4-6. Suggested risk mitigation strategies for the critical infrastructure systems and end-user facilities. 
System Risk mitigation strategies 
Power 
or 
water 
• Having backup batteries, backup power generators and/or backup water tanks at the critical 
power and water facility sites; 
• Increasing the frequency of the maintenance for existing facilities; 
• Replacing and/or upgrading the aged components in existing facilities; 
• Raising the elevation of the critical components of the power and water system facilities. 
Transportation 
(road) 
• Improving the capacity of the drainage system along the road network to ensure that rain water 
could be more quickly drained away; 
• Building more greenbelts along the roads so that more rain water could be penetrated into the 
ground; 
• Increasing the frequency of maintenance of the road network such as cleaning the drainage 
and reinforcing the slopes;  
• Adding more lanes or building new roads to increase the redundancy of the road network; 
• Upgrading the roads such as raising the grade of the roads, switching from unpaved to paved 
roads or raising the elevation of the roads; 
• Implementing traffic rules to make sure the most important vehicles can go through while 
others take an alternative route during the post-disaster recovery phase. 
End-user 
• Having backup batteries, backup power generators and/or backup water tanks at the critical 
power and water facility sites; 
• Increasing the frequency of the maintenance for existing facilities; 
• Replacing and/or upgrading the aged components in existing facilities; 
• Raising the elevation of the critical components of the critical end-user facilities. 
 
4.2.3.2. Alternative Risk Mitigation Plans 
Alternative risk mitigation plans can be developed by combining suitable risk mitigation 
strategies in Table 4-6 to different set of critical facilities identified in section 4.2.2.3. In this 
study, five alternative risk mitigation plans (plan I~V) were proposed as an example. The 
infrastructure performance improvements achieved by each risk mitigation plan are assumed as 
shown in Table 4-7. 
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Table 4-7. Example of the risk mitigation plans I ~ V and the performance improvements. 
Plan Improvement of the infrastructure network performance achieved by implementing the plan 
I 
• The vehicle speed on the following road segments is increased by 30%: region A, B, C and D in Figure 
4-11. 
II 
• The vulnerability of the following high-risk power and water system facilities is decreased by 20%: node 
7, 25, 26 in Figure 4-8, and node 46 in Figure 4-9. 
• The vehicle speed on the following road segments is increased by 20%: region A and D in Figure 4-11. 
III 
• The vulnerability of the following high-risk power and water system facilities is decreased by 40%: node 
7, 25, 26 in Figure 4-8, and node 46 in Figure 4-9. 
• The vehicle speed on the following road segments is increased by 40%: region A and D in Figure 4-11. 
IV 
• The vulnerability of the following high-risk power and water system facilities is decreased by 20%: node 
7, 10, 12, 23, 25, 26 in Figure 4-8, and node 41, 44, 46, 53, 72, 73, 82, 84, 101, 194 in Figure 4-9. 
• The vehicle speed on the following road segments is increased by 20%: region A, B, C and D in Figure 
4-11. 
V 
• The vulnerability of the following high-risk power and water system facilities is decreased by 40%: node 
7, 10, 12, 23, 25, 26 in Figure 4-8, and node 41, 44, 46, 53, 72, 73, 82, 84, 101, 194 in Figure 4-9. 
• The vehicle speed on the following road segments is increased by 40%: region A, B, C and D in Figure 
4-11. 
 
4.2.4. Decision Analysis 
In this study, the cost-benefit analysis was used to compare different risk mitigation plans. 
The total cost roughly increases from alternative plan I to V, but the exact value was not 
calculated due to data availability issue. The service restoration over time for all critical end-user 
facilities (including hospitals, schools and airports) in Jamaica under each scenario hurricane 
hazard for each risk mitigation plan was simulated using the DIN model. The mean power and 
water service restoration curves under all simulated scenario hurricane hazards for each risk 
mitigation plan are shown in Figure 4-12. 
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(a)                                             (b) 
Figure 4-12. Mean (a) power and (b) water service restoration curves for all end-users under all simulated scenario 
hurricane hazards for each risk mitigation plan. 
 
Two resilience-based infrastructure network performance metrics are used to compare the 
efficiency and effectiveness of implementing different risk mitigation plans. The efficiency of 
the infrastructure service restoration is measured by the total service restoration time (TSRT), 
after which the service to all end-users is restored. The effectiveness of the infrastructure service 
restoration is measured by the skewness of the service restoration trajectory (SSRT), defined as 
the centroid of the area below the service restoration curve given the time period in consideration. 
The lower the TSRT or SSRT, the more efficient or effective the risk mitigation plan is. The 
power and water system service restoration evaluated by TSRT and SSRT under each risk 
mitigation plan are summarized in Table 4-8. The time period of 60 days was used to calculate 
SSRT in this study. 
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Table 4-8. The TSRT and SSRT of the power and water systems under each risk mitigation plan. 
Plan 
Power system Water system 
 TSRT (days) SSRT (days)  TSRT (days)  SSRT (days) 
I 57 36.30 54 32.89 
II 53 35.47 53 32.80 
III 53 35.35 53 32.78 
IV 45 34.72 45 32.45 
V 43 34.50 43 32.37 
 
4.2.5. Decision  
The optimal pre-disaster risk mitigation plan is determined based on the decision analysis 
results. Figure 4-12 and Table 4-8 shows that the efficiency and effectiveness of the utility service 
restoration improve from plan I to plan V as the investment increases. It can be learned by 
comparing the plans I and II that allocating the risk mitigation budget and resources on several 
infrastructure systems (as in plan II) could yield better result compared to investing in a single 
infrastructure system (as in plan I). To select the optimal risk mitigation plan, the decision makers 
need to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of each plan. For example, if plan V cost far more 
than plan IV, the decision makers need to decide whether the 2 days’ decrease of the utility service 
restoration time deserves this large amount of extra budget. If not, then plan IV could be the 
optimal risk mitigation plan in this case. 
4.3. Closure 
Strategic pre-disaster risk mitigation planning on interdependent infrastructure systems 
under limited budget and resources is essential to enhance the community resilience. This chapter 
proposes a decision framework on infrastructure risk mitigation planning with considering facility 
prioritization. The framework is illustrated with a case study on pre-disaster risk mitigation 
planning of interdependent power, water and transportation systems in Jamaica under hurricane 
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hazard. This case study presents an ideal pre-disaster risk mitigation decision process where a 
decision maker is interested in improving the total resilience of multiple civil infrastructure 
systems. In the real world, theoretical optimal risk mitigation plan may not always be adopted 
due to some special policy or other constraints. The major contributions of this chapter include: 
(i) it introduces the IIRM problem to guide the pre-disaster risk mitigation planning of the 
infrastructure systems with considering the interdependencies of the facilities in different 
infrastructure systems. The decision objective, applicable phase, decision makers and constraints 
are clearly identified; (ii) it proposes a four-stage decision framework to solve the IIRM problem. 
One important step of solving the IIRM problem is to identify the critical facilities in each 
infrastructure system which deserve priority consideration for investment and interventions 
under certain constraints. This step is important since it can make the proposed risk mitigation 
plan better targeted; and (iii) several risk mitigation strategies for the power, water, transportation 
systems and the critical end-user facilities under hurricane hazard are proposed in this paper. These 
strategies are of great referential importance to other infrastructure systems or critical facilities as 
well for the pre-disaster risk mitigation purpose. The proposed IIRM decision problem and 
corresponding decision framework can be useful for the decision makers for multi-infrastructure 
system risk management. 
It should be noted that the proposed IIRM decision problem and framework mainly focus 
on infrastructure risk mitigation planning in pre-disaster phase and is not developed for 
post-disaster recovery planning. Pre-disaster and post-disaster are two distinct phases for the 
community risk management and resilience planning. During the pre-disaster risk mitigation 
phase, the risk management work mainly focuses on increasing the robustness of the civil 
infrastructure network to better prepare the community for future disruptive events. However, the 
occurrence of natural disasters is unavoidable and sometimes, the hazard intensities of the 
extreme events are unpredictable. No pre-disaster risk mitigation plan could fully eliminate all 
the damage and losses caused by potential catastrophe events. Therefore, strategic post-disaster 
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recovery planning is also important to enhance the community resilience under disruptive events. 
The research in the next chapter is focused on developing risk-informed decision framework to 
guide the post-disaster recovery optimization in order to better support community resilience 
planning.  
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CHAPTER 5 INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE POST-DISASTER 
RECOVERY PLANNING 
Due to the infrastructure interdependencies, the complete recovery of a facility in one 
infrastructure system depends not only on the physical restoration of itself, but also on the 
recovery of the facilities in other infrastructure systems that it depends on. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the interdependencies with other infrastructure systems when planning the 
post-disaster recovery of any damaged infrastructure facility or system in order to achieve more 
efficient and effective recovery. 
The foregoing literature review on post-disaster infrastructure performance evaluation 
and recovery planning in section 2.5 and 2.6 reveals the following issues. First of all, in spite of 
numerous methodologies and models that have been developed to simulate the performance of 
interdependent infrastructure systems under different types of hazards, few studies have been 
done to extend the model in guiding the strategic post-disaster infrastructure recovery planning 
decision making. Secondly, the few existing decision frameworks or models aiming at 
optimizing the post-disaster infrastructure recovery scheduling mainly focus on only one type of 
the infrastructure system (the transportation system), while ignoring the interdependencies 
among different infrastructure systems during the post-disaster recovery phase. Thirdly, although 
the existing infrastructure performance metrics all have their own merits in quantifying the 
infrastructure system performance under disruptive events, most of the metrics emphasize on 
measuring the functionality of the infrastructure systems and fail to take the service disruptions 
to the end-users into consideration. Furthermore, some performance metrics (e.g. water pressure, 
travel time, road network accessibility) are designed to evaluate the functionality of one specific 
infrastructure systems, which makes it hard to quantify the performance of the integrated 
infrastructure network where several interdependent infrastructure systems are considered 
together. 
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To fill these gaps, this chapter introduces the Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery 
Planning (IIRP) problem and proposes a game theory-based decision support framework which 
could guide the infrastructure owners determining the optimal assignment and scheduling of the 
repair teams with considering the recovery plans of the other infrastructure systems that it 
depends on during the post-disaster recovery phase. Besides, two recovery time-based 
performance metrics, the total-facility-recovery-waiting-time (TFRWT) and the 
total-service-restoration-waiting-time (TSRWT) are proposed to evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the post-disaster recovery plan, which can be applied to different infrastructure 
systems. Finally, the IIRP problem and the proposed decision support framework is illustrated 
with an example of optimizing the recovery of interdependent power and water systems in 
Centerville, a virtual community, after a seismic hazard scenario. 
 
5.1. The Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Planning Problem 
5.1.1. Introduction to the IIRP Problem 
During the post-disaster recovery phase, the main objective of infrastructure owners, such 
as the utility companies, telecommunication companies, railroad companies and the local 
Department of Transportation, is to repair the damaged infrastructure systems and restore the 
service to the end-users as efficiently and/or effectively as possible. The decision of the 
infrastructure owners in this phase can be summarized as determining how much and in which 
order resources need to be allocated to repair each of damaged facilities, or how many repair 
teams need to be sent to the affected region, and which team should repair which facility at what 
time. The IIRP problem is proposed to guide infrastructure owners determining the optimal 
assignment and scheduling of their repair teams during the post-disaster recovery phase by 
taking the recovery of other infrastructure systems into consideration. Key characteristics of the 
IIRP problem, including decision objective, decision makers, applicable phase, decision 
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constraints and example decision criteria are defined and summarized in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1. Summary of the IIRP problem. 
Decision objective 
Repair the damaged infrastructure network and restore the service to the end-users as 
efficiently and/or effectively as possible after the disaster 
Decision makers 
Infrastructure owners, such as utility companies, telecommunication companies, railroad 
companies, local Department of Transportation, etc. 
Applicable phase Post-disaster recovery phase 
Decision constrains 
Limited number of repair crews, available resources, policy requirements for system 
performance (e.g.: acceptable performance level) 
Example decision 
criteria  
Infrastructure network recovery time, service restoration time, resilience, skewness, total 
facility recovery waiting time, total service restoration waiting time, cost, etc. 
 
The decision framework for the proposed IIRP problem is comparable to game theory. 
Game theory is a science of strategies, or the optimal decision-makings of independent rational 
decision makers in an interactive situation. It focuses on multiple decision makers, or players, who 
decide independently, but contingent upon the strategy implemented by the other players 
(Myerson, 2013; Herrmann, 2015). The results in game theory describe what players should do if 
they want the optimal guaranteed payoff (Herrmann, 2015). In the IIRP problem, there are also 
multiple decision makers from different but interdependent infrastructure systems, one 
infrastructure owner’s decision on the recovery strategy would be influenced by the strategies 
implemented on the other infrastructure systems that his/her system depends on. The outcome of 
the IIRP problem describes how the individual infrastructure owners could best plan their 
post-disaster recovery works. The decision-making process to solve the IIRP problem using a 
game theory-based approach is introduced in the following subsections. 
5.1.2. Decision Support Framework for the IIRP Problem 
Before solving the IIRP problem, the decision problem needs to be clearly defined through 
identifying the decision context in terms of the four key characteristics of the problem (decision 
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objective, decision makers, decision criteria and decision constraints of a specific infrastructure 
recovery planning problem). Some other relevant information, such as the study region, hazard 
type, infrastructure damage scenario, etc. should also be identified.  
A game theory-based decision framework to solve the IIRP problem is illustrated in 
Figure 5-1, with two decision makers from two interdependent infrastructure systems. Note that 
this decision framework could be easily expanded by adding more decision makers from more 
infrastructure systems. Decision process for each system starts with an initial estimation of total 
number of repair teams assigned. The optimal repair sequence to repair all the damaged facilities 
in one infrastructure system given the initial estimation of total number of repair teams is 
determined according to performance metric 𝛼 (step ① in Figure 5-1). Different optimization 
techniques can be adopted, including genetic algorithms, enumeration, integer programming, 
combinatorial optimization and so on. Then, this optimal repair sequence is examined in order to 
determine whether its recovery could be further improved, with considering the recovery of the 
other infrastructure systems that this infrastructure system depends on. Taking the interdependent 
water and power systems for example, if the damaged water system facilities could be physically 
repaired in 10 days but the power system serving the water facilities could not be repaired until 
the 20th day, then there is no need to add more repair teams for the water system to further speed 
up its recovery process. If the recovery of the infrastructure system can be further improved (e.g. 
the power service can be restored before the water facilities been physically repaired), the current 
recovery performance of the infrastructure system measured by 𝛼 has not reached to the 
acceptable performance level, and there are more repair teams available, then another repair team 
is added to further improve the recovery performance of the system. This recovery optimization 
process for each infrastructure system terminates when its recovery could not be improved 
further, or when its recovery performance has reached to the acceptable level, or when no more 
repair teams are available. The final number of repair teams and the corresponding optimal repair 
sequence forms the optimal post-disaster recovery plan for the infrastructure system. This 
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decision framework is especially useful when the recovery plans of other infrastructure systems 
are available. This could happen when several infrastructure systems are controlled by one 
company and the information between different departments managing different infrastructure 
systems within the company can be easily exchanged.  
 
 
Figure 5-1. The game theory-based decision support framework of the IIRP problem with two decision makers. 
 
5.2. Recovery Time-based Performance Metrics for Infrastructure Systems 
As noted in section 2.5, numerous performance metrics for infrastructure systems were 
proposed in recent decades. However, most of the existing performance metrics for the 
infrastructure systems has one or several of the following issues. First, some metrics, such as 
reliability, vulnerability and robustness, are only suitable to measure the performance of 
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infrastructure system at one specific point in time, at the time of hazard occurrence. Second, 
some other metrics, such as connectivity, efficiency and accessibility, are used to measure the 
performance of the infrastructure system at one point in time during the recovery phase. Third, 
many of the metrics are designed for evaluating the functionality of one specific type of 
infrastructure system, such as water pressure for water system, traffic flow capacity and travel 
time or distance for transportation system, which makes them unsuitable for assessing 
performance of integrated network of several interdependent systems. Fourth, most of the 
metrics emphasize on measuring the functionality of infrastructure systems and fail to take the 
service disruptions to the end-users into consideration.  
This study introduces two recovery time-based performance metrics, the 
total-facility-recovery-waiting-time (TFRWT) and the total-service-restoration-waiting-time 
(TSRWT), both of which focus on the entire recovery phase of the infrastructure system as a 
whole and are applicable to any infrastructure systems. As indicated by the name, the TFRWT is 
defined as the total waiting time for all the damaged facilities in a system or in the integrated 
network to be completely repaired, and represents the efficiency of the recovery plan (how fast 
the damaged facilities could be repaired). On the other hand, the TSRWT is defined as the total 
waiting time for all the end-users in the network to fully get the infrastructure service back, and 
represents the effectiveness of the recovery plan (how fast the end-users could get all the service 
back). The two metrics can be expressed as: 
 
1
TFRWT
n
f
i
i
G T

                                  (5-1) 
 
1
TSRWT
m
e
j
j
G T

                                  (5-2)   
where G is the integrated infrastructure network or single infrastructure system; 
f
iT  is 
the waiting time for damaged facility i in network G to be completely repaired; 
e
jT  is the 
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waiting time for end-user j in network G until its service is fully restored; n and m represent the 
total number of damaged facilities and total number of end-users in network G, respectively.  
These performance metrics measure the overall performance of the entire infrastructure 
network over the whole post-disaster recovery phase, which makes them suitable to be used for 
comparing the effects of different multi-infrastructure system recovery plans. Besides, they are 
not specific to an infrastructure system and can be applied to any infrastructure systems, either 
separately or as an integrated network. They are also straightforward and easy to be computed.  
It is noted here that the proposed performance metrics can be further used to calculate 
other infrastructure network performance metrics, such as resilience. The resilience of an 
infrastructure network can be understood as the ability of the network to reduce the chance of a 
shock, to absorb a shock if it occurs and to recover quickly after a shock (Bruneau et al., 2003; 
Reed, Kapur & Christie, 2009; Sharma, Tabandeh & Gardoni, 2018). The value of resilience 
oftentimes is calculated from the recovery curve of the infrastructure network which depicts the 
performance of the network over time measured by a parameter. The resilience of an 
infrastructure network is oftentimes computed as the area under the recovery curve normalized 
by the time period in consideration (Reed, Kapur & Christie, 2009; He & Cha, 2018b). If the 
parameter used to plot the recovery curve is the number of facilities functioning in the network or 
the number of end-users with infrastructure service, and the time period in consideration is the 
recovery time, then the network resilience,  R G , can be calculated from the  TFRWT G  or 
 TSRWT G , respectively, as: 
     
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                     (5-3) 
where N is the total number of facilities in network G; M is the total number of end-users 
in network G; T is the network recovery time/service restoration time. An example relationship 
between the network resilience and the proposed recovery time-based infrastructure performance 
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metric TFRWT is depicted in Figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2. An example relationship between the network resilience and TFRWT. 
 
5.3. Case Study: Post-disaster Recovery Planning for Centerville Power and Water Systems 
The proposed decision support framework for IIRP problem is illustrated with a case study 
on post-disaster recovery planning of the interdependent power and water systems in Centerville 
Virtual Community subject to seismic hazard. The  TFRWT G  and  TSRWT G  are used as 
performance metrics for this decision-making. 
5.3.1. Centerville IIRP Problem Definition 
Centerville is a hypothetical community developed as a testbed for the NIST-Funded 
Center of Excellence for Community Resilience Planning to facilitate the research teams of 
performing various analyses and testing the methodologies (Ellingwood et al., 2016). Centerville 
is designed as a typical middle-class city, situated in a Midwestern State in the US with a size of 
approximately 8 km by 13 km and a population of about 50,000 (Ellingwood et al., 2016). Electric 
power and water supply systems are two of the most critical infrastructure systems in Centerville, 
since they are essential for the public health, welfare and proper functioning of most other civil 
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infrastructure systems. A schematic of integrated network of Centerville’s building zones, power 
and water systems is shown in Figure 5-3. The power system consists of 1 power plant, 1 
transmission substation, 1 main grid substation, 2 distribution substations, 3 sub-distribution 
substations, 4 transmission towers and 20 distribution poles, connected by transmission and 
distribution lines. The water system has 2 reservoirs, 3 pumping stations, 2 treatment stations, 2 
storage tanks connected by water pipelines. Only the large-diameter pipelines are explicitly 
represented in Figure 5-3, while the small diameter distribution lines are included in the demand 
nodes. Loss of electric power for the water reservoirs/wells, pumping stations or treatment stations 
would disrupt the water supply and lead to cascading infrastructure failures that may affect public 
safety and socioeconomic functioning of the community. The 12 building zones (classified into 
residential, commercial and industrial zones) in Centerville are modeled as one node in the 
network to reduce the size of the network. These 12 building zone nodes and 5 other critical 
facility nodes (including 1 school, 1 government building, 2 fire stations and 1 hospital) serve as 
the demand nodes of the power and water systems. The Centerville Department of Public Works is 
responsible for designing, construction, operating and maintaining the city’s power and water 
infrastructures (Ellingwood et al., 2016). Thus, they serve as a decision maker of this IIRP 
problem.  
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Figure 5-3. The integrated network model for Centerville’s power and water systems and end-user groups. 
 
The infrastructure systems and end-user facilities in Centerville are subjected to an 
earthquake with a magnitude of 6.5 and epicenter located approximately 25 km southwest of the 
city. The PGA, PGV and PGD at different locations in Centerville were obtained from the ground 
motion prediction equations by Fernandez and Rix (2006). The statistics of the ground motion 
intensities at different infrastructure facility or end-user facility locations in Centerville is 
summarized in Table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2. The statistics of the PGA, PGV and PGD in Centerville under the scenario earthquake hazard. 
  PGA (g) PGV (cm/s) PGD (cm) 
Mean 0.2742 17.0057 4.3116 
Standard deviation 0.0149 1.5033 0.4261 
Maximum 0.3019 19.8892 5.1379 
Minimum 0.2451 14.1369 3.5058 
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The power and water systems in Centerville suffers severe damages after the earthquake. 
The expected physical damage level of the infrastructure facilities was estimated using the 
probability of damage state curves in HAZUS-MH and the damage level definitions for damage 
states in ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 1985; FEMA, 2003). According to ATC-13, a 
facility with damage level greater than 0.1 represents the facility suffering significant damage that 
warranting repair. Based on this ATC’s damage level definition, all the power plants, power 
substations, water reservoirs/wells and water pumping stations in Centerville are determined to 
suffer the damage levels that warranting repair. The vulnerability of the power transmission and 
distribution lines under earthquake hazard is found to be negligible under the scenario earthquake, 
and consequently does not need repair (Shinozuka et al., 2007; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). The 
water pipeline damage under earthquake hazard is categorized as either leaks or breaks, the 
number of which follows Poisson distribution with the mean value setting to be the repair rate 
multiplying by pipe length (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2008; Guidotti et al., 2016). In this case study, 
the expected number of damage for each water pipeline was calculated with the HAZUS-MH 
repair rate model (FEMA, 2003) and none of the pipelines suffers any leak or break, consequently 
does not require any repair work. In summary, there are 8 out of 32 power system facilities and 5 
out of 9 water system facilities in Centerville suffer different levels of damages and need repair 
after the earthquake hazard. The structural types, and initial damage states and damage levels for 
all types of infrastructure facilities in Centerville are summarized in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3. Summary of structural types, and initial damage states and damage levels for all types of infrastructure facilities in 
Centerville. 
Node No. Facility type Structural type* Damage state** 
Expected damage 
level 
Require 
repair 
PP1 Power plant EPP3 Moderate 0.2665 Yes 
PS1 Power substation ESS5 Heavy 0.5291 Yes 
PS2 Power substation ESS3 Heavy 0.3975 Yes 
PS3 Power substation ESS1 Moderate 0.2444 Yes 
PS4 Power substation ESS1 Moderate 0.2478 Yes 
PS5 Power substation ESS1 Moderate 0.2657 Yes 
PS6 Power substation ESS1 Moderate 0.2323 Yes 
PS7 Power substation ESS1 Moderate 0.2030 Yes 
WR1 Water reservoir / well PWE1 Moderate 0.1446 Yes 
WR2 Water reservoir / well PWE1 Moderate 0.1754 Yes 
WP1 Water pumping station PPP3 Moderate 0.1408 Yes 
WP2 Water pumping station PPP3 Moderate 0.1850 Yes 
WP3 Water pumping station PPP3 Moderate 0.1706 Yes 
WT1 Water treatment station PWT3 Light 0.0406 No 
WT2 Water treatment station PWT3 Light 0.0240 No 
WS1 Water storage tank PST5 Light 0.0595 No 
WS2 Water storage tank PST5 Light 0.0789 No 
* The structural type classification is the same as in HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 2003). 
** The damage state classification is the same as in ATC-13 (Applied Technology Council, 1985). 
 
The Centerville Department of Public Works (CDPW) is in charge of the post-earthquake 
recovery works of Centerville’s power and water infrastructures. The overall objective of the 
CDPW is to repair the damaged infrastructure network and restore the utility service to all the 
end-users as fast as possible, since both the CDPW and the end-users in Centerville will suffer 
service interruption cost accumulated as days go by (Sullivan, Vardell & Johnson, 1997). Detailed 
decision contexts for this case study are as follows. It is assumed that there are 2 power 
infrastructure repair teams and 1 water infrastructure repair team in Centerville that are 
immediately available after the earthquake event. Also, three more repair teams for each of the 
power and water systems are located in the city adjacent to Centerville community, which could 
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reach the damaged facility sites in Centerville to support the post-disaster recovery a day after, if 
needed. Asking the repair teams in the adjacent city to aid the post-disaster recovery for 
Centerville infrastructure systems requires extra cost and negotiation of the CDPW. However, the 
CDPW has the policy of restoring the utility service within 2 weeks (14 days) after a disruption 
event. Thus, each of the heads of the power sector and the water sector makes a decision on 
recovery plan, which could minimize the service disruption time while using as less outside repair 
teams as possible while meeting the policy requirement. Since both of the power and water sectors 
are in the CDPW, it is assumed that repair plans of each utility system are shared with the other 
sector. A summary of the decision makers, decision objective, tasks, constraints and decision 
criteria of the IIRP problem for Centerville infrastructure recovery planning case study is shown in 
Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-4. A summary of the IIRP problem for Centerville infrastructure recovery planning case study. 
Decision makers 
(i) Power sector head for the power system and (ii) water sector head for the water system, 
both within the CDPW. 
Objective for each 
decision maker 
Repair the damaged infrastructure system and restore the utility service to all the end-users 
as fast as possible. 
Tasks for each 
decision maker 
(i) Determine the number of repair teams sent to the damaged facility site; 
(ii) Determine the assignment and scheduling of the repair teams to repair all the 
damaged infrastructure facilities. 
Constraints for each 
decision maker 
(i) Limited number of repair teams: 2 local + 3 outside repair teams available for 
power system, and 1 local + 3 outside repair teams available for water system. 
(ii) Service restoration time for all the end-users should be within 2 weeks (14 
days). 
Decision criteria TFRWT or TSRWT, cost 
 
The IIRP problem defined as in Table 5-4 is solved using the proposed decision support 
framework shown in Figure 5-1. In this analysis, the post-disaster recovery of the interdependent 
power and water systems in Centerville is simulated for different repair sequences to determine the 
optimal repair sequence given a certain number of repair teams (step ① in Figure 5-1). A desired 
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model to accomplish this task is one that could simulate the performance of the infrastructure 
network at both the facility and system levels, and considering the dependency relationships 
between the infrastructure facilities within and across systems. The DIN model proposed in this 
research has the above-mentioned properties and is chosen to model the post-disaster recovery of 
the Centerville infrastructure network for this case study.  
5.3.2. Infrastructure Recovery Planning Results 
As the first step, all possible repair sequences to repair 8 damaged power facilities or 5 
damaged water facilities in Centerville given 2 local power system repair teams and 1 local water 
system repair team are first enumerated using permutation, then the optimal repair sequence is 
determined based on one of the performance metrics, TFRWT and TSRWT. Using TSRWT as the 
performance metric, the optimal repair sequence under this constraint yield the service restoration 
time of 25 days. Since the 25 days service restoration time for all end-users exceeds the acceptable 
performance level (14 days), and it is the recovery of damaged power system facilities that drags 
the recovery process down, one more power system repair team was added to accelerate the 
post-disaster recovery. This process is repeated until the TSRWP could not be improved further, 
or the service restoration time reaches to 14 days, or no more repair teams are available. The 
intermediate optimal repair sequences obtained for the constraints of the number of recovery team 
varying through the optimization process are shown in Figure 5-4.      
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Figure 5-4. The optimization process of the repair sequences for Centerville utility systems. 
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It can be learned from Figure 5-4 that if only 2 local power repair teams and 1 local water 
repair team are used (iteration 1), the service restoration time for all end-users is 25 days, with 
TSRWT equals to 395 days for all 17 end-user groups under the optimal repair sequence. If one 
more power repair team is added (iteration 2), the service restoration time could be reduced to 22 
days, with TSRWT equals to 365 days under the optimal repair sequence. In this scenario, the 
recovery of the water system drags the utility service restoration time down, so one more water 
repair team is added (iteration 3). It could reduce the utility service restoration time for all 
end-users to 17 days with 96 days of decrease in TSRWT (i.e. 365 days – 269 days = 96 days), 
which is a significant improvement. However, the service restoration time still does not meet the 
policy requirement of less than 14 days, and it’s attributed to the slow recovery of the power 
system, so one more power system repair team is added (iteration 4). Under this scenario, the 
service restoration time finally drops to 13 days and the TSRWT reduced to 205 days. Although 
the service restoration time in this scenario already meet the policy requirement, the recovery of 
the infrastructure network could still be improved if one more power repair team is added 
(iteration 5). Adding this 5th power repair team could reduce the service restoration time by 1 day 
to 12 days and reduce the TSRWT from 205 days to 204 days.  
It’s noted here that the optimal repair sequence under the 5 power repair teams and 2 
water repair teams scenario (iteration 5) is indeed the “global optimal” solution for this case 
study IIRP problem, since the service restoration time for power or water system could not be 
reduced any further. The only power transmission substation (PS1) directly connected to the only 
power plant (PP1) in Centerville suffers most severe damage and takes the longest time to 
recover. Even though the other power or water system facilities could be physically repaired 
within the 12th day, they have to wait until the recovery of PS1 to restore their services. This 
special situation also highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between 
different infrastructure systems when making the post-disaster recovery plan. If the decision 
maker of the water system is not informed of the recovery plan of the power system on which it 
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depends, the decision maker would likely choose to add another water repair team to reduce the 
water facility recovery time from 12 days to 10 days. However, if the decision maker of the 
water system is aware that the power service cannot be restored until the 12th day, this extra 
water repair team will not be needed since no improvement of the water service restoration time 
(i.e. benefits) can be achieved by hiring another repair team (i.e. costs). 
Although the iteration 5 indeed provide the global optimum, it is noted that the reduction 
in TSRWT from iteration 4 is only 1 day, which means only one end-user group (i.e. the 
industrial building zone on the South of Centerville) will benefit from this improvement and the 
benefit is only 1 day. In this case, cost can be adopted as an additional decision criterion to help 
deciding whether the 5th power repair team added in iteration 5 is needed. Then, the head of the 
power sector weighs the costs and benefits before making the decision. In this study, we assume 
that the benefits of restoring the power service one day earlier to that end-user group outweighs 
its cost of hiring another repair team, thus the optimal repair sequence under the 5 power repair 
teams and 2 water repair teams scenario is adopted as the optimal post-disaster recovery plan for 
the utility network in Centerville.  
Another insight that could be learned from this case study is that different optimal repair 
sequences would be obtained if different performance metrics and corresponding decision 
criteria are used. Figure 5-5 shows two optimal repair sequences for Centerville utility systems 
using 5 power repair teams and 2 water repair teams measured by TSRWT or TFRWT. If the 
decision makers from the infrastructure systems care most about the service restoration time for 
the end-users, the TSRWT or service restoration time for all end-users would be used as the 
performance metric. The repair sequence that could yield the lowest TSRWT or minimum service 
restoration time for all end-users is the one that is optimum, just like the repair sequence shown on 
the left side of Figure 5-5. Under this decision criterion, the facilities that serve larger percentage 
of the end-users would be repaired first, such as PP1, PS1, PS2, WR1 and WR2 in this study, even 
though some of these facilities take a much longer time to be repaired. On the other hand, if the 
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number of damaged facilities repaired within a certain period of time is used to measure the 
efficiency of the post-disaster recovery, then the decision makers from the infrastructure systems 
would choose TFRWT as the performance metric and the repair sequence which yields the 
minimum TFRWT under the same constraints is the global optimal solution, just like the one 
shown on the right hand side of Figure 5-5. In this scenario, the facilities that take the shortest time 
to recover would be repaired first, such as PS6, PS7, WP1, WP2 and WP3 in this study. In this case, 
the TFRWT could be reduced from 117 days to 83 days, but the TSRWT and service restoration 
time for all end-users both increases significantly (i.e. 51 days longer for TSRWT and 3 days 
longer for service restoration time of all end-users). This example highlights the importance of 
choosing proper performance metrics and decision criteria before planning the post-disaster 
recovery of damaged infrastructure systems. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Optimal repair sequences for Centerville utility systems using 5 power repair teams and 2 water repair 
teams measured by TSRWT or TFRWT. 
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5.4. Closure 
This chapter introduced the Interdependent Infrastructure Recovery Planning (IIRP) 
problem to guide the risk-informed decision-making for post-disaster recovery planning. Solving 
the IIRP problem can assist the decision makers of infrastructure systems in determining the 
optimal assignment and scheduling of their repair teams during the post-disaster recovery phase 
by considering the recovery plan of its dependent infrastructure systems. The objective, decision 
makers, applicable phase, tasks, constraints and decision criteria of the IIRP problem are clearly 
defined. A game theory-based decision framework to solve the IIRP problem is proposed, which 
can be applied to any interdependent infrastructure systems under any types of disruptive events. 
Two recovery time-based infrastructure performance metrics, the total-facility-recovery 
-waiting-time (TFRWT) and the total-service-restoration-waiting-time (TSRWT) were proposed 
to facilitate the comparison of different post-disaster recovery plans. The TFRWT could evaluate 
the efficiency of a recovery plan while TSRWT focuses on the effectiveness of the recovery plan. 
These two performance metrics measure the overall performance of individual infrastructure 
systems or the integrated infrastructure network over the entire post-disaster recovery phase, and 
are straightforward to understand and easy to compute.  
The proposed IIRP decision support framework and the recovery time-based performance 
metrics were illustrated with a case study of planning the post-disaster recovery of the 
interdependent power and water systems in Centerville Virtual Community after a scenario 
earthquake hazard. The case study demonstrates that the presented IIRP decision support 
framework can provide detailed repair assignment and scheduling for each repair team and 
individual damaged infrastructure facilities, which can be directly used for the decision makers 
of the infrastructure systems to plan the post-disaster recovery. In addition, the results of the case 
study highlight the importance of considering the interdependencies between different 
infrastructure systems when planning the post-disaster recovery of individual systems. Besides, 
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choosing the proper performance measurements and decision criteria before making the 
post-disaster recovery plans is crucial since different performance measures or decision criteria 
would lead to different results. 
Although providing detailed post-disaster recovery planning assignments and scheduling 
results on each repair team and damaged infrastructure facility over the entire post-disaster 
recovery phase is helpful, the size of the problem could become extremely huge when many 
repair teams and damaged facilities are under consideration. Therefore, it’s necessary to develop 
more efficient algorithms or use heuristic approaches to solve the IIRP problem with good 
enough (approximate) solutions under reasonable amount of time. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1. Summary and Conclusions 
Natural and manmade disasters cause huge damages and economic losses each year. 
Although the hazard occurrence is unavoidable, the damages and losses could be reduced by 
improving the resilience of infrastructure systems. Nowadays, the infrastructure systems are 
interdependent upon each other. The normal operation of a facility in one system usually depends 
on several other facilities in other systems for product input and information sharing. However, 
when disaster happens, the dependencies among infrastructure facilities would aggravate the 
initial damage caused by the disasters and lead to cascading failures. Therefore, it is important to 
consider the dependencies among infrastructure facilities in different systems when modeling the 
damage and recovery of infrastructure systems under disruptive events for community resilience 
planning. The literature review on disaster risk management of infrastructure systems reveals that: 
(1) although there exists extensive literatures on modeling the recovery and resilience of 
infrastructure systems under disruptive events, the interdependencies between facilities in 
different infrastructure systems are not very well incorporated in the models; (2) only few studies 
exists on developing decision frameworks to support communities’ pre-disaster risk mitigation 
and post-disaster recovery planning for interdependent infrastructure systems. Therefore, the 
objective of this research is to develop a model which can simulate the damage and recovery of 
the interdependent infrastructure systems under disruptive events and proposed decision 
frameworks to better support the community’s pre-disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster 
recovery planning.  
The specific summary and conclusions from Chapter 3~5 are given below: 
(1) Model development: the DIN model is proposed in this study to simulate the damage 
and recovery of the interdependent infrastructure systems after disruptive events. It 
has the following four features: 
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 Dynamic: the DIN can model the post-disaster performance of the infrastructure 
facilities, systems and the integrated network over time following a disruptive 
event. 
 Integrated: the critical facilities in different infrastructure systems and the 
end-users are modeled in a unified network, where nodes represent infrastructure 
facilities and end-users while the links represent dependency relationships among 
them. 
 Probabilistic: the uncertainties in some of the modeling parameters are captured 
by probabilistic models. 
 Interdependent: the DIN model can incorporate physical, cyber and geospatial 
interdependencies at different levels, including: system-to-system level, 
system-to-facility level and facility-to-facility level.  
(2) Model comparison: the DIN model is compared with two conventional infrastructure 
recovery models, one with no interdependency considered, and the other one with only 
system-level interdependencies considered. The comparative study suggests that the 
recovery time would be underestimated if no interdependency is considered, or be 
overestimated if only system-level interdependency is considered, both of which would 
lead to poorly informed decisions for community resilience planning.  
(3) Model validation: the DIN model is validated through simulating the recovery of the 
interdependent power, water and cellular systems of Galveston City, Texas after 
Hurricane Ike (2008). The simulated power system recovery time is comparable to the 
actual time, which demonstrates that the proposed DIN model can produce comparable 
results to physical reality. 
(4) Model application to guide pre-disaster risk mitigation decision-making: the IIRM 
decision problem is proposed with the objective of reducing the socioeconomic 
impact when future hazard occurs through improving the resilience of the 
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interdependent infrastructure network. The objective, decision makers, constraints 
and some common strategies are clearly identified. A four-stage decision framework 
to solve the IIRM problem is also presented. One novel contribution of this decision 
framework is that it considers the pre-decision processing step, which prioritizes the 
infrastructure facilities in different systems for risk mitigation investment and 
intervention. 
(5) Model application to guide post-disaster recovery planning decision-making: the 
IIRP decision problem is proposed which aims at repairing the damaged infrastructure 
network and restore the service to the end-users as efficiently and/or effectively as 
possible after the disaster. The IIRP problem can be solved by optimizing the 
assignment and scheduling of the repair teams for an infrastructure system with 
considering the repair plan of the other infrastructure systems during the post-disaster 
recovery phase. Key characteristics of the IIRP problem, such as objective, decision 
makers, constraints and example decision criteria are clearly identified. A game 
theory-based IIRP decision framework is presented. Two recovery time-based 
performance metrics, the total facility recovery waiting time and total service 
restoration waiting time are introduced and applied to evaluate the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the post-disaster recovery plan. 
It is noted that the proposed DIN model and two decision frameworks are general and can 
be applied to any infrastructure systems under any types of hazards. 
6.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
Disaster risk management of interdependent infrastructure systems for community 
resilience planning is a highly complex topic. The current understanding of the post-disaster 
infrastructure performance and the ways to improve community disaster resilience still remain 
limited. This section identified some future research directions in the course of the research 
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conducted in this dissertation to advance current practices and knowledge: 
(1) At this point, the damage and recovery models for physical infrastructure, building 
environment, social and economic systems are mostly developed independently. 
Some advanced methods are needed to integrate the post-disaster infrastructure 
performance with the building environment and associated social and economic 
systems to better support the community resilience planning. There is a need for 
studies to investigate the interdependencies between the physical, social and 
economic systems following a hazard event and to evaluate how they affect the 
community resilience as a whole.  
(2) Due to security consideration, some of the location or post-disaster performance data 
for critical infrastructure systems are very hard to obtain, which makes it difficult to 
quantify some of the modeling parameters. The DIN model needs to be further 
calibrated and validated if more data become available in the future. 
(3) Optimizing the post-disaster infrastructure recovery scheduling and assessment plan 
to facilitate emergency response is critical to help the affected communities to build 
back faster and better. However, the size of the problem could become extremely 
huge when many repair teams and damaged facilities are under consideration. This 
would lead to an extremely long time to solve the optimization problem, which is not 
realistic during the post-disaster emergency response phase. Therefore, it’s necessary 
to develop more efficient algorithms or use heuristic approaches to solve the 
post-disaster recovery planning problem with good enough (approximate) solutions 
under reasonable amount of time. 
(4) Currently, most of the infrastructure recovery modeling and disaster risk management 
decision-making studies are still at the research and development phase. There is a 
need to develop risk-informed end-user tools to better guide the decision makers to 
understand the infrastructure performance, its interactions with the building 
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environment, social and economic systems, and explore different pre-disaster risk 
mitigation or post-disaster recovery strategies to better support community resilience 
investment and planning. 
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